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Abstract
This thesis contributes to the study of the role of some identified obstacles to delay the process
of liberalisation and integration of European electricity markets and to impede the achievement
of its full benefits, namely increase efficiency and, ultimately, to pass on this efficiency gains to
final consumers by lowering prices of electricity.
Chapter 1 is a description and analysis of the progress made on European liberalisation
and integration of electricity markets, identifying some of the main obstacles found on the path
to achieve the Single European Market for electricity and solutions proposed to avoid them,
either from the perspective of the EC and from the perspective of economic literature. The
concerns considered for this review are related with the main focus of the thesis, market power
and concentration. The solutions found on the literature to avoid these obstacles are related
with the search for the best market design to be adopted in the Single Electricity Market. Since
the Nordic countries constitute an integrated market considered as a success, this example is
briefly explained in order to understand which are the main features of this success.
The second chapter presents a simulation for the integration of the Iberian wholesale elec-
tricity market (MIBEL) in order to study how the exercise of market power will evolve with
regional full integration. Following Borenstein and Bushnell (1999), we compare simulated mar-
ket outcomes on four days of 2004, with no integration and with full integration. The presence
of market power is measured using the Lerner Index. The simulation results allow us to con-
clude that, as expected, market power is lower after full integration. However, even after full
integration, market power is still a feature of the market. Therefore, the full benefits of liber-
alisation and integration are not seized by the consumers, since wholesale prices persist to be
higher than the marginal costs. The market participants with more benefits are the Portuguese,
both consumers and the incumbent firm.
The third chapter's purpose is to assess econometrically the impact on final consumer of
mergers between electricity generators and natural gas suppliers. We find evidence that a merger
of this type will increase final price of electricity in the market where it occurs. Moreover, as a
consequence of the EOn-Rurhas merger German household consumers pay more 1.8% for the
electricity and, in Finland, the Nest-Ivo merger caused an increase of around 2% on prices for
household consumers. The answer to the question "should household consumers be concerned
if a cross sectorial merger happens" seems to be yes, due to the detrimental effects on final
prices.
x
Introduction
Since the late 1980s, a wave of reforms has transformed the market organisation of some in-
frastructure industries all over the world. Electricity was one of the first utilities to be chosen
for reestructuring and European countries follow this trend.
The EU reform of the electricity market was implemented by the enforcement of several
Directives and Regulations that started with Directive 96/92/EC. From this first Directive to
the more recent Third Energy market package (Directive 2009/72/EC), the objectives are to
establish a competitive, secure and transparent EU Single electricity market. As ultimate goal,
efficiency should be achieved and it should be ensured that European consumers benefit from
these efficiency gains, by paying less for their electricity.
In throughout the past years, competition implementation has been characterized by prob-
lems or obstacles associated with drawbacks and slow progress. The contribution of this thesis
is to study whether or not the ultimate aims of liberalisation and integration process in Europe
is fully achieved, despite the existence of obstacles. More precisely, with this purpose, this
thesis can be divided into two parts.
In the first part, that consists in chapter 1, it is discussed the progress on Single European
energy market, specifically on electricity markets. This evolution is analysed in the perspective
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of economic literature. In the second part of the chapter, some obstacles and concerns, identified
by the EC and also by the economic research, are reviewed. The concerns mentioned are related
with the focus of the second part of the thesis, namely market power and concentration. The
purpose of this review is not only to explain each obstacle but also to describe the solutions
presented in economic research about these subjects. In the last years, with the recognition that
the restructuring process in European electricity markets was in slow path, the EC proposed
a bottom-up regional approach of liberalisation and integration. The idea of starting from
regional integrations between countries with similar features and already converging to move
on to the IEM is a solution to boost the introduction of competition and the integration in
electricity markets. With this perspective, European regions and countries, as well as the EC
are concerned about choosing the best market design in order to achieve their goal as soon as
possible. In fact, the solutions searched for the obstacles and concerns mentioned are, in essence,
the search for the best features to promote competition and efficiency. With this purpose, the
Nordic integrated market, as the first common inter-country market with recognised success,
may be the source of information about the best features of the market to achieve the best
outcome. The first part of the thesis closes with the answer to this point.
In the second part of the thesis, the approach is eminently more empirical. In the last
two chapters, the intention is to assess the consequences on prices of two identified problems:
the presence of market power and the existence of mergers between natural gas suppliers and
electricity generators.
In chapter 2, the focus is on the effect of regional integration of electricity markets on the
exercise of market power. The exercise of market power is a feature of electricity markets and is
pointed out as one of the main reasons for the persistence of high prices, even after liberalisation.
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The achievement of a Single European market may help to, at least, diminish this problem. In
the path to the creation of an Internal Market, the European Commission recognised the main
role of regional integrated markets. Therefore, we use the integrated Iberian market (MIBEL)
as a experimental field to infer the market power evolution as a result of integration.
With this framework, following Borenstein and Bushnell (1999), we present a simulation
of the MIBEL. The main idea is the comparison of Portugal and Spain in four chosen days
in a particular year (2004), considering two realities: no integration and full integration. The
new market is assumed to be an oligopolistic (Cournot) market with a competitive fringe. To
infer market power we use the Lerner Index and we compare the Cournot solution with the
perfectly competitive outcome, before and after integration. From the simulation results, there
is evidence that despite the lower Lerner Index after integration, compared with before, there
is still exercise of market power by the firms, either on peak and off peak periods. Based on
estimated market outcomes, it is possible to conclude also that the country that takes more
benefits from the MIBEL is Portugal, either by the decrease of prices, that can be passed on
to consumers, and the increase of the market share of the biggest incumbent firm. Even if at
lower extent, Spain also takes advantages from the integration.
Finally, in the main last chapter, the target is to assess the effect of mergers between
electricity generators and natural gas suppliers on electricity prices for household consumers.
Liberalisation of energy markets created the opportunity for these cross-sectional mergers in
Europe. Since natural gas is one of the main sources for electricity generator, these mergers
attracted special attention from regulators and general public. In order to achieve the purpose,
it was studied if household prices in European countries are determined by the existence of
these mergers and if consumers should be concerned with this evolution of prices. The signal
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for concern is if the vertical integration raises the final prices of electricity.
Our study refers to all gas-electricity mergers that occurred in European markets between
1997 and 2007. We use a reduced form model for the determinants of prices and we assume, in
our empirical approach that our problem can be seen as a case of the evaluation literature.
We start from considering that all mergers of these type are similar, thus, have similar effects
in all countries. However, recognising that all merger processes are different and that the market
where it occurs is also different, we also consider each merger as a different happening. These
two ways of classifying the merger determine different approaches in this chapter.
The results from this chapter are threefold. First, we found that the existence of a vertical
merger between an electricity generator and a natural gas supplier seems to increase in average
the final price of electricity for household consumers on markets where it occurs. The compari-
son of prices before and after the merger for each country where it occurs allows to conclude for
the negative impact of these events on market outcome. Second, we found evidence that any
household consumer in Germany pays a price for their electricity 1.8% higher because there
was the merger between EOn and Ruhrgas. Third, even in Finland, where the merger was
not controversial, because it involved public firms, the effect on prices was equally detrimental
to consumers. Household prices after the merger are around 2% higher than they would be
without the merger between IVO and NESTE.
Liberalisation and integration of the European market is a continuing process and remains
a work in progress, therefore many of the questions mentioned in our research will continue to
pose other different challenges in the future for further research on the topic.
XIV
Chapter 1
Single European Energy Market:
progress and some concerns
As the center of our research we need to characterize first the electricity, and then the European
Electricity market and the restructuring process. If the first task is simple due to the well known
special features of the good and its consequences, the second task is more complex. It is not
simple to describe the Single European energy market, starting from the assumption that there
is one.
This first chapter offers a detailed description and analysis of the competitive and regula-
tory framework of the European energy market, with particular concern about the economic
view of all process of liberalisation, which involves deregulation on the one hand, and market
integration, on the other hand. Since the beginning, electricity markets had an essential role,
because it was the starting point for the restructuring of energy industries and it has been the
market who determined the path for all the remaining energy markets, such as gas or carbon
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storage. Therefore, we will focus our study on this market and its progress after restructuring.
Despite the trend being forward increased liberalisation and integration, there are several
obstacles that made and are still making the European process a complex and difficult task.
These obstacles were identified by the EC in several reports on the progress of implementation
of the Internal electricity market and by the economic literature.
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section will describe the special characteristics
of electricity as a good and as a market. These features help to understand why the focus
of our research should be studied differently from other markets. Section 2 focuses on the
implementation process and explains briefly the main provisions of the European electricity
directives. The approach is to give an economic view of all the process, mentioning how economic
researchers evaluated the last 20 years of reforms.
In the following section we discuss some barriers and problems mentioned as responsible for
slowing down the liberalisation and integration of electricity markets in the EU. This chapter
does not intend, by any means, to cover all issues on the introduction of competition in European
electricity markets or to be exhaustive about all the empirical economic literature (when is
available) on the topics, but instead, to give an economic approach of these issues. The topics
chosen are related with the subject of the following chapters. The main finding of this review
is that the solutions to avoid the obstacles are a search for a "perfect" market design in order
to boost competition and liberalisation.
Finally, in the last section we describe the main features that justify the achievement of the
first integrated international market in Europe, the Nordic market, in order to access if this
example may be applied to other regional integrated areas in Europe in order to improve the
restructuring process. The introduction of a new intermediate stage - the regional approach
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- in the path to the SEM (Single European market) raises the importance of success for all
the regional initiatives of integration in Europe, namely the Iberian Integrated market. There-
fore, finding if the Nordic experience can be replicated is very important for all the European
integration process.
1.1 Special features of electricity
Electricity has an unusual set of physical and economic characteristics that affect the way it
is traded and used and make different and complex any intervention or study. Liberalisation
and integration was implemented in Europe based on the belief that electricity could become
a commodity to be bought and sold in a market, just like any other. However, the attributes
that make electricity unique and relevant to study should be considered into the successful
design of a competitive market (Green, 2001). In consequence, to analyse electricity market
deregulation and integration, as any other aspect of this market, is very important to understand
its particularities.
Firstly, from the point of view of consumers, electricity is a homogenous product. It does
not have any particular feature that differentiates it, from consumers' perspective. After a
watt-hour being generated it can be used in everything indistinctly. Secondly, the uneven
distribution of demand over time (daily and seasonal fluctuations) leads to the requirement of
having a significant capacity reserved instantaneously or on short time basis.
Thirdly, short run demand is highly inelastic and there are no substitutes for it. This means
that changes in prices have little influence on consumption and spot electricity prices are very
volatile. Fourthly, unlike other goods, electricity is nonstorable and demand must be cleared
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with production from generating capacity available to the network at exactly the same time
that electricity is consumed.
Fifthly, from the point of view of generators, production costs are heterogeneous depending
on the technology and energy sources used. Supply of electricity is partly characterized by a
gradually increasing marginal cost function. When all available generating units are producing
at their maximum capacity, no increase is possible in the short term. As a result, the generation
marginal cost curve ends with a perfectly inelastic section. And finally, with generators and all
end-users spatially dispersed, the network connecting all players in the market plays an essential
role in this market.
The vertical structure of the electricity sector also differentiates it from other industries.
Four stages can be identified in the activities of the electricity industry: generation, transmis-
sion, distribution and supply. In the first stage, electricity is generated in power stations. The
second stage is transmission and the third stage is distribution, taking electricity from trans-
mission grid and distributing it at lower voltages to consumers. The final stage is supply, which
covers metering the customers' demands, billing them, collecting payment and using it to pay
for the other stages involved.
Partly due to the characteristics described above, electricity industry has been, since the
Second World War, organised as an integrated, state owned monopoly in all countries, namely
in Europe. Moreover, unlike what occurred in some industries, liberalisation in the electricity
sector was introduced only in some segments. Generation and supply were the first stages to
be deregulated and liberalised. Transmission and distribution are still highly regulated.
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1.2 Restructuring European electricity market: liberalisation
and integration
At best, since the end of 1980's, it was clear for European countries that a competitive, reliable
and sustainable electricity sector is essential for more growth and competitiveness. Deregulation
and introduction of competition on electricity market is a precondition to achieve those aims.
Liberalisation is defined as the abolition of the rights of monopolies and the introduction of
competition in a market. Those rights gave, for some time, protection against competition to
some European energy monopolies.
Until the 90's, although each country had its own market structure, some features were
common to all: there were few main players on the entire electricity chain and in some cases
there was only one firm in each market producing and also supplying electricity to the final
consumers.
Energy liberalisation in general, and in particular of the electricity industry, was not a
new phenomenon in the world. In many other countries outside Continental Europe (United
States, United Kingdom, Norway or Japan) similar processes took place aimed at liberalising
markets and opening them up to more competition. However, liberalisation in the EU is
considered as the world's most extensive cross-jurisdiction reform programme (Jamasb and
Pollitt, 2005). Moreover, the European experience involves either liberalisation of electricity
markets in Member States and integration of the national markets into a single European
market for energy.
Although, the reasons for opening the markets to competition vary from country to country,
the main goals are to improve efficiency, create a more competitive energy-producing industry,
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ensure security of supply and as an ultimate aim to offer lower electricity prices to final con-
sumers.
Some economic factors were relevant for the introduction of competition on European mar-
kets. The opportunities created for new entrants due to technological development made it
possible. New technologies, such as gas turbines for generation, had provide the opportunity
to decentralise electricity generation without any additional losses, comparing with the former
centralized system. All these changes and the (even) slow increasing physical connection be-
tween European countries, started the discussion in favour of liberalisation. However, it should
be mentioned that if was not only the evolution of the market but also some external pressures,
as political decisions (Green, 2006) that determined the liberalisation process in Europe.
The point of departure for the defence of the liberalisation was the acceptance of new
technical findings and economic studies disproving the old belief that the whole electric industry
was a natural monopoly. The motivations that justified the existence of no competition on the
market in the past are not valid anymore.
The former existence of monopolies in electricity was justified by the recognised presence
of economies of scale along the entire range of the demand. Economies of scale were formerly
achieved due to management only by one firm of all electricity chain from the electricity pro-
duction to customer service and supply. However, this explanation could not be applied to
the European electricity market considered as an (whole) internal market where each national
utility faces, not the local demand but the aggregation of the demands from different countries.
Therefore, one of the arguments that was used to support no competition was being denied by
reality.
Another main criticism that was used to justify liberalisation was the persistence of high
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prices associated with high costs and a low service level due to inefficiency of electricity supply.
Since the EU had (and has) an important role on global trade and European firms compete with
other manufacturers and service-providers from all over the world, this evolution of prices was
not beneficial. Since energy is one of the main inputs, it is difficult to improve competitiveness
without liberalising the sector.
Finally, the European countries agreed that liberalisation of electricity markets was not
only economically justified and needed, but also imposed as a step for the full achievement
of the identity of European integration. The European single market programme aimed at
removing all physical, legal and fiscal obstacles between Member States in order to obtain the
free movement of goods, services, capitals and labour in the EU. Since electricity is a good (even
if it is a special one) it should be considered also as a part of the free movement implemented
by the European integration.
Several advantages were expected from the decision of liberalising and creating an internal
market for electricity. The creation of an internal market is expected to increase competition as a
result of major interconnection capacity and hence a reduction in the possible negative effects of
high concentration at national and regional levels. All users would be able to purchase electricity
on an equal basis, thus avoiding distortions of competition and general cross-subsidisation issues.
Furthermore, as a result of greater interconnection, the single energy market would also
improve security of supply due to the increase on the available resources in the event of crisis
and because it decreases the need for spare capacity, thus enhances efficiency. In this way, the
risk of black-outs will diminish, with more capacity available across Europe, or in the event of
one it will be more easily overcome due to solidarity reinforced among Member States. The
lower level of spare capacity for each country will lead to less costly power plants and to the
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use of cheaper inframarginal power plants available at times of peak demand. The ultimate
consequence will be lowering prices for consumers and improving quality of service.
After several years of internal debates, the EU started a restructuring process based on
the concept of market liberalisation and integration. Even though deregulation on electricity
market started as an end in itself and had increased close to the long term objective of achieving
the single European energy market as it can be seen in the European Directives.
The set of European legislation (listed in Table 1.1) is a reflex of lessons taken from other
experiences around the world in the necessary measures to achieve a competitive electricity
market. The Directives included, gradually (but not by this order), the framework for: (a) sector
restructuring, (b) introduction of competition in wholesale generation and retail supply, (c)
incentive regulation of transmission and distribution networks, (d) establishing an independent
regulator and (e) privatisation (Newbery, 2002).
Table 1.1
Relevant EU directives and regulations in electricity
"Package" Date Denomination Main concern
First 119Dec1996 Directive 96/92/EC common rules for the internal market
Second Directive 2003/54/EC common rules for the internal market
26 June 2003
Regulation (Ee) no 1228/2003 conditions for access to the network for
cross-border exchanges
Third Directive 2009/72/EC Common rules for the internal market
13 Nov 2003 Commission Decision 2003/796/EC establishing the European Regulators
Group for Electricity and gas
13 Julho 2009
Regulati on (Ee) no 714/2009
conditions for access tot he network for
cros s-border exchanges
establishing na agency for the
cooperation of energy regulators (ACER)
Regulation (Ee) no 713/2010
Source: European Commission, DG Energy
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The crucial moment for the liberalisation process was February of 1997 with the adoption of
the ED Electricity Directive 96/92. The main driving force for this resolution was the European
Commission's expectation that "market forces produce a better allocation of resources and
greater effectiveness in the supply of services" (EC, 1996, 5).
This First Directive set the minimum conditions under which competition could be devel-
oped. One of the main issues set for the new market structure by the Directive was the openness
of generation and retail of electricity to new competitors and the continuation of the infrastruc-
ture (transmission and distribution) as a monopoly business being regulated by independent
entities. In addition, it determined that the access to transmission and distribution should be
guaranteed to all market participants at nondiscriminatory prices.
A minimal requirement for the unbundling of generation and transmission, a minimal market
opening and different approaches to the grid were also set by at that time. According to it,
vertically integrated utilities had to keep separate accounts for generation, transmission and
distribution activities. Market openness was defined as being gradual and achieved in three
steps and a Member State could choose between three approaches for the organisation of the
access to the network (negotiated or regulated third-party access or the single buyer procedure).
In view of the fact that performance of the different national markets on liberalisation was not
as planned, the EC decides to implement a second step in order to accelerate the process and to
OVercome some limitations of the previous Directive: the Second Directive (2003/54/EC) and
include also regulation.
The other level of reform pursued by the ED was the effort to improve cross border transmis-
sion (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). In order to intensify cross-border trade, essential for effective
market integration, the ED had enacted the Regulation 1228/2003, implemented at the same
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time as the second directive. This regulation recognised that promoting construction of in-
terconnectors between national systems was an end in itself, rather than a means to enhance
security or to promote competition.
In the same framework, in 2006, the EC recognised the dimension and the difficulty to
achieve a single market at once for all Member States. Accordingly, the EC presented a new
route to the single European market with regional markets as an intermediate stage (Jamasb
and Pollitt, 2005). The existence of different market developments by countries concerning har-
monisation of rules and development of interconnection justifies the regional approach. These
regional initiatives allow considering all the differences, but keeping the focus on the common
aim of a unique market for electricity in Europe.
Although the second package of electricity directives came to correct limitations from the
previous one, several problems still exist, namely the persistence of differences among Member
States concerning market design. Moreover, the achievement of the goals by the different
member states was still very different and far from the expected.
The EC recognised that one new legislative package on energy was needed. In September
2007, the Commission adopted its proposals for a third liberalisation package. The package
has two main parts, namely (i) measures to ensure effective unbundling of production/supply
activities on the one hand and network activities on the other hand, and (ii) measures to
enhance powers and independence of national regulators. Finally, the third legislative package
(Directive 2009/72/EC), again containing even more strict rules, was published.
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1.2.1 Assessing liberalisation and integration in EU Single Electricity market
The task of summarizing how economic analysts assess liberalisation and integration of the
European market is not simple, due to complexity of the process spread by so many countries.
One possible approach may be to assume that the full implementation of all main elements of
the reform by all countries is a proof of success.
In terms of market opening, at the present, almost all countries achieve 100% of proportion
of retail market open to competition, except Greece, Cyprus and some of the new Member
States (EC, 2009). In what concerns to unbundling, the reality is less similar, with some
explicit reluctance of some of the more important European countries in adopting ownership
unbundling. It is the case of France and Germany.
Finally, about the achievements on the last element, the existence of an independent regula-
tor, Pollitt (2009) found that only 5 countries had the maximum value on the score given to the
regulatory agency! which means that there is still a significant lack of independence on national
regulators. In conclusion, given the starting point in 1997, the evolution is very significant and
means an important effort by all countries (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). From this results we
can conclude that liberalisation is a relative success in Europe. In fact, of course, we have in
Europe, some countries with substantial progress, as the UK and Nordic countries, and in some
others there is still some way to go, as, for example, France and Germany.
Other way of assessing may be the comparison of the advances in reform of electricity mar-
kets with other sectors. Wolfi et al (2009) place the sector ahead of the telecom liberalisation,
even if the last one is considered as the leading liberalised utility. Their results also give ev-
. 1Scores related with the independence of the regulator, with 5 being the score for the highest level of
Independence (Pollitt, 2009)
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idence on a wide variation in the degree of liberalisation across EU countries and over time.
From their analysis it can also be seen that restructuring appears to have slowed down between
2003 and 2008, as compared with the period before.
Finally to assess liberalisation in any country we can look at the benefits achieved with the
process. The ultimate aims of liberalisation are lower prices for consumers and, particularly from
integration, price convergence. The same was expected for the European electricity market. The
test about the persistence or not of high prices after the restructuring is vital for the evaluation
of the success of the process (Musgens, 2006). From raw data evidence, EC reports always
very different electricity prices for member countries, which may be interpreted as a sign of
lack of convergence and insufficient market integration (EC, 2009). Moreover, consumers had
lower prices and price convergence until 2003, but this evolution was inverted in the last years.
Nevertheless, several other reasons are pointed out for this evolution, like different cost of
generation or the different availability of generation capacity for each country.
Most of the empirical research available, on more than 10 years of experiencing liberalisation
the EU, focus on only one part of the restructuring process or on one or some of the effects of
liberalisation / integration. Though, we can mention five studies on the effects of restructuring
of electricity market on prices. Two of them report not only European countries, but OECD
countries, while other three are focused on European countries.
Steiner (2001) and Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) use the same approach in different periods
of time in order to infer the impact of the several elements of the liberalisation separately
(unbundling, privatization, third part access, etc) on prices, industrial and household. The
conclusions of either papers are that it was too early to find clear evidence of positive or
negative effects on prices. Moreover, due to the additive approach they use, each element
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studied may have contradictory effects on prices, thus the evidence on the total effect was not
proved to be clear.
Other three cases of empirical research examine the impact of the restructuring on prices,
presented by Ernst and Young (2006), Thomas (2006) and Florio (2007). The first report, asked
for the UK's Department of Trade, evaluates whether liberalisation was working. Among several
questions, they ask if liberalisation lowers prices. Their conclusion is that price of electricity,
in fact, is lower under liberalisation and that there is a strong significant relation between
liberalisation and lower prices. Thomas (2006) is a review of several reports on electricity
prices in Europe and his conclusions imply that reforms in the EU are associated with lower
prices.
Finally, Florio (2007) uses a similar approach to the first two research studies above and
infers the effect of several reform variables on household prices. Even if it is considered as an
interesting way of inferring the effect of each element of the reform, the conclusion is that there
is no clear evidence on price benefits from liberalisation.
The evolution on liberalisation and integration can also be shown in different results and
conclusions concerning price convergence. In the beginning, there was few convergence between
European markets, with exception to Nord Pool (Boisseleau, 2004; Bower, 2002). In the follow-
ing period (2000-2004), Armstrong and Galli (2005) conclude that European electricity markets
were converging. More recently, the evidence is not so consistent. Zachman(2008), for several
pairs of countries, provides empirical evidence that integrated market has not been achieved
by 2006. On the contrary, Da Silva and Soares (2008) find evidence of reduction of differences
between neighbouring countries, thus evidence on price convergence. Since one of the "single
rnost important indicators" of successful liberalisation is the price effect (Jasmab and Pollitt,
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2005) we may conclude about a fairly positive assessment on the success of liberalisation and
integration of the European electricity market.
Finally, we should mention the evidence on successful restructuring on particular experiences
inside the EU. The United Kingdom was one of the countries with an "early" restructuring and
therefore extensively studied (see Newbery and Pollitt, 1997).
The Nordic market is the other extensively studied market that is essential not only due to
the restructuring process, but also, and mainly, the effects on prices were positive, even before
the complete integration. Amudsen et al (1998) quantified the changes in prices after integration
and finds that the emerging Nordic market was likely to produce lower prices and benefit
consumers. The general opinion is that the Nordic electricity restructuring and integration
worked well (Amudsen and Bergman, 2006). Following the Nordic example and accounting for
the features of continental Europe is, for some research, the best strategy to have success on
restructuring electricity market. However, individual countries may implement differently the
measures and the success results from Nord Pool may not be generalized.
As was clearly shown by survey, a number of changes have occurred in the European elec-
tricity sector, over recent years, and the progress of liberalisation of energy markets has been
substantial. However, the achievement of an internal market in Europe is still far from complete.
The several obstacles delaying the achievement of an internal market were identified on bench-
marking reports by the EC: concentration of the market, vertical integration and separation of
the network and lack of interconnection capacity (EC,2009), among others.
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1.3 European concerns in liberalisation and integration of elec-
tricity markets
Looking at economic literature in electricity markets in the last 20 years in Europe, we notice
that several of the topics studied, both empirically and theoretically, were related with the
obstacles to market integration and the search for solutions to overcome it. The solutions
proposed, both by economic researchers and by the Ee are, essentially, a search for the best
market design to promote competition and integration in European markets.
The aim of this section is to survey the main empirical research on some topics of concern,
namely concentration and exercise of market power, vertical integration and unbundling and
lack of interconnection capacity. From the beginning of the liberalisation process, these obstacles
were always mentioned in the reports and their study is a permanent subject in empirical
research in the EU. These are the reasons of the choice of these three concerns.
1.3.1 Concentration and exercise of market power
Although the liberalisation process has led to the disintegration of national monopolies, it has
not resulted in less concentration within the sector. In fact, the increasing concentration on
energy markets is recognised as the "most important obstacle to the development of more
vigorous competition" (Ee, 2005, 5).
The last report available still confirms that concentration is still a feature of the market,
with only seven European countries considered as moderately concentrated (Ee, 2009) and
reinforces the perspective of a clear path towards increasing concentration. The exception are
the UK and Norway, countries where liberalisation started earlier. Even if, in some countries,
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such as Spain, Portugal and Italy, concentration ratios have decreased slightly in recent years,
they are still considered high.
The incumbents continue to be the main actors in each national electricity market. Even
after liberalisation, either in generation and retail markets, the share of the three largest firms
in the market is close to 50% or above for the majority of the European countries.
Although it was expected less firms in the market with the introduction of competition, be-
cause only the more efficient would prevail, the evolution of concentration still raises concerns,
namely as a result of mergers between (large) European electricity firms (Green, 2006). Natu-
rally, all incumbents in the electricity power sector reacted to the introduction of competition
by fighting for their positions in order to maintain their market share. The largest European
utilities started a wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&A), in the context of friendly or some-
times hostile takeover bids, inside a country or cross-countries (Speck and Mulder, 2003). Some
authors have predicted that in ten years there will be around only 8-10 significant players in the
European electricity market (Codognet et al., 2003) or even less than that number (Thomas,
2003).
The merger activity and concentration may not cause negative impact on European coun-
tries if it generates mainly efficiency effects. The major concern is the introduction of some
anticompetitive risks. While the entrance of new firms can lead to a decrease in the market
share of incumbents, M&A activity may impose effective restrictions to competition.
The electricity industry has all the features identified in economic literature that make pos-
sible the exercise of market power. Levels of concentration that may be considered sufficiently
low in most industries might be sufficiently high to have damaging effects on competition in
the electricity industry. In addition, the usual instruments available in other markets to reduce
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market power, such as storage or the presence of substitutes in the market, do not work in this
industry (Green, 2006).
These particular characteristics coupled with the M&A trend have raised serious concerns
about exercise of market power (Domanico, 2007). In fact, one of the main worries is that,
after liberalisation, the electricity market will become a private oligopoly with power to increase
prices, after all. A smaller number of market players may have more market power and thus
more influence on final prices. If European concentration continues to prevail, and (the same)
few companies are operating in each of the national markets, they may lose the incentive to
compete with each other. Adding to this, the incumbents will try to increase the barriers
to maintain their position and to foreclose the entrance of more efficient (new) market actors
(Ringel, 2003) and to reduce the number of competitors. All the effects described probably may
lead the European electricity market away from the main goals of liberalisation and integration:
lower prices for consumers, security of supply and sustainable market.
Liberalisation has drawn even more attention to the potential use of market power and
several empirical studies have tried to infer the state and/or the future of market power in
Europe. Some identify as the main problem in the liberalisation of electricity markets in Europe
the fact that restructuring overlook issues of market power (Newbery, 2002). The idea from
the beginning was to introduce competition in two stages of the electricity chain (generation
and supply) and wait for the best outcome/: the markets will become competitive and prices
will fall. However, as it was mentioned before, this was not always the case. The persistence of
high prices in several countries after liberalisation had to be explained. The exercise of market
20f course, the EC made other efforts, mentioned in the section before, to introduce the right elements
to achieve the best results.
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power was one of the more often reasons used to justify the high prices of electricity.
For the specific features of the electricity industry, the electricity market is better described
as a oligopoly than a perfect competition, from which they seem to be rather far. In the
electricity markets market power may arise motivated by an increase in prices with respect to
competitive values and a capacity withdrawal from the market.
One of the main measures of the exercise of market power is the price-cost margin. It
measures the degree by which prices exceed marginal costs and the extent to which firms are
able to exercise market power. An effective economic integration and liberalisation would, on
average, reduce the markups of all firms, in particular, the largest incumbent firms (Smeers,
2005). Thus, the evidence of difference between prices and generation costs may be understood
as a signal of problems in the European liberalisation issue.
The market in England and Wales (E&W) had significant market power problems that have
persisted for several years. Green and Newbery (1992) were pioneers in studying the British
electricity market in order to infer if the reforms implemented were sufficient to achieve higher
competition and to reduce market power or additional regulation was needed to fulfill the aim.
They found evidence, in the short run, of the presence of market power. Newbery and Pollitt
(1997) confirm that the high electricity prices in the five years after the restructuring, were based
on the exercise of market power. Two years later, Wolfram (1999) did not find results denying
market power but she mentions that generators exercised less market power than predicted by
standard oligopoly models. Eventually, after several years, price-cost margins decreased, due
to the reduction of concentration in the market (Evans and Green 2005). However, even if it
would be expected, Sweeting (2007) shown that in E&W wholesale market, a decreasing on
market concentration was not followed by the decrease of the exercise of market power.
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The Nordic electricity market is also extensively studied. Usually for Nord Pool, the low
level of concentration is usually connected with no evidence of market power. There were some
doubts on this evolution for 2000 and 2001, due to relatively sharp increase on prices verified
for those countries, but most of these were explained by a combination of factors: reduced
hydropower availability, increased demand and higher fuel prices (Bergman, 2002). These
findings supported the view that market power so far has not been a problem in this market.
Therefore, the integration and liberalisation of Nordic countries have effectively diluted market
power, otherwise it would have been a feature of each of the four national markets (Amudsen
and Bergman, 2007), as it is for almost all European countries.
On the opposite side, Germany is an example of a problematic market where market concen-
tration is high and it is forecasted to be increasing. Even with a favorable evolution of prices in
the beginning of the liberalisation process, the result of the merger wave in this country was a
substantial increase in market power and a significant rise in prices above the competitive levels
(Bower et al, 2001). Empirical research found also evidence of increasing exercise of market
power over time, reflected on the evolution of the difference between costs and prices (Musgens,
2006).
In the Spanish market there were no dramatic price movements in the spot market, though
there is evidence of bilateral market power (Kuhn and Machado, 2004). The existence of market
power on both sides of the market make the evolution of prices less conclusive for an assessment
of high markup.
As it can be concluded, the study of market power is usually country or region focus and
several other countries or regions were tested over the past years for the existence of market
power on electricity markets, after liberalisation (as example, the South East European mar-
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ket). For the European market, Zarnic (2010) in a recent work, presents a number of estimates
of price-cost margins and finds evidence of a gradual decline in markups associated with liber-
alisation and restructuring of the electricity sector. However, he finds that electricity firms, on
average, still exhibit considerable price-cost margins of about 40 percent and confirmed that
greater market concentration is associated with higher markups.
In Chapter 2 of this thesis our aim is to contribute to this topic, focusing on exercise of
market power on an European regional market, the Iberian Electricity market, assuming full
integration between Portugal and Spain. The objective is to infer if the market power would
be exercised at the same extent after full integration.
1.3.2 Vertical integration and unbundling
Before liberalisation, electricity markets in Europe were mainly controlled by large vertically
integrated (regulated) state monopolies with acti vities from generation (own almost all genera-
tors) to transmission and/or distribution networks. To introduce free competition in the market
it was necessary to guarantee free access to network to all generators and suppliers. Therefore,
only undertaking some form of separation between the network and competitive activities (some
form of unbundling) the conditions for competition will be attained.
The lack of a rigorous unbundling is pointed out as an explanation for the slow progress of
the internal market for electricity. Four main potential problems can be mentioned as result of
insufficient separation. First, an integrated company owning either the network and competitive
activities may deny access to the network, discriminating or setting unfair terms (unreasonably
high access and service fees) to their competitors. Joskow and Tirole (2000) show that ownership
of physical transmission rights, under vertical integration, increases the ability of generators to
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exercise market power through withholding transmission capacity.
Second, the integrated firm may use the cross-subsidisation, allocating costs attributed to
generation or retail to the network activity. This would lower the costs of their competitive
activity artificially and would give them an unfair advantage compared with independent firms.
With the same aim and the same approach, vertically integrated firms may recover generation
losses by setting high transmission fees.
Third, the vertical structure reduces incentives to invest in new transmission capacity, since
more transmission capacity increases the potential competition from neighbouring generators.
Finally, the EC (2007) reported concerns about valuable inside information being exchanged
between integrated firms in different activities. These will also represent an advantage for
integrated firms and it is explicitly an impediment to achieve free competition.
Introducing unbundling has several known benefits and costs. This imposed separation
may improve the network performance and creates a more independent position of the network
without any other activity connected. The network firm will be more focus on its objective
and it will respond better to regulatory incentives, namely on tariff regulation and the market
monitoring task of the energy regulators will be easy. Moreover, a higher degree of unbundling
of generation and transmission networks may boost the incentive for new entrants in generation,
thus may lead to substantial welfare gains.
Nevertheless, unbundling may lead to higher transaction costs (Perry, 1989). This cost
results from restructuring the industry, namely breaking existing links between network and
competitive part, such as changing contracts. Even if there are no contracts to renegotiate,
unbundling may increase transactions costs (Pollitt, 2008) or the costs of changing legislation by
the public authorities. The loss of economies of scope, due to the former close relation between
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network and other parts of the chain may also be mentioned as a potentially significant cost of
unbundling.
Some analysts have also expressed concern that ownership separation of transmission and
generation may distort investment decisions in generation. The reason is that generation and
transmission can be substitutes for each other. Instead of investing in transmission, a firm may
invest in constructing a new plant in the needed location.
To prevent some of the issues described in the EU, the First Directive required vertical
separation between firms on stages open to competition and the ones still regulated. Several
proposals could be supported to implement separation: accounting separation of network activ-
ities, legal separation of network activities, ownership unbundling, and separation of operation
of the assets from ownership. From all the options available, the EC, in a first stage, allowed
each Member State to choose between legal and accounting ownership, as well as the time path
of implementation. This means that generation, transmission and distribution must be carried
out by separately managed units within integrated firms and these units must produce separate
sets of accounts (accounting separation) or the grid should be owned and operated by a firm
whose exclusive activity is the network (legal unbundling).
Many members have been slow in implementing the directive and many have chosen the
weaker (but permitted) form of unbundling. In a first stage, unbundling of generation and
transmission has been successful in England, in the Nordic market, and in Spain. The countries
which adopted full ownership unbundling from the start, ensured that generation competition
had fair transmission access. In Central Europe, however, and more especially in Germany and
France, unbundling was only done by weak internal management measures that was considered
inadequate to avoid discrimination (EC, 2001).
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In fact, the choice for the weakest forms of unbundling on the directives was believed to
be welfare-reducing (Ee, 2007). Due to these results the main problems were not avoided and
firms were able to delay the introduction of competition in the market. As a consequence,
the 2003/54/eE Directive specified the legal unbundling as the minimum requirement. The
rationale behind the choice of a stronger unbundling level was that stronger unbundling options
boost the introduction of competition and deliver more of the benefits.
However, it was clear that even so this new requirement has not been effective. Although
cost allocation might be solved, the ownership shared between network and generation does
not avoid other problems, namely preferential treatment. The Third Energy Package is a
strong reinforcement of the role of unbundling and recognition that it may be actually the most
important step of the European liberalisation process (Soares and Sarmento, 2010). The Ee
has proposed ownership unbundling of transmission networks as the main and preferred option
(Ee, 2009) and the creation of independent system operators (ISO) as an exception that may
be offered to Member States which have not already implemented ownership unbundling. This
most complete level of unbundling requires not only separate ownership, but also requires the
firm not to be a subsidiary of another firm with generation or retail activity. While there are
no connection between the network and other stages with competition, there are no reasons to
believe that discriminatory treatment prevails (Thomas, 2007) or cross-subsidies will persist.
Unbundling was always at the heart of the economic debate on how to achieve integrated and
competitive energy markets. Among the issues that always captured the interest of researchers
and scholars are the merits and consequences of vertical unbundling. Though, there are few
empirical studies which look at unbundling specifically, due to the time simultaneity of several
reform elements in Europe and elsewhere.
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When the objective is the assessment of benefits and costs of unbundling and analysis of
the welfare effects of unbundling, some authors use checklist of cost and benefits to assess if
unbundling should or not be adopted. For Netherlands, several different empirical studies can be
referred. In the context of a debate about unbundling of electricity distribution networks from
retail supply, Mulder and Shestalova (2005) and Baarsma et al. (2007) provide a useful checklist
of the costs and benefits. The last research paper found that contract negotiation costs were
potentially significant. DeNooij and Baarsma (2009) present an ex ante cost-benefit analysis
of the Dutch unbundling act, in order to assess the introduction of ownership unbundling on
Dutch law prior to the European imposition and they conclude that it is unlikely that this act
is welfare enhancing.
Other stream of research is related with the effects of unbundling and/or vertical integration.
According to empirical evidence (full ownership) unbundling revealed a general positive impact
on the market by stimulating investment, contributing to the reduction of prices, facilitating
competition, improving the benefits from regional integration and facilitating new entry. The
main variables of interest reported are investment, prices and competition.
Alesina et al. (2005) examine the effect of deregulation in a number of sectors, namely
on electricity. Using the OEeD measure of product market reform for vertical integration,
they find evidence that investment increases as the vertical integration score decreases. In fact,
experience in Member States where ownership unbundling has been implemented is positive.
Strong circumstantial evidence can be reported for the effectiveness of ownership unbundling in
achieving investment adequacy (Pollitt, 2008). There is also empirical evidence on the decline
of network investment along transition periods to the ownership unbundling regime (Buchan,
2007).
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Another desirable effect of unbundling is that electricity prices are lower than would oth-
erwise be with vertically integrated firms. Empirical research on this topic found different
evidences from the relation between vertical separation and prices. Copenhagen Economics
(2005) studied electricity price trends in the EU for 1990 to 2003 and conclude that ownership
separation reduces industry electricity prices. Steiner (2001) uses panel data for 19 OECD
countries covering 1986-1996 to study several elements of restructuring in electricity markets
and finds that separation of generation and transmission is not associated with lower prices.
Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) examine similar OECD data, over a longer period 1987-1999 and
they confirm that unbundling of generation did not necessarily lower the price and may have
possibly resulted in a higher price. The explanation given was that unbundling increases the
transaction costs that would be pass-through to final customers and the economies of vertical
integration might be lost as a result of a strict form of unbundling, making the net impact of
unbundling ambiguous. The conclusions from the last two papers may be due to the definition
of unbundling, because they use strict definitions of unbundling. Fiorio and Florio (2007),
in an EU-wide analysis found that vertical integration seems to increase prices, thus having a
damaging effect on consumers. On the contrary, Ernst and Young (2006) found evidence of a
significant benefit on consumer prices from completing the full unbundling of the TSO.
Even if all EU countries have been required to unbundle and liberalize their wholesale and
retail markets since 1997, some countries are still nowadays reluctant about adopting the higher
level of unbundling. In half of the Member States the TSOs are not ownership unbundled yet
(EC,2010).
The imposed separation rule was always criticized and it is still a subject of debate. The
main point to be discussed is the decision on which level to choose in order to achieve a
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competitive market. New arguments mention that the restructuring of electricity market should
be an evolutionary process and that, perhaps, for the nature of the market, there is no need to
guarantee full unbundling to achieve competition (Sioshansi, 2008).
1.3.3 Lack of interconnection capacity
Due to the features of electricity, only a limited volume of electricity can be transmitted in a
power grid. This is named as transmission capacity of the grid. In a restructured market, the
function of the transmission system is beyond the role of connecting generation to load or to
guarantee the reliability of the system.
For several years, numerous reports from the EC have been underlying the lack of inter-
connection capacity between Member States and the (very) often congestion problems between
them. The existing interconnection infrastructures do not guarantee the limits to anticompeti-
tive effects deriving from concentration in national markets (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005) and do
not guarantee the achievement of a European electricity market.
Therefore, in a congested framework, imports do not play the role of pressing dominant firms
or the role of opposing market concentration. Actually, the limited cross border transmission
capacity may lead even to an actual increase in market power. Producers can raise their
price and profit in these bottleneck periods, and thereby strategically use these periods to gain
market power (Joskow and Tirole, 2000). On the contrary, in total interconnected markets
the competition from different generators would limit the abuse of market power even in peak
demand periods.
In order to improve the introduction of competition in the EU, some solutions were suggested
and studied. In the long run, the solution is to invest in extending interconnection capacity.
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However, in the short run, interconnection capacity is fixed and the solution must be the efficient
management of congested lines.
One of the usual solutions, coming from either the EC publications or some experts is that
if transmission capacity available is not sufficient then, in a long run perspective, investments
should be made to expand it (Bergman et al, 1999). Since the European Council meeting of
March 2002 in Barcelona/ the EC has called frequently for additional interconnector invest-
ment. As competition problems are reinforced frequently by limited transmission capacity, the
improvement of cross-border flows should mitigate market power (Newbery, 2002b).
Insufficient interconnection capacity may result either from the fact that cost from inter-
connection expansion exceeds the uncertain benefits from totally free trade or from a failure
to undertake an efficient level of investment in additional capacity. This last case occurs if
economic incentives are not enough for investments to foster competition. The Green Paper
on the energy sector recognizes the lack of incentives for investment in European markets (EC,
2006b).
The main debate is, firstly, if investment should be made. This decision is similarly related
with the existence of the right incentives. Most transmission operators prefer using the extra
congestion revenue for other purposes rather than investing in expanding transmission and
since they may get extra revenues from congestions, they may get more advantages from the
congestion problem than from investing. As a consequence, the incentives may not be enough
to make them invest.
Moreover, low public acceptance is one additional major argument against investments. The
3In this Meeting an agreement was made about a specific target for the volume of cross-border capacity and
priority investment projects in the framework of the trans-European network were proposed.
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disparity between private and public incentives may be an additional matter. On the one hand,
private investors have to demonstrate the public convenience and necessity of expansion. On
the other hand, from the perspective of a private firm, investments in expanding transmission
capacity only is profitable if there are excess capacities in generation in at least one of the areas
connected. Otherwise, there is no incentive because there is no electricity to be traded. The
uncertainty of investment is the main problem for the private investor, because the main benefit
will come from the difference of prices between areas and there are no guarantees if this price
difference will persist after investment.
As a result of the above factors, some researchers stress that the lack of incentives requires
the intervention of regulators, by setting a stable regulatory framework (Haas et al, 2008).
In contrast, the supporters of free competition argue that no regulation is need and that the
market itself should (and will) provide incentives for the right level of investment.
Due to it importance in the path to the European Single market it is essential to evaluate
benefits and costs of expanding interconnections. Compared to the benefits, defining the costs
is rather clear, it mainly consists on the value of investments made.
The main benefits are due to the price differences between countries, the impacts on compe-
tition and the security of supply. The barrier to cross-border trade may lead to persistent prices
differences (Brunekreeft et al., 2005) and as, a consequence, consumers in some Member States
may pay more than others for their electricity. The increasing on cross-border transmission
may induce price convergence across countries and relocation of gains and losses: consumers
from high cost country will have advantages at the expense of consumers located in the low cost
country and there may be rent reductions for producers from imports that will be compensated
by rent increases for producers in the exporting country. The reallocation of gains and losses
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across countries might explain some of the resistance in the EU to a full integration of electricity
markets, through increasing interconnections.
Expanding cross border transmission may also boost competition. The high degree of con-
centration and the ability of some players to exercise market power have impact on market
outcomes and on consumers. An expansion on available interconnection capacity will create
opportunities for new firms in the market and, thus, the former firms will exert power less
frequently or in less extent. As a result, the average price may decrease and, due to increase
competition, the price benefit will be passed on to consumers. The last benefit to be mentioned
is that the security of supply can be realized against lower costs. Security of supply will be the
topic of next section on this chapter.
Even so, investments in interconnection do not automatically generate positive welfare ef-
fects. The productive efficiency gains result from the increased efficiency of generation. The
interconnection restriction may enable a more extensive use of the cheapest method of genera-
tion. The allocative efficiency gains follow from the fact that consumers face prices reflecting
better the level of marginal costs, allowing more optimal consumption decisions. Only if these
last two effects are present and not only the above mentioned distribution effects we can find
positive effects from unbundling.
The effects of the expansion of interconnection capacity were tested in applications to Eu-
ropean markets. Lise et al (2008) uses a static model of a fully opened European electricity
market to study this effect and they conclude that more transmission capacity would not only
benefit more the consumers in countries with relatively higher prices, by reducing its prices,
but it also reduces the impact of market power.
Assuming Cournot behaviour in the spot market, Ellersdorfer (2005), analyses, in connec-
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tions between the German electricity market and the neighbouring countries, to what extent
network investment improves competition. The evidence found indicates that reinforcement of
the transmission lines mitigates the ability to exercise market power in Germany. For Belgium,
France and Netherlands, Ehrenmann and Neuhoff (2009) also find that increasing interconnec-
tion capacity reduces the wholesale prices, reduces market power and increases welfare.
Kupper et al (2009) state that increasing transmission capacity is expected to be most
efficient where transmission capacity is small or nonexistent and when regions have considerable
differences (heterogeneous demand profiles and generation mixes) and also when the competition
between generators is expected to increase significantly. Referring to the Trilateral Market
Coupling between the Belgian, Dutch, and French electricity markets, they stress that the
efficient use of the existing capacity may have the same effect on competition.
The cost-benefit framework and the assessment of the effects above mentioned can be useful
to decide wether to invest or not, though, as important is knowing which is the amount of
the expansion on capacity enough to achieve efficiency and the full benefits of competition
described. The countries more frequently studied are the ones in Central Europe, due to
their main role on the integration process. On the typically congested interconnection capacity
between France and Spain, Dominguez and Perez-Arriaga (2001) evaluate the magnitude of the
additional interconnection capacity that would be necessary to mitigate market power. Since
the necessary investment is excessive for the result obtained, at the end they conclude that
there must be other less expensive mean of achieving the same aim.
Moselle et al (2006) studied the electricity market in the Netherlands and they measure
how large an interconnector with Belgium and Germany would have to be to induce a com-
petitive electricity market. They conclude that interconnection between the Netherlands and
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Belgium/Germany would have to be at least 6500 MW, when it was 3600 MW, or 30% of total
Dutch installed capacity in 2005.
Finally, Valeri (2009) analyses the study effects of additional interconnection Ireland-Great
Britain on welfare and competition. As the amount of interconnection increases, the evidence
shows positive effects of competition in Ireland, the less competitive of the two markets. How-
ever, she stresses that it is unlikely that private investors will pay for the optimal amount of
interconnection since their returns are significantly smaller than the total social benefit of in-
terconnection. This difference between private and social benefits may lead to inadequate level
of investments.
The expansion of interconnector capacity, which would be necessary to avoid congestion,
may not be feasible, so some degree of congestion may always remain. We can say that conges-
tion occurs when demand is higher than the existing network transmission capacity (Knops et
al., 2001). In the EU, congestion occurs at least occasionally at almost every border and half of
the connections are permanently, or at least frequently, congested while only less than a third
are seldom or never congested (Parision and Bosco, 2008). Therefore, by principle, congested
lines need to be managed efficiently in economic terms.
Although congestion management was always an issue in the electricity industry, it mani-
fested itself primarily inside the control areas of single TSOs. With the increasing cross-border
electricity trade and the aim of the EU of becoming an integrated electricity market (!EM),
this subject became more complex.
The congestion mechanisms to allocate interconnection capacity play an important role in
market integration. The frequency of congestion and the size of the resulting submarkets in
Europe depend on the one hand on the capacity and, on the other hand, on the management
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of the network (Ehrenmann and Smeers, 2005).
Transmission congestion must be managed so that transmission capacity is used efficiently
with minimal social welfare loss. Some market based methods are available to achieve that
aim. Usually these methods'' are classified in two groups. Table 1.2 describes briefly these two
groups of methods for congestion management.
Table 1.2
Methods for congestion management
(1) congestion price methods
explicit ouctioning price mechanism; send a price signal to market
players indicating the cost of congestion; result:
implicit auctioning players have incentive to relocate in order to reduce
the congestion; give correct economic signals
provided there is no exercise of market power.
market splitting
(2) corrective methods redispatching they do not affect the market tronsactions directly;
do not send a price signal to market players, but
leave it to the TSOs to find a solution to congestion,
since it provides an incentive to minimize congestion.
counter trading
In Europe, the limited available cross-border transmission led to the use of either market
based and non-market based allocation methods to manage cross-border congestion, depending
on the period and on the countries being interconnected. Non market- based solutions comprise
first-come-first-serve (priority list) and pro-rata rationing and are considered as non efficient.
The congestion management regime in European interconnections was, before 1996, a bilat-
eral set of agreements between TSOs, mainly based on non-market solutions. The first Directive
did not provide strict rules on either capacity or congestion management. The Second Directive
(2003) was more focused on this subject and introduced a single regime designed to integrate
"See Knops et al (2001) for a description and evaluation of the different congestion management
methods which seem most appropriate for Europe.
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the national electricity markets. Nevertheless, it failed to provide "any explicit provisions on
the regulation of cross-border electricity trade" (Meeus et al., 2005: 28). In the same year,
the Regulation 1228/03 on 'Conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges
in electricity' clearly states that the implementation of market based methods was preferred.
However, it only set the general principles and not an obligation. In the work of the Florence
Forum, created with the specific aim of giving guidance on this subject, amended in beginning
of December 2006 the need for improved regional cross-border electricity trade was reaffirmed,
with greater coordination and cooperation amongst transmission system operators.
However, despite pushing for a harmonised approach to interconnection and congestion
management, a common European method is still absent. One of the main difficulties to choose
one (and only one) management method is the existence of different regulatory approaches and
market structures in Europe. Any scheme chosen for the management of congestion should con-
sider these features (Perez-Arriaga and Olmos, 2005). Even if the tendency is the convergence
on the methods due to agreement between TSOs, perhaps it is not feasible to have a single
solution for Europe.
Cross-border transmission management raised academic and policy interest. The literature
on congestion management in electricity markets presents proposals on a number of mechanisms
for managing transmission constraints efficiently and its effects in several limited interconnec-
tions in Europe. At best of my knowledge, the literature on congestion management methods
is mainly theoretical. Even the applications to European countries are, in most of the times,
on a theoretical and comparative perspective.
For the assessment on the on social surplus from different ways of dealing with transmission
constraints in the Nordic grid, Bjerndal and Jornsten (2007) considered the possibilities of
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improving the utilisation of the capacity of the grid, by coordinating the methods. They
conclude that the lack of coordination of congestion management within the Nordic power
market may induce considerable additional cost, and that there is a potential for significant
savings by a harmonisation. This may be used to support the definition of a common method
for Europe or at least close harmonisation between TSOs as the best way to improve integration
between markets.
The method studied more often in the last years was market coupling, alone or in comparison
to other methods. This method is only slightly different from market splitting, Under market
splitting there is only one power exchange operates across several price zones, whereas market
coupling links together separate markets in a region. However, the effect is recognised to be
the same (Gilbert et al, 2004 and Ehrenmann and Smeers, 2005). This method was adopted by
many countries (trilateral market coupling between France, Netherlands and Belgium) and was
been called to be extended to others (for example, Central West European region and British
and Dutch markets). The market splitting was chosen in Nord Pool to manage congestion inside
the integrated market.
Brunekreeft et al. (2005) compares coordinated auction and a decentralized market cou-
pling and emphasizes that the latter is superior to joint explicit auctions because it limits the
market power of generators located in frequently congested areas. They mention that even if all
arguments seem to favor market coupling rather than a coordinated auctions for transmission
capacity, the implementation of market coupling requires the coordination of a large group of
stakeholders. This condition makes more difficult the implementation.
In what concerns to geographic focus on this topic, the importance of interconnections
in Central Europe (France, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium) made it the principal focus of
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research. Both Amudsen and Bergman (2002) and Hobbs et al. (2005) study the welfare
effects of coupling between two equally sized markets, the Belgian and Dutch market. Their
analysis shows that it clearly benefits the Belgian consumer, while the Dutch consumer's benefit
depends upon the producer's behaviour. Hobbs et al (2005) show also that coupling would
increase electricity trade. Neuhoff (2003) compares the explicit auction between Germany and
the Netherlands and the market coupling between Sweden and Northern Norway and finds that
explicit auctions allow for more exercise of market power, because generators face lower effective
demand elasticities.
In a numerical model of the meshed network between France and Germany, Ehrenmann and
Neuhoff (2009) show that market coupling would reduce prices relative to a coordinated auction
of interconnectors. Moselle et al (2006) conclude that market coupling in the interconnection
between Netherlands and Belgium / Germany would increase the effectiveness of interconnector
capacity by increasing cross border flows in 15%.
In Kristiansen (2007b) we can also find a price assessment of the explicit auctions on the
cross border between West Denmark (DK1) and Germany and on the Kontek cable between
East Denmark (DK2) and Germany. There was a change to market coupling in the latter
interconnection mentioned and he found evidence that the introduction of explicit cross-border
auctions resulted in significant improvement in capacity reservation system compared to the
earlier.
Valentin et al (2005) focus on the cross-border congestion management as practiced by
the French TSO. Since France is a key player, due to its geographical position, it is essential
establishing efficient cross-border trading mechanisms that comply with EU regulations. He
describes cross-border management in all French borders and assesses the best approaches in
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order to promote competition and ensure the secure operation of all network. He concludes
that the best solutions are either allocation of transmission rights through explicit auctions, or
the implicit treatment of the transmission rights through the coupling of energy markets.
Other congested cross-border interconnections in Europe were also studied. An example
is Kristiansen (2007) with a description of the current applied and future possible congestion
management methods in Europe, including the still emerging South East Europe region. He
identifies the potential benefits of a regional electricity and cross-border trade within the region
and neighboring countries.
Despite efforts from the European Union and Member States, interconnection congestion
has remained a problem and it still is a serious impediment to the development of the IEM.
1.4 Regional integrated markets: interim stage to IEM
The EC recognised the presence of some obstacles, the ones described before and several others.
Moreover, they recognised that the European-wide internal market will not emerge instanta-
neously.
The proposal to foster competition and to build the IEM, as foreseen by the Directive
96/92/EC, includes an intermediary stage: a bottom-up regional approach. The creation of
regional integrated markets is based on the fact that certain groups of countries, inside the
EU, have already adopted common harmonised rules (like the Nordic countries). A second step
would be to connect these regional markets into the wide IEM.
In fact, a significant effort has emerged to create the conditions for a higher degree of
market integration. In recent years, several regional initiatives, included in this perspective,
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were implemented, namely the agreement between Spain and Portugal for the organisation of
the MIBEL. The main advantage of the regional approach is that it enables the involvement
of the relevant stakeholders more than it is usually possible on an European level. In addition,
the regional approach can also better take account of regional specificities.
In order to overcome the obstacles, the main challenge is also to develop and maintain a
suitable framework to enable each regional market to operate in a way that promotes effective
competition in order capture the full benefits of restructuring. This is the basis of the search
of the best form of market design.
Different markets have adopted different solutions, because there is no universal "first-best"
solution. However, from the literature, it can be mentioned that the overall design of an
electricity market should have three fundamental components: the regulatory framework, the
trading arrangements and the design of transmission tariffs.
In Europe and even in the world, the Nordic Power Market was the first common, integrated,
inter-country electric power market. The general opinion among analysts is that the Nordic
electricity market is a well functioning market, regarding restructuring (Amudsen and Bergman,
2005: Amudsen and Bergman, 2007), with increased competition and efficiency. This recognised
efficiency clearly depends on its regulatory framework and its market design.
These will be our departure point for the description of the factors driving the success of the
Nordic experience and also to answer the question: is the Nordic electricity market a relevant
model for other experiences or, in other words, can the Nordic experience be replicated for other
regional integration? The aim of this section is to explore why this is the case and to what
extent the Nordic experience is relevant for other regional integration experiences, namely for
the MIBEL.
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1.4.1 A success story: the Nordic electricity market
The Nordic electricity market comprises Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark. The devel-
opment towards an integrated market began in 1996 when Norway and Sweden began joint
trading their national markets for physical power contracts. At the same time, the Nord Pool
was established. Finland joined the market area in 1998 and the Finish power exchange began
representing Nord Pool in Finland. In 2000 Denmark was fully integrated into the market area
and the Nordic market had become the first internationally functioning electricity exchange
market (Von der Fehr et al, 2004). This market is a result of the transformation from five
electricity markets in four nations to one electricity market.
The experience of the Nordic countries provides a rich source of information and conclusions
that can be used to identify the best market design to improve the effects of the liberalisation and
integration process. If the success of the Nordic market is due to a good design of regulations
and market institutions, then the experience may be useful for other countries. But if the
favorable outcome primarily depends on country-specific factors or temporary circumstances,
there is not much for other European countries to learn and apply.
The question of what constitutes a well functioning competitive market is not trivial. Joskow
(2003) and Pierce (2005) suggest general preconditions for a competitive market of electricity,
listed in table 1.3.
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Table 1.3
General pre-conditions for effective restructuring in electricity markets
(1) introduction of a wholesale electricity market horizonta I i ntegrati on of
transmission and network
operations to create the wholesale
market
creation of a single independent
system operator to di rect the
operati on of network and ma i nta i n
frequency. voltage and stability of
network
establ ishment of wholesale spot
electricity marketthat are open
creation of mechanism to allocate(2) design of transmission tariffs
(3) establishment of independent TSOs
the scarce transmission capacity
and attract new investment to create
new or expand transmission
capacity.
non-di scri mi natory access to
transmission network under
tra ns pa rent pri ces
creati on of independent gri d
operator
(4) aI/owing consumers to choose their suppliers
(5) separation of competitive and monoplistic
activities
Structural and functional
sepa rati on of generati on and reta i I
activities from transmission and
distribution activities
Source: Joskow (2003) and Pierce (2005)
The Nordic integrated market has benefited from a number of positive experiences that have
contributed positively to the achievement of a competitive market and may be attributable to
a simple and sound market design. These are key factors that justify the use of this market as
benchmark for comparison.
One of the steps of the electricity sector liberalisation process has been the introduction of
a wholesale electricity market. Wholesale markets constitute a tremendous driver for market
integration and the development of the power exchange was a part of the development of the
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Common Nordic electricity market. The highest degree of harmonisation among national mar-
kets was found, where one power exchange (Nord Pool) manages capacity and energy auctions
for all involved countries.
A second key prerequisite for a competitive electrcity market is the third party access to the
network infrastructure. Even though the Nordic countries have used a regulatory framework
similar to the criteria and requirements of the first EU electricity market directive, they have
chosen the alternative that is most likely to foster competition. The non-discriminatory Regu-
lated Third Party Access was introduced at all grid levels: all companies with grid concessions
had to connect anyone who wished to their grid in a neutral way, with objective conditions and
fair tariffs.
In addition to the creation of the Nord Pool, the establishment of a close cooperation between
the transmission system operators (TSO) in the four countries has been the key element for the
process.
The treatment of transmission constraints, and the resulting congestion of the network, rep-
resent also a major design issue. Transmission constraints arise on transmission networks from
time to time due to changing patterns and costs in generation and demand. These constraints
can be handled with several methods. The Nord Pool market uses two different models: as
a whole uses market splitting model and "buy back" (also called counter trade) model, when
congestion occurs within the defined price areas during the "operational phase".
All Nordic countries have ownership unbundling for transmission, which effectively separates
the interests of the transmission and production companies, and legal unbundling for distribu-
tion. The Commission states that a strict transmission unbundling is the single most important
variable to ensure that a market functions properly and the weak unbundling chosen by most
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of the continental power markets must be seen as one of the main reason to their concerns on
restructuring.
However, the Nordic market has also some properties, that distinguish it from the rest
of the EO, and whose specificity also justifies the success of this market (Amundsen and
Bergman, 2006). Firstly, the complementarity of the countries' resources (Norwegian and
Swedish hydro-based with the Finnish and Danish thermal-based power systems), the large
share of hydropower, matched with significant inter-connector capacities allowed a smooth in-
tegration. Secondly, the very strong mature networks and the low demand growth facilitate the
restructuring due to the minimum needs of new investment.
Thirdly, much of the generating capacity of Nord Pool was fully or partially state-owned
and this dominance of the public ownership implies an informal commitment to public service
by the power industry. Lastly, mentioned as one of the most important factor, was political
will to liberalise and unify the markets and a tradition of cooperation between Nordic countries
(Thomas, 2006).
The replication of some elements of the Nordic example in other European regions may not
be easy and may not guarantee the same achievements concerning competition and integration.
However, there are some lessons that can be learned. In particular, the Nordic example suggests
that a "deregulated" market for electricity works well if there are no price regulations and
constraints on the development of financial markets and there is continued political support for
a market based electricity supply system also when electricity is scarce and prices are high.
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Chapter 2
Market power and integrated
regional markets of electricity: a
simulation of the MIBEL
2.1 Introduction
One of the proclaimed aims of economic integration of the EU is the liberalisation and integra-
tion of national energy markets (for gas and electricity). After the first EU electricity directive
that came into force in 1997, almost all European countries are already involved in the process
of creating an Internal Electricity Market.
A way of achieving greater integration,as proposed by the EC, is through gradual integration
of regional markets. Some examples of integrated regional markets (in EU) are the (first) Nord
Pool (Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark) and, more recently, prior to the final aim of full
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integration of all European energy, MIBEL (Iberian Electricity Market), between Portugal and
Spain. Since it was assumed as an intermediary aim, the achievement of regional markets is also
seen as experimental fields to infer advantages and inconveniences of integration. Since it has
specific characteristics the MIBEL can be used to pursue the same purpose, namely studying
pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects of the integration of electricity markets.
Moreover, the promotion of good governance in the market, according to free competition,
is one of the main principles written in the protocol for the creation of the MIBEL. Therefore,
it is possible to start by studying some concerning questions in MIBEL and then trying to learn
from this experience to achieve the Single Electricity market.
While the benefits of the electricity sector reform have been substantial, experience has
shown that a liberalised market for electricity is prone to the exercise of market power. The
Report on Progress in creating the internal gas and electricity market (EC 2005, 2007) claims
that in most Member States a high level of concentration persists in generation, which creates
a scope for market power from incumbent generators and significant efforts are still needed to
create a competitive common market for electricity (and energy in general).
According to the literature, the opening of any market to greater competition should deliver
greater efficiency and, over the long term, lower than otherwise would be without competition.
However, the current structure of the market and the special features of electricity may mean
that the benefits of integration may not be maximized. The major generation companies are
large enough to be able to influence prices using their generation capacity (exercise market
power), and thus prevent the potential gains of integration to be fully realised. Therefore, it is
important to study the evolution of electricity markets in Europe with respect to market power
and its influence on the advantages of restructuring.
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The purpose of this chapter is to give a contribution to the existing literature on market
power and restructuring of electricity markets by studying the integration of two oligopolistic
markets that are not symmetric (in number of firms, in demand or market dimension). The
model applied in our research is a partial equilibrium one. In our case, the behaviour of
generation firms after integration will be based on a Cournot model with competitive fringe.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the Iberian market
(Portugal and Spain), before and after integration. In section 3 we present several procedures
used in the literature to analyse market power and we justify our choice for the assumptions on
the behaviour of firms in the market. In section 4, we describe our model with the specification
of costs and demand. The main idea is the comparison of Portugal and Spain in four chosen
days in a particular year (2004) considering two realities: no integration and full integration.
The results of the simulation exercise are shown in section 5.
We can conclude that market power will be lower or at least not higher, after integration,
as expected, but the exercise of market power by electricity generators will still be a feature of
the market. A key finding is that larger firms might use market power in all periods of time (on
peak and off peak). There is also market power on some off peak periods, surprisingly, where
the Lerner Index assumes higher values. This is due to the presence of nuclear plants in the
market that postpone the use of thermal plants, namely in periods of low demand. In section
6, we conclude and give suggestions for future research and extensions.
44
2.2 Iberian Electricity Market (MIBEL)
The success of any integration process depends on the coordination between individual partie-
ipants. MIBEL is a regional integration within Europe between two very different countries:
Portugal and Spain. For the past several years, Portuguese and Spanish authorities have been
cooperating in order to solve some of these differences. In this section it will be shown, first how
markets are characterised before and after integration and secondly, how different Portuguese
and Spanish electricity markets are.
The liberalisation of the Portuguese electricity market started in 1995, through a series
of decree laws. The Portuguese wholesale and retail market is divided into two subsystems:
Public Electric System (PES) and non-binding electric system (NBES). A special regime system
(PRE) was also created for renewable energy sources and cogeneration, under which producers
benefited from feed-in-tariffs with buy back obligation by the network operator.
The PES is responsible for the majority of the electricity purchased in the market. The
NBES is formed by independent generators and generators from the special regime and promotes
supply to non-binding consumers". There is not an organised market in Portugal, i.e, the spot
market or forward market or intra-daily market are inexistent and all the transactions are made
through bilateral private contracts between generators and REN (National Electricity Grid).
The prices for the PES are fixed by law (regulated tariffs), according to several criteria such as
fuel prices and payments for CO2 emissions.
In Spain there is a spot market where generators and consumers can purchase electricity.
Since 1999, by royal law, liberalisation and deregulation in generation and supply of electricity
1Non-binding consumers are consumers that, given the permission from the electricity regulator may
freely choose their supplier.
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was established. Transmission is still regulated and dominated by REE (Red Electrica de
Espana). In this system created with the liberalisation, generators sell electricity to a pool and
the prices are set in a competitive bidding process. The structure of the market includes the
day ahead market, the intra-day market, the ancillary services market and physical bilateral
contracts.
Mibel is expected to operate to guarantee, to all agents established in both countries, access
to the Iberian Market Operator and also access to interconnections with third countries under
free and equal bilateral trading conditions. MIBEL will be made up by different organised and
non-organised markets in which electricity transactions and contracts are made. The organised
markets will be a forward market, a day-ahead market and a intra-day market. The non-
organised market comprises bilateral (OTe) contracts. According to the agreement signed on
the 1st October 2004, in each market the legislation should be applied according to the country
in which those markets are constituted. The spot market will follow the current model of the
Omel (Spanish) and the forward market will be managed by the Omip (Portuguese). The
integrated market will maintain two stages of the electricity chain completely deregulated and
liberalised, namely generation and supply. Transmission will continue to be a regulated sector.
Officially the 4th September 2006 was the first day of operation for the MIBEL.
Table 2.1 shows a comparison between the two countries before integration and after inte-
gration for the MIBEL. For the values of the integrated market, as it was not a reality at the
time, we assume the addition of both markets for all items. The prices of purchasing electric-
ity have always been one of the main differences between Portugal and Spain. For values of
December of 2004, prices in Spain were in average 20% lower than Portuguese prices.
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Table 2.1
Comparative features of electricity market, Portugal, Spain, MIBEL, 2004
Portugal Spain Mibel
Production· market shares
EDP 61.7 8.9
Tejo Energia 11.1 1.6
Turbogas 15.7 2.3
EDIA 0.3 0.03
Special Regime Generators 11.4 1.7
Endesa 41.8 35.8
Iberdrola 29.8 24.7
Union Fenosa 12.2 10.4
Hidrccantabrtcc 7.2 6.1
Viesgo 3.1 2.6
Gas Natural 2.7 2.3
Others 3.1 2.6
TOTAL (lWh) - Production 39.4 233.5 272.9
Relative size (Portugal/Spain) 17% (1 to 6)
Installed Cal!!!c1!l! - marlcet shares
EDP 69.4 10.6
Tejo Energia 5.3 0.81
Turbogas 8.5 1.3
EDIA 1.0 0.15
Special Regime Generators 15.9 2.43
Endesa 34.5 29.23
Iberdrola 37.2 31.52
Union Fenosa 12.7 10.76
Hldrocantabrico 5.1 4.32
Viesgo 4.5 3.81
Gas Natural 3.1 2.63
Others 3.3 2.8
TOTAL (MW) -Installed Capacity 11708 64971 76679
relative size (Portugal/Spain) 18% (1 to 6)
Generation Milt l"l
Hydropower 20.0 11.9
Gas!Fueloil/CCG 25.0 14.7
Net imports 14.0
Coal 31.0 30.5
Nuclear 24.4
Special Regime Generators 10.0 17.5
Maximum Annual Power (MW) 8249 37724 45973
Wholesale price of electricity 60 41
(Dec 2004 - (jMWh)
HHI (production) 4306.6 2862.5 2145.9
HHI (installed capacity) 5170.51 2802.14 2132.3
eR3 (production) 88.7 84.4 70.9
eR3 (installed capacity)) 83.2 84.4 71.51
liberalized sectors: gen + supply gen + supply gen + supply
Ira nsactions based on bilat. contracts spot+contracts spot + contracts
Source: EN, ERSE, Annual Report for the European Commission, 2005; Endesa, Iberdrola, Union Fenosa,
EDP; Spanish Regulator's Annual Report to the European Commission, CNE, 2005; European Commission;
"El sistema electrico espafiol 2004", REE. Own calculations.
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Although generation and supply of electricity were totally liberalised in 2004, we cannot
consider that there is competition in the Portuguese electricity market and Public ownership
is still dominating. The electricity sector is still dominated by the incumbent Electricidade de
Portugal (EDP), with a market share of around 62% of total Portuguese consumption. On
table 2.1 we can see the relative contribution made by the different generators to meet national
consumption.
In Spain, the electricity market can be considered to be more competitive than in Portugal.
Nevertheless, as a result of merger and acquisition transactions carried out in the 90's, Endesa,
the largest Spanish generator, has around 42% of all electricity generated in Spain. Together
with Iberdrola and Union Fenosa, they have a market share of around 84%. The fourth largest
generator is Hidrocantabrico, whose major owner is EDP, with only around 7% of the market.
All the remaining firms have less than 5% of the market each.
The analysis of HHI and CR3 allows concluding about the comparative concentration in
both markets and in the integrated market. Concentration is higher in Portugal, compared with
Spain. When considering the integrated market, the concentration level is lower, as expected,
than within each country separately, due to the higher number of firms in a larger market.
Another important way of analysing and comparing wholesale markets is to characterise
the installed generation capacity, namely total installed capacity and distribution of installed
capacity by generator. In 2004, the total installed capacity in Portugal showed a value of
approximately 11.7 GW. However, this value is very unevenly distributed: Group EDP is
dominant with almost 70% of the total installed capacity. In Spain, two companies, Endesa and
Iberdrola, own the majority of generating capacity, while Union Fenosa and Hidrocantabrico are
smaller competitors. This means that, even if the installed capacity is more evenly distributed,
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there is also some concentration on the supply side of the market.
With 29 million consumers and around 280 TWh of annual consumption, MIBEL will be the
5th largest electricity market in the ED. However, if the features in the market are extrapolated
to the integrated market, MIBEL will be dominated by five business groups that will control a
very high percentage of electricity generation (around 86%) plus a number of smaller companies
from the two countries, which may constitute a competitive fringe.
Since these are the features of the markets, only by analysing simple statistics, can a high
level of concentration be forecasted. Therefore, it is very important to infer the possibility of
exercising market power in this regional integrated market, considering the strategies of the
firms involved. The objective is to be able to conclude about the achievement of all aims of full
integration of electricity markets in Europe.
2.3 Market power analysis
The effects of market integration have been studied before, either in partial equilibrium liter-
ature or in general equilibrium literature. In either theoretical or empirical studies, there is a
standard assumption that integration of markets will promote competition.
In partial equilibrium, several literature was concerned with examining the relation between
integration (shift from two separate markets to a unique integrated market through gradual
elimination of all barriers to transactions) and market power of firms. Ishikawa (2004) refers
to a model with a monopolistic firm producing for two markets and claims the existence of
pro-competitive effects of economic integration, under oligopoly. Venables (1990) with the
same purpose and conclusions considers a model with one firm in each market. We can find
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a model with several firms in each market in Venables (1990b). All this literature is based on
static models of competition where the firm's behaviour is given and thus it assumes that firm's
reaction to their competitor's behaviour is the same before and after integration.
Dynamic models can also be reported to study procompetitive effects of integration (see
Colonescu and Schmitt, 2003, Fung, 1992 and Lommerud and Sergard, 2001). In these models
it is assumed that firms interact repeatedly through time.
Previous work assesses various aspects of an integrated electricity market in several countries
based on a model on the existing generating infrastructure. The study by Berger et al (1991)
evaluates the cost savings from electricity trade in the American-Canadian Northeast. The
general approach is similar to Amudsen and Tjotta (1997) but in the former research they
consider that demand is totally price inelastic and they apply linear programming to find the
equilibrium solution in a long run model. Bjorvatn and Tjotta (1993) consider the effects
of various market forms. Bergman and Andersson (1994) study a more complex conjectural
variation model restricted to the Swedish electricity market. Amudsen et al (1994) consider
some Northern countries in their long run model in order to determine both transmission and
generation capacity. The model of Fehr and Sandsbraten (1994) is restricted to two countries
and two technologies for electricity generation (hydro power and thermal power).
Market power is one of the subjects that was most often studied in all markets and, in
particular, on wholesale electricity markets. Several methods have been used in industrial
organisation to measure market power in electricity markets. Multiple studies found in the
literature analysed how prices are affected by competition in electricity markets and measure
the departure from marginal cost pricing. Researchers have developed alternative approaches
to analyse the potential for market power which basically involve the simulation of market
50
outcomes using the available cost data and oligopoly equilibrium concepts. These models can
be divided into either Cournot (simulation) approach or Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE)
approach.
An electricity market simulation model is appointed for the cases where we have more than
one firm in the market leading to a higher complexity of the reality, as it considers interactive
effects between different generators at different points in the supply curve at different times of
the day. These are the main features of an electricity market. According to these models, if one
finds a difference between oligopolistic price and competitive price then it means the presence
of market power.
It is commonly accepted in the literature that Cournot quantity setting is not perfect to
model reality in electricity market, but the existence of generation capacity constraints (at
least during peak periods) in these markets and the presence of increasing marginal costs of
producing electricity justify the choice. Another fact that justifies the use of this approach is
the existence of a centralized price mechanism in electricity markets. The capacity constraints
on generation are significant in both the medium term and the short term when plants are
turned into "unavailable" due to maintenance or other reliability considerations. Short term
constraints are more relevant in our study, since the capacity investment of the major players
have already taken place. Therefore, Cournot competition seems to represent (fairly) realis-
tically firm behaviour in an electricity market where generators are competing with relatively
"steep" marginal costs and where capacity constraints exist.
There have been numerous studies of oligopoly behaviour in restructured electricity market
that rely on the Cournot framework to infer market power. For the Californian wholesale
market, Borenstein et al (1996) and Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) use a Cournot model with
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competitive fringe. The inefficiencies due to deregulation of the wholesale market was also
studied in the same framework through the application of a Cournot model in Borenstein et
al (2002). The question of the impact of strategic hydro scheduling on market power may also
be analysed using this approach, as Bushnell (2000) did. Adding to the Californian market,
also the Spanish market (Ocana and Romero, 1997) and the Swedish market (Andersson and
Bergman, 1995) were simulated with this approach. All these examples illustrate the flexibility
of the Cournot simulation to study electricity markets.
The alternative approach, the SFE, is based on the assumption that under uncertainty
firms adopt supply functions/ as strategic variables rather than prices or quantities. The most
important advantage of SFE approach is the better representation of firms' behaviour when they
have to bid a single curve that will be applied to different demand states. However, the supply
function model also has a weakness that may limit its usefulness particularly when applied
to certain electricity markets: the inability to combine the model with detailled production
costs data. Generally, the studies using SFE make use of stylised representations of generators
costs to develop smooth continuous curves, because solving for supply curve equilibria requires
relatively well-behaved cost and revenue functions.
Moreover, in some markets, trade does not occur exclusively, or even primarily, through a
supply function bid process. Bilateral trading of specified quantities is usual in many restruc-
tured markets as are in future markets and in different forms of spot markets. According to its
features, SFE models are not well suited to markets where these situations happen or where
competitive characteristics vary between different periods, as it was pointed by Bushnell (2000).
2In SFE models, firms compete by bidding supply functions which state the relationship between the
price and the supply offered by a firm at that price.
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Additionally, the SFE approach does not feature well in markets where there is a competitive
fringe. This is due to the fact that supply function models are based on the assumption that
the slope of the demand function does not vary across time periods. The introduction of a
significant price-taking fringe results in demand curves that are kinked at the points at which
these constraints become binding. The slope of demand does not only change as demand
increases, but this change is endogenous to the output decisions of the strategic firms. Overall,
the SFE approach is accurate in one important aspect of restructured electricity markets related
with the rule of bidding, but it is not as flexible as the Cournot approach in incorporating other
institutional aspects of the market.
Klemperer and Meyer (1989) have developed the first model using the SFE approach. Some
of the most important literature in this vein is concerned with market power on wholesale
spot market, particularly after deregulation in several different countries. Green and Newbery
(1992) apply this approach to the British Electricity spot market, assuming a sectorial structure
dominated by two firms and considering an affine demand function and linear marginal cost to
construct the corresponding bid curves. It can be also found some attempts to overcome some
disadvantages pointed out before, namely incorporating the role of a market for futures and/or
forward contracts to mitigate market power in electricity markets (Newbery, 1998).
Our choice: Cournot simulation market
In our research, the role of marginal cost curves of each firm is very important and one of our
concerns is the accuracy on the assumptions about costs. Thus, we do not assume smooth and
well-behaved cost curves and we use detailed production data that lead to steep functions that
are not convenient for solving with a SFE approach.
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Our choice for the Cournot simulation model is also justified by the adequacy to the real
market. First, in MIBEL, firms will bid supply curves, but they are permitted to bid a different
supply curve for each hour of the day. Second, in MIBEL, according to the current features of
each market and the expected evolution of the integrated market, there will be a competitive
fringe, so it is relevant for the final conclusions and results considered it in the simulation model.
For all the above reasons, the Cournot simulation approach seems to be an appropriate
starting point. Even as a base scenario, the Cournot analysis will be useful as an indicator for
the need for regulation in the case of potential exercise of market power.
2.4 Oligopoly simulation model
Our model is constructed along the same base lines of Borenstein and Bushnell (1999)'s analy-
sis of California's power pool, with a different purpose and some different assumptions. They
use it to infer market power after deregulation and we use it to assess the exercise of market
power after regional market integration. The electricity market is modelled at the level of the
wholesale markets, as in Amudsen et al (1994). In our case, differently from Borenstein and
Bushnell (1999), the market size increases as both electricity markets integrate. The benefits of
enlarging the geographical scope of power markets are, according to economic theory, increas-
ing economic efficiency and lowering market concentration. Even though the literature has
extensively explored the question of how integration affects the welfare properties of electricity
markets, more results and conclusions on market performance and on the exercise of market
power are needed under realistic assumptions and considering the special features of electricity
markets.
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The simulation will have, essentially, three steps and is similar to a merger assessment.
First, it is necessary to choose the nature of competitive interaction between the firms in both
separate markets, before integration. The model that best describes firm's behaviour in both
markets is an oligopolistic model. According to the features of each market (described in section
2.2) we conclude that for Portugal we will use a model of leadership with competitive fringe
and for Spain a Cournot model with competitive fringe.
According to Scherer (1970, 164), a "Dominant firm price leadership occurs when an industry
consists of one firm dominant on the customary sense of the word", i.e. controlling at least 50%
of the total industry output - plus a competitive fringe of firms, each too small to have influence
on price through its individual output decisions. Since EDP had, in 2004, more than 60% of
the total electricity in Portugal and we infer from market information that the remaining firms
do not have any ability to change prices with their actions or decisions the choice for the model
of a leader with a competitive fringe for Portugal is justified.
For Spain the choice of a Cournot model with competitive fringe is justified by the presence
of the four firms with similar importance on production and installed capacity. The remaining
firms with less than 5% of the market compose the competitive fringe.
Next we should choose the model that better fits the integrated market, the MIBEL. In
order to simulate the Iberian market, we decided also for a Cournot model with a competitive
fringe. After integration we assume that only the five largest firms present in both markets
behave strategically as Cournot competitors (Endesa, Iberdrola, Union Fenosa, EDP and Hidro-
cantabrico), In equilibrium, each of the five firms considers the output of all the other firms as
fixed and sets its own output that maximises its profits. All other producers (from both coun-
tries) are assumed to behave competitively and are modelled as a competitive fringe, taking
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market price as given.
In a second step we should have a fully specified model through some specification assump-
tions and through parameter calibration based on pre-integration data. At this point we must
decide on the specification of demand and we should have available information on marginal
costs of the firms and installed capacity for each firm. To calibrate the parameters of the
model we use the specification for the demand function chosen and we substitute data in cur-
rent wholesale prices and quantities into the model. The last step is to determine prices and
quantities before and after integration and specify the changes occurred with the integration
process.
We follow Wolfram (1999), Borenstein et al (2002) and Joskow and Kahn (2002) by measur-
ing market power by the difference between simulated (oligopoly) market prices and estimates
of competitive prices. The competitive price is defined as the expected marginal cost of the
highest generating plant in the industry required to meet electricity demand.
The idea of the simulation is to compare four time periods in a defined year (2004) consid-
ering two cases: without integration (two separate markets) and with full integration. The year
chosen was 2004, because it was, according to hydrological conditions, the most recent year that
could be considered as "normal" (not too dry or too wet). The choice of a normal hydrological
year allows us to identify a base case for comparison. However, the simulation conclusions may
be extended to allow for years with different hydrological conditions.
The equilibrium at the demand levels is determined for four Wednesdays: two in December
(15th and 22nd) and two in June (16th and 30th). Wednesday is the weekday usually described
in the generators' reports as having typical features. The selection of the month was made to
account for seasonal variations in availability of hydro generation capacity. For each of these
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days, we chose market price and quantities for two representative hours: a peak demand hour
and an off peak demand hour.
Each day is traditionally divided in three periods: peak, mid-peak and off peak. The
definition of each period depends on the year's season (summer or winter). The summer period
is May through October and the winter period is January through April and November and
December. The following table (Table 2.2) shows the definition for both countries of peak hour
time and off peak hour time.
Table 2.2
Definition of peak hours and off peak hours, Portugal and Spain
Peak hour Off peak hour
Summer 9h15 to 12h15 2h to 6h
Portugal 9h30 to 12h
Winter 2h to 6h
18h30 to 2Ih
Spain Summer 8h to I6h Oh to 6h
Winter I6h to 23h Oh to 6h
Source: ERSE, CNE
In Table 2.3 are presented the real values for the market outcomes for both countries in the
chosen days. A more detailed description of the data can be found in Appendix A.
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Table 2.3
Market prices and quantities, Portugal and Spain, 2004
WINTER SUMMER
15th Dec 22nd Dec 16th June 30th June
on e.eak 0!1.e.eak on e.eak of1.eeak on peak 0!1.e.eak one.eak 0!1.e,eak
20h 3h 20h 3h llh 3h llh 3h
Portugal MWh 7617.1 4486.7 7558.6 4576.8 6657.5 4083.1 6703.1 4094.7
cent€/KWh 5.243 5.243
Spain MWh 29797 22272 26006.4 21486 27201 19408 27263 22142
cent€/KWh 5.846 3.077 3.994 1.955 2.7 1.452 3.5 2.437
Source:EDP and OMEL
The replication of the strategic behaviour of each player in the market as a Cournot com-
petitor allows the definition of the oligopolistic market price. If we compare it to prices from
perfect competition (according to marginal costs), we define the Industry Lerner Index.
The model considered in our research is static and is a short term model in the sense that
the capacity for generation of each firm is exogenously determined. Therefore, our model does
not incorporate explicitly any dynamic aspect, such as the effect of current and potential new
entry into the market or possible exit from the market. The main difficulty in introducing
these aspects into a short run analysis is considering the measure of the velocity of the changes.
However, it is possible to infer some results in our model for these aspects allowing for long
run elasticities of demand in the demand specification. Hence, entry and exit considerations
are implicitly considered by examining long run (more elastic) demand functions. The results
for the long run own price elasticity may be used as guide for the ability of firms in the market
to exercise market power in the presence of potential entry.
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2.4.1 Specification of demand of electricity
Each market price-quantity pair chosen is an anchor point for each period. Given that there is
only one pair for each period, it is not possible to directly estimate the electricity demand func-
tion. Therefore, we will choose an appropriate functional form and following we parameterise
it, using each period's anchor point and the assumption for the values of the price elasticity of
demand.
The functional forms specified for the electricity demand equations have mostly been the
double logarithmic form and the linear form. The log-log form is convenient because the para-
meter estimate measures elasticity directly, while linear form is preferred by those who question
the reasonableness of assuming constant elasticities at all price levels. In the first case, the de-
pendent variables and the independent variables are both expressed in terms of their logarithmic
values and the elasticity of demand is assumed to be constant.
We represent the demand for electricity in each market with a constant elasticity demand
function of the double log form used in the literature on electricity demand, where Qt would
represent the total demand, Pt the price and Et the own price elasticity of demand. The function
is fully specified if the value of parameters at and Et are known,
As in Green and Newbery's study (1992), we have chosen to pre-set values for the price
elasticity of demand and then determine the values of slope E and at according to real data of
demanded quantities and market prices. Therefore, at and Etare positive parameters determined
by a calibration process. The calibration process determines the parameters in such a manner
that the market prices match market quantities for the given own price pre-set elasticities. The
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slope parameter (Et) is calculated such that it equals the price elasticity at the demand level
and the intercept at is calculated to fit the anchor-pair quantity- price. Both parameters are
different, depending on the period analysed.
The chosen price elasticities are used to define the specification for demand functions on peak
and on off peak times for the chosen days in 2004. Therefore, different demand specifications
for each period considered are available for the simulation model. All specifications will be
used as input for the Cournot model in order to assess the existence of market power in several
realities, before and after integration.
Although a constant elasticity demand curve with elasticity less than one may cause a
monopolist to charge an infinite price, it is guaranteed in the model that the Cournot firms
would, in this scenario, face their residual demand, insuring a finite price. Cournot players
choose their output facing the result of subtracting the aggregate fringe supply from the market
demand. This residual demand will be more elastic than the initial demand for every price.
To obtain the aggregate fringe supply at any price, we add together the quantity that each
price-taking firm would produce if it produced every unit of output for which its marginal cost
was lower than the price.
Demand for electricity and own price elasticity
The purpose of this section is to survey the results of several academic literature on own price
elasticity of electricity demand in order to choose the appropriate values to be used in our
demand specification. This same approach was used in other past studies of market power in
European electricity markets (see Andersson and Bergman, 1995 and Borenstein and Bushnell,
1999).
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Within the last decade, the demand for electricity has been the focus of numerous econo-
metric studies and the price elasticity of electricity demand is one of the main concerns found.
Although this literature is not limited to the residential sector, it contains a good part of it.
Typically empirical papers on this topic have related electricity consumption to a variety
of economic and demographic variables and have yield estimates of long run or short run
price elasticities, or both. Demand elasticities estimations vary considerably and this may be
attributed to the different time periods considered, the different consumer categories studied
or the different models and methods employed.
Most price elasticity studies before 2000 are captured in one of the following surveys. Tay-
lor (1975) is one of the first surveys on this subject. He reviewed 10 studies on residential,
commercial, and industrial electricity demand. All studies are on aggregate data and he finds
large differences in estimated long run and short run elasticities. For residential electricity,
he reported that short-run price elasticities varied from -0.90 to -0.13. Long-run price elas-
ticities ranged from -2.00 to near zero. The only study on commercial price elasticities that
distinguished between long-run and short run elasticities reported a short-run price elasticity
of -0.17 and a long run elasticity of -1.36. For industrial demand, on the short run, he reports
one research stating -0.22 and for the long run the range goes from -1.25 to 1.94.
Taylor (1977) extends the former survey with eight additional studies, where he reviews the
existing econometric evidence until 1976 on price (and income) elasticities for each major type of
energy. His conclusions include a lower long run price elasticity with a maximum price elasticity
of 1 in absolute value for residential demand. On demand for industrial and commercial sector
he finds it still to be under researched. Both surveys led to the conclusions that the overall
short run price elasticity for electricity is -0.2 and the long run elasticity is between -0.9 and
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-0.7.
Bohi (1981) does a more extensive survey and draws conclusions from a larger sample
of studies. He divided the 25 studies of residential demand for electricity into reduced form
models, structural models, or fuel share models, with subdivisions according to aggregate data,
disaggregate data, or data by industry and whether the price variable is average or marginal.
He notes the wide difference between short run elasticities varying from -0.54 to -0.03 and
long run price elasticities varying from -2.10 to -0.45. He found that the few existing studies
on commercial demand indicated that long-run demand is elastic, while studies of industrial
demand, which are severely criticised, have a consensus estimate of price elasticity of -1.3.
Another comprehensive review of studies on energy demand is Bohi and Zimmerman (1984).
They surveyed the existing research on demand in the residential, commercial, and industrial
sectors not only for electricity, but also for natural gas, fuel oil and gasoline. As pointed out
by Taylor (1977), in what concerns electricity price elasticity, they conclude that for residential
consumers it equals -0.2 in the short run and -0.7 in the long run, but they also state that the
values for estimates in commercial and industrial sectors were too variable to take any clear
conclusions. Moreover, they conclude that even if the long-run estimates vary considerably
between studies, overall it is below 1 in absolute terms.
Dahl (1993) provides a wide survey of energy price elasticities for the developing world.
Similarly to previous surveys, they mention that there is a wide variance in price elasticity
estimates. The conclusion, even if cautious, shows a long run price elasticity for aggregate
demand for electricity to be near -1.0 and a long run price elasticity for the residential sector
between -0.91 and -0.75. Atkinson and Manning (1994) provide an overview of elasticities
estimated mainly for developed countries. In general, in the long run, price elasticities vary
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from about -0.2 to -1, while short-term price elasticities are reported to be about half those
values.
A meta - analysis by Espey and Espey (2004) states that price elasticities reported in the
literature published between 1971 and 2000 range from 0.076 to -2.01 for the short run and
from -0.07 to -2.5 for the long run. They show that the average residential electricity price
elasticity among these earlier studies is -0.35 in the short run and -0.85 in the long run.
We can find applications to non European countries (Bernard et al, 1996; Houthakker et
al, 1974; Houthakker, 1980; Hsing, 1994; Silk and Joutz, 1997; Narayan and Smyth, 2005) and
to European countries. Since our aim is to find an appropriate value for price elasticity for
Portugal and Spain, the last group of research will be more suitable for comparison. Previous
examples of research works are for the United Kingdom (Dodgson et al, 1990; Henley and
Peirson, 1998), Greece (Donatos and Mergos, 1991), Switzerland (Filippini, 1999), Denmark
(Bjerner et aI, 2001; Bjorner and Jensen, 2002) or Southern European Countries (limi, 2010).
Table 2.4 summarises some estimates of own price elasticities found for European countries or
European regions.
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Table 2.4
Comparison of some past empirical results for price elasticity of electricity
demand, European Countries
Country Authors Elr4lirical method Period res/ind
Own Price elasticit~
short run long run
Finland Ilmakunnas and Factor substitution 1960-1981 ind -0.74
Torma (1989) model
England and Dodgson et al panel data model 1974/75 to res -0.08
Wales (1990) 1984/85
England Henley and panel data model April 1989 - res -0.25 to 0.07
Peirson (1998) March 1990
IJ< Baker and Extended Almost 1978-88 res -0.673 (wint) / -1.033
Blundell (1991) Ideal Model (sum)
IIOrway Nesbakken cross sectional 1993-1995 all res -0.5
(1999) model each year -0.24 to -0.57
Halvorsen and discrete-continuos 1975-1994 res -0.433 -0.442
Larsen (2001) model
Denmark Bj0rner et al panel data model 1983- 1996 ind -0.48
(2001)
Bj0rner and panel data model 1983- 1997 ind -0.34; -0.28
Jensen (2002)
Sweden Brannlund et al Almost Ideal 1980-1997 ind -0.24
(2007) Model
Cyprus Zachariadis and Cointegration and 1960-2004 res / -0.10 -0.30 to -0.43
Pashourtidou error correction services
(2007) model
Raly Bianco et al time series model 1970-2007 res -0.06 -0.24
(2009)
EU*(and US) Azevedo et al panel data models 1990-2004 all -0.20 to -0.25
(2011) only EU -0.20
9West Hesse and Translog 1960-72 e all -0.3
European Tarkka (1986) 1973-80
Countries**
Note:* Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, US, Canada, Australia, Japan and
New Zealand.*'" Belgium, Finland, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK.
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Past empirical studies have estimated widely varying price elasticities, ranging from -1.0
to zero. This wide interval reflects differences in the geographic regions examined, as well as
considerable variation in data quality and statistical techniques.
Nesbakken (1999) studied the price sensitivity of residential energy consumption by using
cross section data from the Norwegian consumer expenditure survey for the 1993-1995 period.
The results show that the energy price sensitivity in residential energy consumption varies from
year to year but it is higher than the surveyed values.
Azevedo et al (2011) assess the price elasticity for household electricity consumption in (the
US and) the EU. For all models tested, EU price elasticity is estimated to be around -0.2.
Bianco et al (2009) investigate demand of electricity in Italy. Their results are also different
from other research already mentioned, -0.06 on the short run and -0.24 on the long run.
Moreover, other conclusions seem to be clear. First, the estimated elasticities have wide
variation and cannot be easily compared directly with one another and there is a risk of over-
generalizing our results. Second, most of the results are for residential demand and there are
fewer commercial and industrial studies to survey. Even if price elasticities for the industrial
sector are significantly lower than those for the non-industrial sector, there does not seem to be
a consistent pattern. Therefore, it might make sense to use the same estimates in all sectors.
Thirdly, the short run price elasticity is assumed to be lower than the long run elasticity and
with respect to season there seems to be no reason to assume any differences in price elasticities
(Amudsen and Tj4>tta, 1997). Finally, in all cases electricity demand is inelastic to own price.
However, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusion from previous literature with respect
to the values of price elasticities estimated for the countries included in our study (Portugal
and Spain), because for both countries research on electricity demand is scarce. For Spain,
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few works can be mentioned that may guide our choice. Labandeira et al. (2006) estimate
residential and industrial electricity demand using panel data within a context of individual
demand equations. They concluded that residential own price elasticity ranges from -0.96 to
-0.45 for short run.
Labandeira et al (2011) show only a short-term estimation per group of consumers. Their
results present a residential demand of electricity that is more rigid than the one obtained by
Labandeira et al (2006), with elasticities ranging from -0.03 (firms) to -0.25 (households). For
the long run, we should mention results from Buisan (1992) about residential demand in Spain.
On her conclusions she finds a price elasticity for the long run of -0.5.
Academic literature on electricity demand for Portugal is even more limited. According to
our best knowledge there is no available research on this subject. Given this lack of information
to guide our choice, our approach was to find results for a European country similar to Portugal
concerning the dimension of the market (total consumption of electricity). According to this
criteria, Portugal may be similar to Greece and Switzerland. In what concerns research on
Greek electricity demand, we can find several results. However, the interval of estimates is,
even in this case, large. The short run elasticity goes from -0.51 to -0.21 and in the long run
takes values on the interval -0.85 to -0.24.The range of price elasticities estimated in some of
these studies is shown in Table 2.5.
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Table 2.5
Review of own price elasticity estimates for electricity demand for Greece
Greece
Short run Long run
Viachou and Samouilidis (1986) ind -0.31
Donatos and Mergos (1991) res -0.21 -0.58
Caloghirou et al (1997) ind -0.51 - 0.77
Christodoulakis et al (2000) -0.23 -0.24
Hondroyiannis (2004) res inel -0.41
Rapanos and Polemis (2006) res -0.31 -0.60
Polemis (2007)* ind -0.35 -0.85
Note:* also estimates an oil demand function separately.
Due to the large variation of price-elasticities estimates available in the literature, the usual
approach followed in the literature is to report the results of the model for different values
of elasticities. Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) assume a constant elasticity of demand and
estimates the model for -0.1, -0.4 and -1.0. Andersson and Bergman (1995) use -0.3 as the
value of own price elasticity. Bushnell (1998) assumed -0.1 at peak forecasted price/quantity
point and Wolfram (1999) uses a linear demand with a price elasticity of -0.17. In particular,
usually the market demand is usually estimated for several assumptions of own price elasticity
of demand.
In some other literature the authors assume a unique value, based on former knowledge.
Andersson and Bergman (1995) based their analysis for the deregulated Swedish electricity
market assuming -0.3 and -0.6, for short run and long run respectively. The Department of
Energy has used short-run and long-run own-price elasticity values of - 0.1 and - 0.6. For current
government agency practice, the Energy Information Agency (EIA) historically employed a
short - term price elasticity of -0.15 for non-electric sectors. In their 2010 report, the EIA
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adopts a price elasticity of -0.3 (Alberini et al, 2011) for the short run. For the long run the
values assumed were higher, from -0.31 for 1999 to -0.49 for 2003.
For our research we choose the second option and we set the value of price elasticity for
each country reflecting our survey of previous literature and the conclusions above. The values
assumed, displayed in Table 2.6, are measured at the anchor points and in line with the wide-
spread perception that electricity demand is not very sensitive to own price changes. Once the
value of price elasticities of electricity demand are chosen, we use this information to simulate
the market in order to analyse the exercise of market power in the Iberian Integrated market.
Table 2.6
Choice of own price elasticities for the demand specification
Portugal Spain
Short run 0.3
Longrun 0.6
0.25
0.5
Note: Values in absolute terms.
2.4.2 Firm's marginal costs
The total cost of any good is the sum of all expenses to produce it. In electricity generation, the
good is electricity generated and supplied to distribution. To generate electricity, a generation
plant and fuel is needed. Consequently, the marginal cost of generation includes fuel consump-
tion and operational and maintenance expenses. To estimate the marginal cost of production
for each firm, we need data on all generation plants that constitute the capital of the generation
firm or, in our case, data on all generation plants by source of generation. Transportation or
distribution costs will not be included in the relevant costs, because the purpose is to study the
wholesale market and we do not need to account for the costs in the distribution sector.
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An inverted L is the typical shape of the cost function of generators, with each step corre-
sponding to a different fuel for generation. This means that generators have constant marginal
costs up to the capacity constraints, where the costs increase very rapidly.
Following Borenstein and Bushnell (1999), three categories of generation plants must be
considered, taking into account the specific generation mix of the firm: fossil fuel generation,
nuclear generation and hydroelectric generation. This separation is essential to accurately
determine generation marginal costs, since the treatment of marginal costs on each of them is
different. We assume that marginal cost are the same as the average variable costs, and can be
divided into costs of fuel and operational and maintenance (average) costs.
The cost of fuel comprises the major component of the marginal cost of fossil fuel generation.
Therefore, each firm's marginal cost curve is specified using fuel prices for electricity production,
efficiency rates of each fuel and heat rate of each fuel. The expression used for the calculation
is the following:
Fuel cost (€jKWh) = Fuel price * (Efficiency Rate * Heat rate}"!
The efficiency rate and the heat rate for each fuel are displayed in the Table 2.7.
Table 2.1
Heat Rate and Efficiency Rate for each fuel type
Heat Rate Efficiency Rate
Coal Kcal/Kg 5500 0.33
Natural Gas Kcal/rn" 9047 0.55
Fueloil Kcal/Kg 9400 0.33
Gasoil Kcal/Kg 9700 0.28
Source: eNE, AlE
69
As an example, the variable cost of coal for Spain is given by
Cost of Coal (€jKWh) = 8,94*(5500*0.33*0.001163)-1 = 4.236
To calculate the marginal cost of each type of fuel we should add the operational and
maintenance cost per KWh to the fuel cost. This data was obtained on generators' reports, by
dividing all the operational and maintenance expenses in the year by the total production of
electricity.
For the nuclear marginal cost we use the information released by the Foro de la Industria
Nuclear Espanola. Their report determines the cost of nuclear generation using a method similar
to the one used by us for the remaining sources. The cost of each KWh is divided in three
components: fuel, operational and maintenance costs. The last fraction of the cost is obtained
as a mean value for all the forecasted time of a nuclear plant.
Hydroelectric plants are considered, usually, as zero marginal cost facilities, due to their
negligible amount. Another alternative assumption that can be considered is the also tradition-
ally idea that hydro energy has an opportunity cost equal to the operating cost of the thermal
power plant that replaces marginally in each period. We use the first assumption for simplicity
purposes. More on the treatment of hydrogeneration will be discussed in a latter section.
The special regime generators (wind, solar generation and cogeneration) operate under a
regulatory side agreement, thus it is always infra-marginal to the market. These facilities
always operate when they physically can and the production is always acquired by the unique
distributor. Consequently, we are not considering the generation from these utilities in our
model. Moreover, special generation represented a small part of the supply in 2004 so this
absence is not determinant for the market equilibrium.
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After calculating the marginal cost per source of generation, merit order will be assumed
on generation plants for each generator. This means that the firm always starts using a source
with lower marginal cost before a source with higher cost and that the firm does not start using
a new source before reaching "full capacity" in the previous one. According to this assumption
we are able to construct the cost function of each firm only after determining output capacity
for each fuel.
The maximum output capacity must also be allocated to each firm which corresponds to
the capacity constraint. Full capacity should be defined as less than the plant's engineering
capacity (maximum capacity) since it may not be possible to run the plant at the theoretical
engineering capacity. Each plant, by generation source, has defined an outage rate, OR, which
represents the probability of an outage in any given hour. We use the total outage rate for each
type of plant, reported by the generators. Therefore, according to Borenstein et al (2002), the
capacity of each firm should be determined using the concept of effective capacity, re-rating the
maximum capacity using an availability factor (I-OR):
Effective Capacity = maximum capacity *(l-OR).
Following this procedure we finally find the steep marginal cost functions for each generation
firm. Figures BI to B3 in Appendix B show some of the marginal cost estimates for the
generators in Portugal, Spain and MIBEL, as explained in the present section.
2.4.3 Other assumptions
Electricity is sold in different sub-markets such as the spot market, the day-ahead market, the
long term contracts market (physical or financial) and the ancillary services market. All these
71
sub-markets outcomes should emerge in price in wholesale electricity market. If the system
rules are appropriately designed and do not give an advantage to transactions in a particular
sub-market, the price for electricity in each of these markets is likely to be the same. This is
due to the fact that the existence of arbitrage will remove all the significant price differences
between the markets. We assume that arbitrage is possible in MIBEL and that the system rules
are set in order to provide the same advantages to all markets. Therefore, in our case, the price
of electricity will essentially depend on firms' marginal costs and generation capacities and on
demand elasticity.
In order to infer potential market power, we have to make two further assumptions. First,
marginal costs of the firms will not change with the integration. And, second, the demand
function after integration will be the sum of the individual demand functions before integration
for each country.
2.4.4 Implementation of oligopoly simulation methodology
The presence of marginal cost functions from each firm that are not continuous makes it im-
possible to apply the usual maximisation procedure. The existence of capacity constraints does
not allow also the usual method for solving a Cournot model. Therefore, in this case, Cournot
equilibrium is iteratively estimated, determining profit maximisation output for each genera-
tor under the assumption that the other competitors will not change their production level
decisions. This will be repeated for each Cournot firm, until equilibrium is found.
The iterative process is described as follows. First, one of the (larger) generators sets
output assuming the others will have no output; the second sets it output assuming that the
first will maintain its output at the level that was calculated in the previous iteration; the
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third will choose the profit maximising output, considering that the two firms before do not
change their decisions (found on previous steps) and so on. All this iterative process will be
repeated, returning to each maximisation problem for a given generator, based upon the most
recent output decisions for the others. The process will continue to the point that no generator
can profit from changing its output, given the output decided by others. At this point the
equilibrium is found.
Due to the shape of the marginal cost of electricity generators, the residual demand has
flat regions. Therefore, the marginal revenue curve related to the demand curve may have
discontinuities. This may result in a multiple local maximum for the maximisation problem.
To solve the problem we use different starting points for the iteration, that means starting the
iteration with different firms being the first to set output, assuming the others produce nothing
and redo all the iterative process, trying to find if this change in the starting point will lead
to different final solutions. If it changes, we should pick the solution that is most similar to
the market data collected. If otherwise, the solution is not sensitive to that change and the
equilibrium solution was found for the generated quantity of each firm and, therefore, for the
market.
2.5 Simulation results and discussion
A first question for the analysis of market power is the identification of the geographic scope
of the market or the relevant market (Werden, 1996). In our analysis, the relevant market is
the Iberian Peninsula (as defined in a previous section), considering absence of transmission
constraints after integration (all the problems of interconnections are assumed to be solved)
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inside the Iberian market. We will also assume that transmission losses are not very significant.
Our main aim in this chapter is to describe and discuss our results from the simulation
model in two perspectives: static (short run) and incorporating some dynamic aspects (long
run). The main difference between the two perspectives is the assumption for the own price
elasticity on the demand function.
We will infer the evolution of market outcomes and market shares from the Iberian integra-
tion. In a second part, we should confirm that market power will decrease, as expected, after
integration and, if this is the case, infer by how much it will decrease. In both parts our aim is
also to discuss who wins and who loses with the integration process.
2.5.1 Static perspective (short run)
Effect on market outcomes
In 2004 electricity prices (tariffs) in Portugal were set by law and consequently the simulated
outcomes (from the leadership with a competitive fringe model) do not match the real data
very well. Even for the Spanish market, the model chosen leads to results above the real data.
One of the main drawbacks of Cournot simulation models is that generators' strategies are
expressed in term of quantities and not in terms of supply curves. This implies that prices
are determined only by demand functions and therefore these are extremely sensitive to the
demand representation. One of the consequences of this sensitivity is that calculated prices
tend to be higher than observed. As we focus on analytical results, this is not such a drawback.
Table 2.8 shows the simulation results for the two scenarios, before and after integration,
showing prices and outputs of the competitive solution, the Cournot solution and real price and
quantity in each of the demand hours selected.
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Based on the comparison of the simulated values, we can conclude that there will be a
decrease in the wholesale price after integration in both on peak and off peak hours, as was
expected. This impact finds evidence, regardless of the hydrogeneration conditions. For on
peak hours the decrease on price seems to be higher than on off peak hours for both countries.
This evolution was expected, because in a fully integrated market, a decrease in prices is
forecasted, also due to the increase in the dimension of the market. To this fact should contribute
the availability of more diversified and efficient (Spanish) firms. Another justification for this
evolution of prices is the presence of more competition in the market and the role of imports
as a limiting factor to the exercise of market power.
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Table 2.8
Market outcomes: Portugal, Spain and MIBEL (Short run)
before integration after integration
Portugal Spain MIBEL
16th
on peak of/peak on peak off peak on peak off peak
"t:I competitive price (c€/KWh) 0.00 0.00 1.10 0.00 1.07 1.07
Qj...
III
Price (c€/KWh) 132.3 25.9 18.0 7.3 7.7 3.4:;
E
Vi Mkt Quantity (MWh) 2527.598 16928.567 12945.444 26988.696 20411.737
~ Price (c€/KWh) 5.24 2.7 1.45.0 iiiE Qj
Qj a: Quantity (MWh) 6657.5 4083.1 27201 19408lrl
0... 30th
S on peak off peak on peak off peak on peak off peakc
j "t:I competitive pri ce (c€/KWh) 0.00 0.00 1.10 1.10 1.07 1.07
.l!l
III
Price (c€/KWh) 135.4 26.2 21.4 9.3 7.7 3.4:;
E
Vi Mkt Quantity (MWh) 2527598.63 17344.326 15850.934 26988.696 22621.966
iii Price (c€/KWh) 5.24 3.5 2.44
Qja: Quantity (MWh) 6703.1 4094.7 27263 22142
15th
on peak off peak on peak off peak on peak off peak
"t:I competitive price (c€/KWh) 0.00 0.00 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10
.l!l
III Price (c€/KWh) 190.7 32.7 28.8 8.6 7.06 4.04:;
E
Vi Mkt Quantity (MWh) 2591.440 19998.982 17216.161 26460.724 20981.220
Qj' iii Price (c€/KWh) 5.24 5.85 3.08s::: Qj::s a:~ Quantity (MWh) 7558.6 4576.8 29797 22272
t
E 22th
~ on peak off peak on peak off peak on peak off peak
"t:I competitive price (c€/KWh) 0.00 0.00 1.10 0.00 1.10 0.00
Qj...
III Price (c€/KWh) 185.9 34.9 15.0 7.2 4.28 2.25:;
E
Vi Mkt Quantity (MWh) 2591.440 18620.458 15486.286 23666.140 18293.677
iii Price (c€/KWh) 5.24 3.99 1.96
OJa: Quantity (MWh) 7617.1 4486.7 26006.4 21486
As well as price decreasing when there is integration of markets, total production will be
higher than the sum for the two markets before integration. Therefore, for consumers in both
countries, there will be more electricity available for consumption, namely during peak hours.
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Table 2.9 shows the simulated values of generators' market share, before and after integra-
tion. In this table, we try to infer which are the firms that will have more benefits with the
integration and the ones that will not. We compare the simulated market share of the firm on
the total of the two countries before integration and after integration.
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Table 2.9
Market shares: Portugal, Spain and MIBEL (Short run)
before integration after integration before integration after integration
Portugal Spain MIBEL Portugal Spain MIBEL
On peak Of/peak
16th
Mkt shares (%) Mkt shares (%)
firm Pl 3.9 15.37 firm Pl 4.91 20.32
firm 51 21.75 22.36 firm 51 20.92 27.61
firm 52 12.66 25.98 firm 52 9.68 28.67
firm 53 6.25 7.74 firm 53 3.49 2.71
-c- firm 54 9.99 13.13 firm 54 6.79 11.13
Cl)
.c fringe 9.09 15.6 15.43 fringe 11.43 19.62 9.57E
fl Mkt quantity (MWh) 2527.598 16928.567 26988.696 Mkt qua ntity (MWh) 2527.598 12945.444 20411.737
Cl)
C.. 30th
GI.. Mkt shares (%) Mkt shares (%)c
~ firm Pl 3.82 15.37 firm Pl 4.13 18.34
firm 51 21.82 22.36 firm 51 21.56 24.91
firm 52 12.97 25.98 firm 52 11.85 25.87
firm 53 6.25 7.74 firm 53 5.86 2.45
firm 54 10.61 13.13 firm 54 8.77 10.04
fringe 8.90 15.28 15.43 fringe 9.62 16.52 18.40
Mkt quantity (MWh) 2527.599 17344.326 26988.696 Mkt qua ntity (MWh) 2527.599 15850.934 22621.966
15th
Mkt shares (%) Mkt shares (%)
firm Pl 3.44 15.68 firm Pl 3.92 19.77
firm 51 22.13 23.09 firm 51 21.73 26.86
firm 52 14.95 27.40 firm 52 12.87 27.05
firm 53 6.21 7.85 firm 53 5.86 2.96
firm 54 12.47 12.68 firm 54 8.65 10.71
Qj"
fringe 8.03 16.62 13.31 fringe 9.16 18.96 12.65c
::s
:::l. Mkt quantity (MWh) 2591.440 19998.982 26460.724 Mkt quantity (MWh) 2591.440 17216.161 20981.220..
GI
E 22ndE
:I Mkt shares (%) Mkt shares (%)III
firm Pl 3.67 17.53 firm Pl 4.30 22.67
firm 51 21.95 23.81 firm 51 21.42 30.80
firm 52 13.92 27.68 firm 52 11.58 32.59
firm 53 6.21 3.89 firm 53 4.08 3.00
firm 54 10.41 12.22 firm 54 7.85 8.75
fringe 8.55 17.70 14.88 fringe 10.03 20.77 2.19
Mkt quantity (MWh) 2591.440 18620.458 23666.140 Mkt quantity (MWh) 2591.440 15486.286 18293.677
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The firms that take more advantages from integration are the largest firms whose market
shares always increase in all scenarios. We should stress that these results are based on the
assumption that there are no transmission constraints. Only in this case it is feasible for all
larger firms to seize all the benefits from integration.
The smaller firms in the market lose their position to the larger firms, as expected. For the
smaller firms (fringe firms) we can see a decrease in the market share in all cases. Moreover,
the new fringe of the Iberian market will have a lower market share compared with the one
represented by the sum of the two separate fringes before integration. The most efficient firms
may seize more benefits from the enlargement of the market. The smaller firms on the fringe
seem to feel some detrimental effects from integration. The firm 83 also loses a higher percentage
of market share with integration, namely in off peak hours.
In what concerns which country benefits most with the integration, the evidence seems to
be that Portugal will take more benefits. Not only Portuguese consumers may benefit from
the decrease on prices, if benefits pass on to the final market, but also the main incumbent
firm, PI, is the generator that has a higher increase on the market share, compared with before
integration.
Effect on Market Power: Lerner Index and HHI
The exercise of market power is evaluated by the Lerner Index, which is defined as (P-c)/P,
where P is the market price and c is the industry marginal cost at the Cournot quantity. The
Lerner index may assume the maximum value of one if prices are set above marginal cost and
value 0 if this price set in the market equals marginal cost. Table 2.10 shows the measure of
exercise of market power for each of the scenarios, before and after integration. Additional
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information is present in this table, the Hirshman Herfindahl Index", in order to infer the
differences on concentration level in the market.
Table 2.10
Lerner Index and HHI: Portugal, Spain and MIBEL (Short run)
Lerner Index HHI
before i ntegrati on afl!:c i Dt!:~cati QO before integration afl!:r i ol!:~catiQD
Portugal Spain MIBEl Portugal Spain MIBEl
... ::0 15th on peak 0.9 0.9 2678.58 1881.27
GI E off peak 1.0 0.7 2905.00 2219.58C Qj 1.0 5797.6
i ~ 30th on peak 0.9 0.9 2119.83 1881.27
off peak 0.9 0.7 2111.39 2071.20
... 16th on peak 1.0 0.8 2144.74 1929.00
GI~
off peak 0.9 0.7 2137.67 2127.58E Qjc: 1.0 5799.98E :l
::I~ 30th on peak 0.9 0.7 2130.10 2025.95
In
off peak 1.0 1.0 2202.65 2615.21
Before integration, and for all scenarios, there is evidence of the exercise of market power
in both countries and regardless of the hour considered (on peak or off peak). Market power
seems to be higher in Portugal for the majority of cases and even in Spain for some scenarios
the Lerner Index also assumes the value one.
In the literature we can find conclusions supporting the idea that market power is higher
during high demand periods (on peak) than it is during low demand periods (off peak). We
can confirm this for almost all the periods, except for the 30th of June. This is a period of dry
hydrological conditions.
After integration, we can conclude that market power will be lower, as expected. There is an
improvement, or at least we can find that the exercise of market power does not increase with
the creation of MIBEL. The decrease is higher for off peak times, for both countries. However,
3The HHI is the sum of the square of each firm's market share times 1000. For Cournot firms, market share
was defined as total firm output divided by market output.
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for the integrated market, higher market power seems to persist in both periods, on peak and
off peak period. It seems clear that market power is lower after market integration, as expected,
and that even decreasing it is still a feature of the regional integrated market.
Concentration measures may help to screen the potential exercise of market power. Even if
generators do not need to be large (in terms of market share) to have market power, it is true
that larger and fewer generators have more often ability to set prices above marginal cost than
smaller and more generators. In our model, the evidence seems to confirm a relation between
concentration and potential market power for most of the cases.
Competition authorities in Europe regard any industry with an HHI of above 1800 as being
concentrated. According to this criteria, Portugal, Spain and the MIBEL can be seen as
having highly concentrated markets. Portugal is by far more concentrated than Spain, as
we had expected. However, according to HHI there seems to exist also a huge improvement in
concentration with the integration of markets, namely for on peak hours in both hydrological
conditions and for both countries. These conclusions are also due to our assumptions that the
same generators are present before and after the integration and that we have not considered
entry or any other strategy that may change the number of firms in the market.
2.5.2 Incorporating dynamic aspects (long run)
In order to implicitly include some dynamic aspects in our model, as we explained before, we
have considered also the analysis for long run (more elastic) demand functions for the four days
chosen. The next three tables (2.11 to 2.13) present the results for the procedure from the
section above according to a long run analysis.
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Effect on market outcomes
The simulated market outcomes for the two scenarios, before and after integration, are described
in Table 2.11. It shows prices and outputs of the competitive solution, the Cournot solution
and real price and quantity in each of the demand hours selected. The simulated values for the
Portuguese and the Spanish markets are more similar to the real data on this analysis than in
the short run analysis.
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Table 2.11
Market outcomes, Portugal, Spain and MIBEL (Long run)
before integration after integration
Portugal Spain MIBEL
16th
on peak off peak on peak off peak on peak off peak
-0 competitive price (c€/KWh) 3.32 3.32 2.30 1.10 1.07 0.00
.2l
tU
Price (c€/KWh) 10.40 4.60 3.89 2.01 2.68 1.153
E
Vi Mkt Quantity (MWh) 4408.203 23392.710 16488.364 23622.514 19752.948
L:"
QI Price (c€/KWh) 5.24 2.70 1.45..c !ij
E QI
QI ex: Quantity (MWh) 6657.5 4083.1 27201 19408u
QI
C... 30th
GI.. on peak off peak on peak off peak on peak off peakc
~ -0 competitive price (c€/KWh) 3.32 3.32 2.40 1.10 1.07 0.00
QI....
tU
Price (c€/KWh) 10.50 4.60 4.10 3.50 2.68 1.153
E
Vi Mkt Quantity (MWh) 4408.203 25178.171 19498.374 236622.514 19752.948
!ij Price (c€/KWh) 5.24 3.50 2.44
QIex: Quantity (MWh) 6703.1 4094.7 27263 22142
15th
on peak off peak on peak off peak on peak off peak
-0 competitive price (c€/KWh) 3.80 3.80 3.80 1.10 2.44 1.10
QI....
tU Price (c€/KWh) 12.40 5.20 6.22 3.63 3.52 2.783
E
Vi Mkt Quantity (MWh) 1814 28898.175 20505.469 32005.682 20607.430
QJ !ij Price (c€/KWh) 5.24 5.85 3.08c:: QI;:, ex:~ Quantity (MWh) 7558.6 4576.8 29797 22272
t
E 22th
~ on peak off peak on peak off peak on peak off peak
-0 competitive price (c€/KWh) 3.80 3.80 2.40 1.10 1.10 0.00
QI...
Jl! Price (c€/KWh) 12.30 5.30 4.00 2.40 2.89 1.87:J
E
Vi Mkt Quantity (MWh) 1814 25824.046 19362.392 25614.454 19438.616
!ij Price (c€/KWh) 5.24 3.99 1.96
QIex: Quantity (MWh) 7617.1 4486.7 26006.4 21486
From the evolution of market outcomes we can see that the market price decreases and
the quantity of electricity traded in the market also decreases after integration. Even when
considering dynamic elements, the Portuguese consumers will benefit more from the integration
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of the Iberian market due to a higher decrease in prices, assuming that the effect on the wholesale
market is passed on to consumers. This decrease is higher in periods of higher hydrological
availability (December) for off peak hours and in dry months for on peak hours. This same
tendency can be witnessed if we compare the price in Spain before integration with the price
after integration, but in a comparatively lower proportion. The same description can be made
for the evolution of total electricity available in the market.
In Table 2.12 we can see the simulated values of the market share for each generator, before
and after integration. The MIBEL seems to improve the already important position of larger
generators in the market. On one hand, for PI the market share always increases, compared
with before integration and in a higher proportion for on peak hours. On the other hand, one
of the larger incumbents in generation in Spain (S2) before integration seems to increase its
market share more in off peak hours. For the other larger generators (SI and S4) the evolution
in the market share is not so clear with some periods where it increases and some periods where
it decreases.
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Table 2.12
Market shares: Portugal, Spain and MIBEL {Long run}
before integration after integration before integration after integration
Portugal Spain MIBEL Portugal Spain MIBEL
On peak Of/peak
16th
Mkt shares (%) Mkt sha res (%)
firm P1 9.49 17.56 firm P1 12.63 21.00
firm 51 29.75 29.93 firm 51 26.97 28.21
firm 52 24.74 32.29 firm 52 22.82 38.62
firm 53 2.64 2.34 firm 53 1.66 2.05
L:' firm 54 8.77 9.61 firm 54 6.79 8.10
Q)
.Q fringe 6.36 10.92 8.27 fringe 8.46 1.92 2.03E
Q) Mkt qua ntity (MWh) 4408.203 23392.710 23622.514 Mkt quantity (MWh) 4408.203 16488.364 19752.948u
Q)
C.. 30th
Q)... Mkt shares (%) Mkt sha res (%)c
~ firm P1 8.92 17.56 firm P1 11.04 21.00
firm 51 30.48 29.93 firm 51 30.48 28.21
firm 52 27.85 32.29 firm 52 27.85 38.62
firm 53 2.64 2.34 firm 53 2.64 2.05
firm 54 8.77 9.61 firm 54 6.79 8.10
fringe 5.98 10.26 8.27 fri nge 7.4 9.64 2.03
Mkt quantity (MWh) 4408.203 25178.171 236622.514 Mkt quantity (MWh) 4408.203 19498.374 19752.948
15th
Mkt shares (%) Mkt sha res (%)
firm PI 8.14 18.80 firm P1 10.87 20.13
firm 51 26.80 27.81 firm 51 28.57 27.34
firm 52 31.77 33.19 firm 52 22.82 37.02
firm 53 6.21 2.87 firm 53 2.75 2.66
firm 54 10.42 9.04 firm 54 8.19 10.91
Qj'
fringe 5.43 11.23 8.29 fringe 7.24 8.25 1.95c
:l
:::l. Mkt quantity (MWh) 1814 28898.175 32005.682 Mkt qua ntity (MWh) 1814 20505.469 20607.430..
GI
E 22nd
E Mkt sha res (%) Mktshares (%):s
VI
firm PI 8.96 16.19 firm P1 11.39 21.34
firm 51 29.31 31.20 firm 51 23.58 28.99
firm 52 27.99 31.20 firm 52 22.82 39.24
firm 53 2.75 2.27 firm 53 2.75 2.82
firm 54 8.65 8.77 firm 54 6.72 5.55
fringe 5.98 12.37 10.36 fringe 7.59 12.27 2.06
Mkt quantity (MWh) 1814 25824.046 25614.454 Mkt quantity (MWh) 1814 19362.392 19438.616
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For the smaller firms, 83 and the fringe firms, the integrated market seems to be a major
inconvenience, according to the evolution of its market shares. In both cases, there are decreases
in the weight of each of them in the whole market. If the position of the price taking generators
is smaller compared to the market share on each separate markets, it may be the case that
some of the firms will exit the market after integration.
In this long run analysis, we can see that the generator whose market share increases most
is still the Portuguese incumbent, namely for on peak periods. We should keep in mind again
that these results are based on the assumption of total integration of the market. However, in
the long run the variations in the market share seem to be lower to all generators, except for
the fringe firms.
Effect on Market Power: Lerner Index and HHI
To evaluate the exercise of market power before and after integration in a long run analysis we
can see in Table 2.13 values for the Lerner Index for each of the scenarios. In addition to this
information we also have the HHI to measure concentration in the market.
Table 2.13
Lerner Index and HHI, Portugal, Spain and MIBEL (Long run)
Lerner Index HHI
before integration after i cte!il[ati QC before i ntegrati on after icte!il[atiQc
Portugal Spain MIBEL Portugal Spain MIBEL
.. :0- 15th on peak 0.7 0.4 0.6 5195.24
3295.67 2412.88
QI E off peak 0.3 0.5 1.0 3633.28 2801.871: w.- u 30th on peak 0.7 0.4 0.6 2943.34 2412.883: s 5195.24
off peak 0.3 0.7 1.0 2907.52 2801.87
.. 16th on peak 0.7 0.4 0.3 5199.95 2678.27 2386.78w_
off peakE w 0.3 0.7 0.6 2900.93 2652.84cE :> 30th on peak 0.7 0.4 0.6 2850.26 2398.58:>::::.
5199.95."
off peak 0.3 0.5 1.0 2785.67 2025.95
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Before integration, market power seems to be higher in Portugal for on peak hours. For
Spain, the conclusion about the higher value of market power in on peak cannot be supported, in
a long run perspective. Our explanation is that during low demand hours, lower cost generation
units, such as nuclear power and hydrogeneration plants, satisfy a large fraction of demand so
that the residual demand faced by the thermal plants is very small or perhaps even zero. As a
result, the thermal plants are less likely to set the price. This is the case, as it can be seen in
Table 2.8. The Lerner Index assumes higher values for off peak hours where nuclear and hydro
plants are supplying the demand. Therefore, the competitive price corresponds to the marginal
cost of nuclear plants.
After integration, the conclusions about market power are different according to the period
considered. In general, we can conclude that considering some dynamic aspects, namely the
existence of exit and entrance in the market by assuming a more elastic demand function, it
seems that the exercise of market power on the integrated market will be higher. The values
for the Lerner Index are higher in off peak than in peak hours, always in the integrated market.
The feature of existence of market power seems to be even more present after integration.
According to the HHI, there is an improvement in the concentration in the Iberian market.
However, in our model, the integrated market still seems to be a highly concentrated market,
according to competition authorities criteria. Portugal is more concentrated than Spain before
integration, as expected. After the integration of the Iberian electricity market the concen-
tration seems to diminish, namely, for on peak hours for both countries and considering all
hydrological conditions. This result may be also due to the assumptions of our model: same
number of firms and a market with larger dimension.
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As expected, in the long run perspective, market power is lower than in the short run, at
least before integration. The unexpected result is the higher market power on off peak hours
after integration. The justification for this is the above explanation of the presence of nuclear
plants in the Spanish market and consequently on the MIBEL, after integration.
In both analyses it is also clear that firms may exercise considerable market power even
after integration. These conclusions are similar for short run and long run analyses. The reason
for this can be that only a very few firms compete in the oligopolistic model, with only four
strategic competitors. Two of them are of a similar size, whereas the others are comparatively
much smaller. The fact that in all periods the fringe firms lose market share may be an indicator
that in the long run only the larger firms will stay in the market and therefore market power
and concentration will be higher, as the simulation results allow to conclude.
2.5.3 Discussion on marginal cost for hydrologic generation of electricity
We have assumed zero marginal cost for hydrogeneration plants in both countries, due to the
very low variable operating costs from water. Since only reservoir and pumped hydro plants can
be strategically used, only these types of plants assume particular complexity in what concerns
marginal cost. The marginal cost of run river plants is assumed to be always zero because the
water flows anyway, whether being used or not to generate electricity.
We should be aware of the alternatives to determine the marginal cost of these plants, since
the importance of hydrogeneration on generation mix in Iberian markets should not be ignored.
In 2004, for the months chosen (June and December) hydro resources assumed around 18% in
total generation for Portugal and between 11% and 15% for Spain.
The other alternative approaches available in the literature are based on the potential strate-
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gic use of hydrogeneration plants. Even recognising that using water to generate electricity has
literally no direct cost, this approach assumes that it may have high opportunity costs. There-
fore, an alternative assessment of marginal costs may consider the opportunity costs of water
or marginal water value.
Hydroelectric plants should be run according to their marginal value of water stored in the
reservoirs. With this approach, the simulation procedure would be the same as we describe,
but with the hydro plant treated as a thermal plant using the water value surface'' to determine
the marginal cost of water, given the period and the storage level at that period.
Using hydro resources for electricity generation, introduces some dynamic elements into the
model because firms start considering that more water used today, means less water available
tomorrow. These inter-temporal constraints turn the treatment of hydroelectric generation
more complex than other production technology. Our model as a static model of competition
for analysing market power does not capture this dynamic aspect.
Introducing a new methodology to determine the marginal cost of hydro sources may lead
to different results. The higher values for the Lerner index found in our simulations, namely on
off peak times, may be justified by this assumption about the marginal cost of hydro source.
The marginal cost used on the index calculations corresponds, several times, to the null costs
of the hydro resources. Since a zero cost type of plant on the merit order will be used to full
capacity and only then any other source will be used leads, several times in our case, to compare
the market power with a zero marginal cost, as it can be seen from the null competitive prices
4The water value surface consists on a set of curves, one for each period, which relates the storage level at
a certain period to the marginal value of water. It is derived recursively. The storage level at the beginning of
a certain period is calculated by adding to the end of period storage level a demand curve for release of water,
which is a function of marginal value surface, and subtracting the (expected) water inflows of the period. This
is done recursively starting from the end of the planning horizon, resulting on a water value surface.
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in table 2.8 for Portugal, for example.
Therefore, considering a non zero value for the marginal costs of hydro generation may at
least change these results. However, since the value of costs for hydro plants will be in any
way lower than thermal and nuclear plants, it will not change the merit order. Therefore, it is
uncertain that the final conclusions in exercise of market power will change.
2.5.4 Discussion on transmission issues
Markets are interconnected by a transmission network allowing imports and exports of elec-
tricity. Each wholesale market is served by the region's own producers but may, in addition,
receive imports from other markets. Also the wholesale market satisfies the region own end-use
demand through the distribution network. However, each market may also export electricity to
other wholesale markets. Therefore, market power and market concentration may depend on
the boundaries of the market, and on internal and external transmission networks.
The impact of transmission constraints may be greatly intensified because electricity is a
non storable product. Consequently, the geographic scope of the market may change seasonally
and even hourly. Some markets may appear to be very competitive during off peak hours
and still show potential for exercising market power during peak demand periods. The lack of
storage of electricity may also create the potential for rather complex strategic manipulation of
transmission constraints.
The main idea of the present chapter was to consider the results and conclusions for a full
integrated regional market scenario. Therefore, the results presented up to this point assume
that there are no binding transmission constraints inside or outside the MIBEL that would
create geographic sub-markets.
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The national networks are assumed to have no capacity problems and no tariffs are assumed
for the network. The international network consists of transmission lines between the countries
which are described for their capacity and physical losses. No tariffs or limits are assumed also
for the international transmission network.
These assumptions are clearly not very realistic. We should mention two constraints of
concern: one internal interconnection between Portugal and Spain and two international inter-
connections: between Spain and France and between Spain and Morocco.
It is crucial to understand that the flows that would result from a Cournot equilibrium
where the competitors assume there will be no in-market congestion are not the same as the
potential congestion that would arise if strategic players explicitly account for potential in-
market congestion in their output decisions (Borenstein et al, 1997). According to Borenstein
et al (1996) the interactions between strategic firms in a very simple network may be complex
when transmission capacity is limited. A Cournot player knowing that potential imports into
that region would be limited by transmission constraints may very well reduce its output below
the level of output chosen if there were no limits on transmission capacity.
The transmission capacity between the two Iberian markets is limited and this is one of the
main obstacles that are delaying the MIBEL. The actual flow limits over these paths vary with
supply and weather conditions. In table 2.14 are listed the interconnection capacities between
Portugal and Spain, for the present and the future.
Only if there is sufficient transmission capacity between the two markets, will they behave as
one. If not, then the ability of a generator in one part of the market to participate in the other
part of the market will be limited. This means, for example, a Spanish firm generating electricity
to be able to supply Portuguese consumers. For this purpose, interconnection capacity has to
91
be used, since in our case, the transmission grid may be at times congested and electricity may
not be delivered as firms desire. This constraint has impact on the exercise of market power.
Table 2.14
Interconnection capacity
From-To 2004- 2005 2010*
PT-SP winter 1390 -1545 1600
summer 1200 - 1375 1300
SP- PT winter 1000 -1225 1600
summer 1250 1300
Interconnection capacity
(MW)
Note: * forecasted
Sources: MIBEL - Progress report about the state of the interconnections (December 2004),
REN-REE; "Descricao do funcionamento do Mibel", Conselho de reguladores do MIBEL, 2009
If we simply take the interconnection level as an exogenous factor in the framework, trans-
mission capacity may determine restrictions in each of the markets. Taking the electricity
generated by firms in each country and comparing it with the quantity demanded in each coun-
try after integration we may conclude that Spain is a net importer for the days and hours chosen
and Portugal is a net exporter. This means that some parts of Spanish consumers are supplied
by a Portuguese firm.
Since there are constraints on the transmission capacity between the two countries we may
compare the amount of electricity that, according to our model, the Portuguese firms are willing
to export to satisfy Spanish demand and the interconnection capacity to infer if the required
transfer of electricity is feasible or if there will be congestion problems. The main values from
this analysis are reported in Table 2.15.
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Table 2.15
Detection of congestion problems
Portugal TO Spain
Import as % of over the capacity increased need as
Spanish demand (GW) % of existing
.. :a 15th on peak 7 280.0 18
CII E off peak 9 406.0 261:; <U
~ ~ 30th on peak 7 280.1 18
off peak 8 903.9 59
16th on peak 6 140.0 11..
CII~ off peak 8 640.4 47E <uE §
30th on peak 7 539.2 39:::I ....,",,-
off peak 9 290.2 21
Note: We only consider the short run results on this analysis.
For any of the cases studied, our Cournot results imply always congestion problems. The
main problems are presented on off peak hours in Winter.
Considering interconnection limits in our model would also imply that there will be different
prices for each country, instead of a unique market price. We forecast a higher market power
in each of the markets as result of the introduction of these limits, because generators know
that imports do not work fully as competition and as a limit to the exercise of market power.
Interconnection constraint will have similar consequences to entry barriers, increasing wholesale
prices for electricity in both countries.
To achieve full benefits of competition the transmission capacity between these two markets
must be large enough that each firm prefers to compete over the larger market than to act as
a residual monopolist in its own local market (Borenstein et al,1999). Their results show that
expanding transmission capacity between sub-markets where there is exercise of market power
may have very high payoffs in terms of reduced prices and increased consumption.
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We may conclude that it is necessary to invest in more extensive interconnection to create
additional capacity to allow for full integration and free functioning of the market and com-
petition. Investment in new capacity is only possible in the long run. For some periods, an
increase of more than 50% of the present capacity is needed. According to the forecasted values
for 2010 the improvements in interconnection capacity are still not enough.
Even if there were enough interconnection capacity, we would still need to consider whether
the interconnection would be binding when it is incorporated into the firm's output decision. It
is worth stressing that the expansion in the interconnection capacity to achieve the full integra-
tion, according to our model, may not be enough to insure no exercise of market power. The
network enforcement would lower prices, as can be forecasted in the model, but the oligopolistic
players will still be able to exercise market power at some extent. However, the expansion of
transmission paths, meaning greater integration, may reduce the incentive of any producer to
restrict output in order to raise prices (Borenstein and Bushnell, 1999).
The geographic isolation of the Iberian Peninsula from the rest of Europe resulted in one
interconnector link connecting Spain to France and other connecting Spain to Morocco. The
border between Spain and France is among the most heavily congested in Europe. The lack
of interconnections may provide more opportunities for the incumbent generators to behave
strategically and unilaterally profit from limited competition. The reinforcement of the inter-
national interconnections with France and Morocco should be priorities as they would allow
the horizontal concentration of the MIBEL to be reduced and therefore the exercise of market
power predicted.
The impact of introducing the information on interconnections with external countries will
be similar to the one pointed out before for the interconnections between Portugal and Spain.
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Therefore, as we have shown with this simple analysis, considering information on transmission
capacities on the analysis of market power seem not to change our main simulation results and
conclusions.
2.6 Conclusions
Market power in the wholesale market is one of the major concerns for electricity markets. One
of the questions raised during the integration of electricity markets is about the impact of this
process on the exercise of market power.
Due to the particular characteristics of electricity markets, generation firms may have sig-
nificant potential market power, namely the larger incumbent firms. The exercise of market
power has considerable damage for consumers and may make it difficult to seize all the benefits
of an integrated market. Therefore, the most advisable is to follow a strategy that structures
the transition to an integrated market in order to avoid or minimise the potential exercise of
market power.
For the purpose of assessing what will happen after integration of Iberian markets, this
chapter analyses how the Iberian electricity wholesale market would operate and the impact of
this integration on electricity equilibrium prices and quantities, comparing them with the levels
before integration. Finally, the chapter evaluates the likelihood of significant market power
problems once the market is fully integrated, using the Lerner Index.
The importance of studying the MIBEL is due to three reasons. First, physically the MIBEL
is a peninsula and has limited transmission lines with its neighbouring countries (France),
causing import of electricity to be needed to insure the stability of the system. Thus, the
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MIBEL must primarily rely on internal generation and it is important to know how the market
will work. Second, several generators in either markets potentially possess market power, before
integration. It is essential to determine how it will evolve with the integration process. Third,
since is an integrated market in Europe, it is a part of the preliminary step for the Single
electricity market. Thus it is important to assess its success, namely on the impact on the
exercise of market power.
Our research is relevant due to the unique characteristics of the market studied and for the
application of a method to assess ex-ante the evolution of market power. This method may be
applied to infer market power concerns in other regional markets in Europe, only adjusting to
the specific features of the market.
We use real data on plant costs, capacities, an analytical model and quantitative simulations
of generators' behaviour to simulate the competitive market for electricity, following integration.
A Cournot model of oligopolistic competition with competitive fringe is used to represent the
operation of a Pool free of energy restrictions.
Since the Cournot analysis is a stylized representation of both the costs and range of strate-
gies available to firms, the results should be thought as a first indication of the ways market
power might be exercised, rather than an exact forecast or prediction of market price. The
choice of the models to represent either markets was justified by the real features of each mar-
ket. However, the simulation results seem more appropriate for Spain than for Portugal. The
Portuguese case is particular due to the law enforcement for the price and the inexistence of a
competitive pool.
The results obtained with our model depend on assumptions. Price, production level and
markups and other variables are a function of own price elasticity of demand, a value for which
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there is no precise estimation yet. Even if there were, it is likely that after all the changes due to
the integration process demand for electricity will change. Therefore, the main contribution of
this chapter are the qualitative results. Moreover, this model is expected to be a useful tool to
evaluate the impact of different policies and reforms that could be implemented in this industry
to mitigate market power.
The most important result of this chapter is the reduction of exercise of market power in
the integrated market, as it was expected. Notwithstanding, the simulation shows that there
is still evidence of incentives to raise prices above marginal cost, either on peak and off peak
time, but it is lower than before the integration. This potential problem may be even more
serious if there is also a problem of entry in the integrated market. Otherwise, the existence of
a temporary excess profit can be solved by the entry of a new generator in the market.
The simulations suggest that, in the MIBEL, there will be an average mark up of 60% on
the perfect competition price (when price equals marginal cost), dependent on the hour of the
day. Despite the decrease on the Lerner Index, there is evidence of a high difference between
price and marginal costs. This means that market power is still an important feature of the
regional integrated market.
The Iberian electricity market produces lower electricity prices, as expected, for both coun-
tries, and thus benefits electricity consumers, if we assume that the evolution in wholesale prices
will be passed on to consumers. The Portuguese consumers are the ones that benefit the most
with the integration. Moreover, it is also the Portuguese larger incumbent firm that benefits
the most from integration, with the highest increase in market share, compared to before inte-
gration. For the remaining smaller firms it seems that the effect of integration is to lose market
share. This is due to the efficiency of the Portuguese firm, reflected in its marginal cost with a
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considerable large part assuming a null value associated with the hydro resources.
We should notice some simplifications of the model that should be kept in mind when ana-
lyzing its results. First, the model has no dynamic perspective, even if we try to introduce some
dynamic elements with the analysis of long run demand specifications. It may be important
to consider the assumption of changes the production capacity through time and the effects of
these investment decisions on the exercise of market power.
Secondly, even though high margins may likely attract new entrants to the market, we do
not take into account the role of the entrants or the case of failure of firms (mainly on the
fringe). We assume that the number of firms in the fringe will be the same after integration.
Therefore, the model does not consider any change in the strategic behaviour of firms, such
as for example the change of smaller Cournot firms to price-takers and to be included in the
fringe.
Thirdly, the model treats all firms as being independent. Cross-ownership may, in a number
of ways, modify production decisions and alter the incentives to exert market power. Introducing
cross-ownership into the model would most likely sharpen the results. All the omissions result
in this model misestimating market power. However, they should have impact only on how
intensely the market power is used and not on the existence of market power. The inclusion of
all these factors in the model may make the results more robust, since there is evidence that
market power is still present in the MIBEL. This chapter calls for further research in extending
the model to take into account of these issues in the simulation model.
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Chapter 3
Mergers between natural gas
suppliers and electricity generators:
should European household
consumers be concerned?
3.1 Introduction
The liberalisation of energy markets creates opportunities for gas and electricity firms to enter
each other's markets for the final product, by acquiring firms in the other fuel market. All energy
mergers pose distinct challenges for competition policy. Namely, the features of electricity as
a commodity, determine these challenges: demand is highly inelastic in the short run, storage
is limited and transmission constraints limit the ability to use generation capacity in different
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locations. Since natural gas is not only an important input into electricity generation, but also
a competing energy source in the retail market, vertical mergers between electricity generators
and gas suppliers may raise additional concerns and questions.
During the past decade, the electricity and gas industry around the world and in Europe,
in particular, have witnessed a trend towards integration. Mergers between gas and electricity
firms, actual or attempted ones, seem to have been in fashion in the EU. The importance of this
wave was not so much on the high number of mergers, but on the dimension and on the attention
attracted by them. Three of such mergers (or attempts of merger) were news throughout
Europe: the takeover bid of Endesa by Gas Natural, the serious competition concerns about
the EON-Ruhrgas merger, controversially cleared by the Ministry of Economy of Germany and
the acquisition of Gas De Portugal (GdP) by Electricidade de Portugal (EDP) blocked by the
EU Commission.
These also have attracted the attention of regulators, researchers and consumers associa-
tions, as it raises questions on how merger policy should act to face this phenomenon. The
increasing interest on this subject can also be seen in the evolution of regulator's interventions
on merger processes. Some regulators had concerns about the effects on economic efficiency
and on consumers welfare and some have consequently reacted. More recently, the acquisition
of Union Fenosa by Gas Natural and the merger between Ed! and Suez show that this topic
is still live.
Most of the literature on this topic is focused on the ability of mergers to create value for
merging parties' shareholders and not on the effects on final consumers. It is well documented
that corporate acquisitions via mergers and tender offers are wealth-increasing events for share-
holders. The existing evidence shows that shareholders of acquired firms almost always gain,
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while the shareholders of acquiring firms do not lose. However, since not all consumers are
shareholders, the existence of gains or losses for consumers is still a contentious issue. This
question is important to be answered as it should be one of the main concerns for regulators
on assessing any merger.
Usually these cases should be analysed within the framework of vertical integration theory,
which usually do not lead to anticompetitive concerns. However, given the specific features of
a network industry, anticompetitive problems may be present. Some researchers recommend
that merger control in electricity (energy) markets should be more cautious and stringent than
in other sectors (Barquin et al, 2006). Even the EC promised to apply more rigorously the
competition law in the electricity sector (Vandezande et al, 2006).
The aim of our research in this chapter is to empirically assess the effects of vertical in-
tegration between gas suppliers and electricity generators on consumer welfare. In the short
term, consumer welfare analysis in any particular case focus on price and quantity available
for consumption. In the first instance, a practice is against the consumer interest if it raises
prices. These findings can help distinguish cases where vertical integration is more up to benefit
consumers from those where it is more likely to be detrimental.
Therefore, we assess the extent to which changes in final household electricity prices following
mergers can be attributed directly to the merger that occurred. It is the sign of the coefficient
of the dummy variable for the existence of a merger which provides a test of the hypothesis that
markets with mergers have higher prices. The focus is on gas-electricity mergers that occurred
in European Energy markets! after liberalisation, between 1997 and 2007 (first half).
1Austria (AU), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece
(GR), Netherlands (NE), Norway (NO), Portugal (PT), Spain (SP), Sweden (SW), Italy (IT), UK (UK).
101
Some simple policy questions are important to be answered such as, for example, if European
consumers are facing lower prices in countries with less mergers of this type or if mergers that
are allowed by competition authorities are detrimental for consumers. Knowing these answers
is vital for public policy on the European energy market, since it is important to develop the
merger policy in order to attain all the benefits of full integration of energy markets. Moreover,
the focus is not so much on whether the cross-sectional mergers should be prohibited or not
but, instead, how it affects final consumers.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section reviews the relevant theories and
the previous empirical studies on vertical integration and vertical mergers and presents the
main drivers for cross-merger activity in Europe. Section 3 describes the mergers selected for
analysis and it main features. Following the empirical model, methodology and data issues.
The empirical results and discussion will be presented in section 5.
The main results of our analysis are evidence of negative effect of vertical cross-sectorial
mergers on household consumers: the existence of an acquisition between an electricity genera-
tor and a natural gas supplier increases final price of electricity for household consumers. From
the results and conclusions of this chapter we can summarise three main findings. First, we
found that the existence of a vertical merger between an electricity generator and a natural gas
supplier seem to increase in average the final price of electricity on markets where it occurs.
The comparison of prices before and after the merger for each country where it occurs allows to
conclude for the negative impact of these events on market outcome. Second, we found evidence
that any household consumer in Germany pays a price for their electricity 1.8% higher because
there was the merger between EOn and Ruhrgas. It is worth mentioning that German com-
petition regulators found, during their assessment, reasons to block this merger. However, it
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was authorised by the Government based on the interest to create a national champion. Third,
even in Finland, where the merger was not controversial, because it involved public firms, the
effect on prices was equally detrimental to consumers. Household prices after the merger are
around 2% higher than they would be without the merger between IVO and NESTE. Section
6 concludes.
3.2 Theory and previous empirical evidence on Vertical Inte-
gration
Mergers between electricity generators and natural gas suppliers can be studied according to
two perspectives: as a vertical integration (upstream gas and downstream electricity) or as
convergence merger (extending the firm's focus from one energy source into two). On the
one hand, wholesale natural gas and electricity markets may be seen as vertically interrelated
markets (Brennan, 2001). On the other hand, electricity and gas can also be seen as actual and
potential competitors in a broader market for energy services, because they are also substitutes
in some final markets (as heating, for example).
According to the first perspective, existing evidence of the effects on prices should be found
on vertical integration literature. Past research does not suggest that VI would necessarily have
an adverse impact on final consumers. Instead, there is some ambiguity on the conclusions found
about their consequences and there are few clear predictions on the effects on final consumers.
More often, economic literature focus on the effects of VI on competition, instead of effects
on final prices. Usually, theoretical models or empirical research studies one or both of the two
effects of vertical integration on competition: efficiency gains and market foreclosure. From the
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balancing of these effects (one pro-competitive and another anti-competitive) it is possible to
conclude on the effect of VI on competition and competitors.
Integration of two vertically related activities may result III a more efficient, lower-cost
entity and in an improvement in resources allocation. Some problems of coordination between
activities may be solved and costs of transaction, originated by the existence of contracts
between firms, are eliminated (Williamson, 1971). This restraint of the "double margin" is a
result commonly stated on the literature (Spengler, 1950). If the two activities are integrated,
the first of the two margins disappears, due to the new internal input transaction. Moreover, the
creation of the new vertical bonds may create economies due to the difference of costs between
producing two goods or services separately and to produce jointly (Baumol et al, 1982).
In contrast, mergers may increase market power and affect competition negatively and,
therefore, decrease social welfare. The firm resulting from the merger may have capacity to
increase the costs of its competitors with the intermediate product by refusing to sell it or to
set a higher price (Salinger, 1988; Hart and Tirole, 1990). This is the so-called foreclosure.
Nevertheless, the same balancing has been used to infer effects of VI on prices and on con-
sumer welfare. The standard argument to support the idea that vertical mergers are benign
to consumers is that, by reducing the inefficiency of transactions between upstream and down-
stream operations, they decrease prices in the final market. If the upstream market involved
mark-up on marginal cost before the merger, in the absence of a change in market power, this
integration may eliminate or reduce the mark-up, thus prices may fall. Hence, the fact that the
merging firm is more efficient might make the merger desirable, not only for competition, but
also concerning consumer welfare.
However, the presence of cost advantages per se does not necessarily imply anticompetitive
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nor welfare reducing behaviour. Only if these cost savings are passed on to consumers by
lowering prices, it means that the merger could be welfare enhancing. Only in this case we can
mention positive effects on consumer welfare.
If there are no efficiency gains and instead the merger increases the exercise of market power
then this behaviour may push up the overall price in the market. Hence, vertical integration
driven by market power may be potentially beneficial to merging firms and to their competitors
but at the expense of consumers.
Overall there is an extensive body of theoretical literature regarding vertical mergers while
the research containing empirical analyses is remarkably small and does not provide substantial
evidence on whether such mergers are harmful or not for consumers. Even though it is a major
component of antitrust enforcement, relatively few studies directly estimate the price effects of
mergers. We can divide the existent literature according to their conclusions on the effect of
VI on final prices.
The report on theoretical results starts with Spengler (1950) 's conclusions on the beneficial
effect to consumers from VI by solving the double marginalisation distortion. Lafontaine (1995)
finds that prices do differ after VI, and in fact, prices in integrated firms are slightly below those
in franchised units. The same researcher in 2003 concludes that only the presence of technical
synergies, which allows the firm to exploit economies of scale, would lead to lower prices to
customers, in a oligopoly framework. In a different context (a dominant firm with an exogenous
cost advantage), Riordan (1998) states that vertical mergers may be welfare improving. On the
contrary, according to Michaels (2004), consolidation may, in the short term, lead to adverse
price changes.
Most of the empirical research report studies on markets where concentration was an impor-
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tant feature, even before integration, and where regulators showed important concerns before
the merger. For this reason, in almost all these cases, it was forecasted, before the assessment,
that there was evidence of negative effects to consumers. This is the case of gasoline, cement
and concrete, cable TV, soft drinks, hospital-physician and energy. Nevertheless, empirical
evidence on many of these industries conclude that, considering efficiency effects, VI mostly
benefits consumers, or at least there is no evidence of harmful effects for them.
Regardless the industry analysed, we can find either conclusions for beneficial effects or
detrimental effects on the final consumer. The first four of the following examples show evidence
of lower prices due to the merger. Shepard (1993) uses cross-section regressions of a reduced
form price equation for gasoline to test the relationship between price and the contractual form
in the market and found evidence that retail price of some gasoline products are lower when
there is VI. McBride (1983) finds that price of cement goes down in a VI with concrete firms,
using a panel data approach.
Ford and Jackson (1997) studied empirically the effect of VI on the programming cost and
price of cable operators. Through a system of equations they find that both concentration and
integration lower the programming cost and that the economy of costs is partially passed on
to consumers with lower prices. On carbonated soft drinks market, Saltzman et al (1999) take
the same conclusion of lower prices as result of vertical events (in average a decrease of 4%).
Gasoline industry is one of the most studied industries with respect to the effects of VI.
The main difference between the several empirical research are the methods used to prove it:
from event study to simultaneous equations and data estimation. In spite of the method used,
several papers report higher wholesale prices as consequence of VI (Gilbert and Hastings, 2001).
The reasons pointed out to explain the price evolution are either that foreclosure dominates the
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efficiency benefits (Buehler and Aydemir, 2002) or decrease in market competition (Hastings,
2004). However, like in some other research mentioned already, it was not reported any evidence
of effects on retail prices.
It can also be found evidence on hospital-physician integration where price increases (Cuellar
and Gertler, 2006) , even in the presence of (insignificant) effects on efficiency. After studying
five US mergers in several markets (oil, feminine hygiene products, ready-to-eat cereals and
distilled spirits) Ashenfelter and Hosken (2008) also found that prices increase for four of the
products involved as result of VI. Some studies also find no significant effects on prices, as it
is the case of Waterman and Weiss (1996) and Hortacsu and Syverson (2007) for pay cable
programming networks and cable systems, and cement and concrete industry, respectively.
Two recent surveys on the effects of vertical integration should be mentioned. The first, by
Church in 2008 strongly supports, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, a presumption
that vertical mergers are welfare enhancing and good for consumers and also that cases and
conditions that are harmful for consumers are not very frequent. The second is Lafontaine and
Slade (2007). They survey empirical literature on the effects of vertical integration on several
variables. Among the several studies they also mention consequences on welfare. From the 16
studies considered, they report an increase in welfare for downstream consumers on 13 of them.
For the other 3 cases, the effect on consumers' welfare is reported to be ambiguous. Lafontaine
and Slade (2007,680) conclude by noting: "We are therefore somewhat surprised at what the
weight of the evidence is telling us. It says that, under most circumstances, profit-maximizing
vertical-integration and merger decisions are efficient, not just from the firms' but also from the
consumers' points of view. Although there are isolated studies that contradict this claim, the
vast majority support it".
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In what concerns to prior research on price effects of cross-sectorial energy mergers, the
literature is even more limited, though a few studies are worth referring to, even if in some
of them the focus was not on price effects. Knittel (2003) compares prices for electricity and
natural gas for markets where there are VI with prices of markets where separate firms supply
separately the two energy goods, in a monopolistic framework. He uses reduced form regressions
and finds higher relative prices for the first case. Based on a sequential relation between the
two markets, Micola et al (2008) use a new approach (agent-based model of a multi-tier energy
market) to show how interdependence within a vertically integrated firm increases market prices,
using as explanation the existence of net back effects. In Kennedy (1997), efficiency gains and
synergies coming from dual fuel in retail sector are stated as the main advantages of a vertical
merger. Nevertheless there are no mentions to price effects.
In theoretical literature, Gilbert and Newbery (2006) assume these mergers as convergence
mergers and conclude that the merged firm would likely have an incentive to increase natural
gas prices above their premerger levels. However, they report that electricity consumers are not
necessarily worse off as a result of the merger. Assuming the same view of convergence, Brennan
(2001) presents a model to be used on identification of problematic convergent mergers with an
application to two mergers in the US. His model considers all the special features arising within
a gas-electricity merger. However, we do not find mention to any effect on market outcomes
and therefore on consumers in any of the cases. Keeping the same point of view about the
cross-sectorial mergers, Hunger's concern in his paper of 2003 is to measure the ability of the
merged firm to abuse market power. He highlights as concern for consumers the capacity of the
merged firm to restrict output and using estimation of electricity supply curves, he argues that
"the conditions have to be just right for a merger combining natural gas and electric generating
108
resources to harm competition". Therefore, it seems more likely that a vertical merger has no
detrimental effects on consumers.
More common is the research on vertical integration inside each market separately (natural
gas and electricity market) and some results found are also interesting. By running simulations
(with a supply function equilibrium) based on the performance in the three largest and oldest US
electricity markets, Bushnell et al (2008) state that the exercise of less market power contributes,
in a vertical integrated sector, to lower retail prices, compared with an unbundled sector. Hogan
and Meade (2007) through a theoretical approach, support these findings by concluding that
retail prices are higher with vertical separation than with integration. Both allow to conclude
for beneficial effects for final consumers.
Most of the effects due to merger activity lack of definite theoretical basis, and the empirical
evidence of post-merger outcomes has been conflicting. With all these different theoretical and
empirical evidence there is no consensus on whether VI has positive or negative effects on final
prices, particularly between electricity and gas activities.
While the goal of merger policy is clear - blocking the harmful and allowing the beneficial
- the accomplishment of this aim is often complicated because sometimes information available
is insufficient to distinguish it. Thus, an important task for economic analysis is to identify
those particular conditions in which vertical mergers may reduce consumer welfare.
According to our literature review, there is a vast literature on this subject, but the con-
tribution of our research is not only the concern about a particular case of vertical integration
with special features but also the method chosen to infer the effects of vertical integration: a
retrospective study of some effective mergers to verify whether these type of mergers lead or
not to higher prices and therefore harm or not household consumers. If it is the case that
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there is evidence of harmful consequences for consumers, then European consumers should be
concerned.
3.3 Cross-sectorial mergers in Europe: its main drivers and
evolution
Following the liberalisation of energy markets, European firms appear to be reshaping their
business strategies accordingly. As a reaction, firms in the energy sector engage in a wave
of mergers. Above all, firms are now interested in managing several activities inside energy
industries, as witnessed by some of the recent operations.
The increasing importance of convergent mergers, defined as an electricity firm acquiring
a firm with activity in the gas sector or vice-versa, may be also understood as an obstacle to
achieve the Single European energy market. The exception is the case of crossborder mergers
which are beneficial to integration of markets. The growing number of new gas combined cycle
plants can be justified by the technological development of the turbines. However, it does not
explain everything on the trend towards vertical integration between these two sectors.
These mergers can be driven by efficiency, but they can also strengthen market power of
incumbents by raising other anticompetitive barriers. Cross-sector vertical integration may
be justified by reductions in transaction costs (Eikeland, 2007). This explanation is reasonable
namely because many of these vertical relations are regulated by long-term contracts. Addition-
ally, the acquisition of firms on other sectors with several similarities can generate experience
and scope economies from the joint production (Vaitilingam and Bergman, 1999). Third, these
mergers allow power generation firms to hedge against the risk of uncertainty in its own market
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(Waterson, 1984). For gas suppliers the merger guarantees buyers for their commodity. More-
over, generators can produce electricity from natural gas, or arbitrage and sell gas in this way,
and to exploit price differentials between gas and electricity. The same applies to natural gas
suppliers. Mergers may be seen as a strategy of diversification of risks (Armstrong, Cowan and
Vickers, 1994).
The vertical integration raises also some concerns due to related anti-competition problems.
Merging parties will no longer compete with each other in each of the two markets. Moreover,
convergent mergers make it feasible to use the market power held in one market, in the other
upstream or downstream market. This problem may be exacerbated if the two firms operating
in the same geographical area and/or are larger or dominant firms in each of the markets. This
is the case of vertical mergers between electricity firms and natural gas firms with market power
in gas", which are problematic, since the incentive to raise gas prices may be enhanced through
ownership of electricity generation.
These mergers also guarantee to one electricity generator the control over one of the most
important energy sources for the production of electricity, what represents an advantage com-
paring with to its competitors. Vertically integrated incumbents may be able to manipulate the
wholesale price in order to create obstacles for new entrants and thus may result in potential
incentives for foreclosure. The last problem concerns the strategic use of privileged information
about its competitors' gas needs, as well as its costs, in the generation of electricity.
In past years, in Europe, the relation between these two energy sectors changed as a result
of several reasons that drove them to combine. The revocation of the 1975 EC Directive, which
2The market power is often secured through their control over the pipeline network and storage and
balancing services.
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was in force until the beginning of the 1990s, restricting the use of gas in electricity generation,
was an historical development that can help justifying the wave of mergers. The removal of this
constraint opened up a new opportunity for natural gas as an input for electricity generation.
A new connection was created between the sectors with the increase in demand for natural gas
for generation purposes.
Since, in the medium run, the best placed potential entrant into the electricity market may
be a gas supplier, this also increases the inter-relation between the two sectors. According
to Newbery (2002c: 14) "Gas-fired CCGT (combined cycle gas turbine) is almost everywhere
the least-cost form of entry ... ''. Therefore, the opening of electricity markets favours gas-
fired power plants, which are better suited to more competitive markets, given their short
construction time and not so high up-front investment costs. Natural gas is also a technology
more flexible to adapt to the development of markets with regard to timing and location. Unlike
some other fuels, natural gas fired power plants can quickly start generating electricity either
during periods of peak demand or to back up intermittent renewables.
Technological development that increased the efficiency of gas-fired turbines and the avail-
ability of gas reserves was another incentive to use natural gas as a main source for electricity.
All these features make the construction of a CCGT plant an attractive, short-term option for
expanding electric generation capacity. Moreover, as a result of the use of Take-or-Pay (TOP)3
clauses in natural gas supply, European gas firms try, through mergers with electricity firms, to
reduce the uncertainty characterising their demand and to secure the captive demand in order
to fully respect TOP obligations in their import contracts with strong extra-EU producers.
3TOP clauses are mandatory in the European Union, in order to avoid that some importers reserve
capacity they do not need so that they could foreclose import capacity to their competitors.
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Natural gas can also be seen as the cornerstone of the national energy policy because it
is one of the energy sources currently available that can bridge environmental concerns and
economic requests: gas is less carbon intensive than coal, emits fewer traditional air pollutants
and does not bear the waste burden of nuclear power. Since energy policies have aimed to
decrease the C02 emissions, the use of natural gas in power generation can be seen as one of
the best options. In fact, the 2008 World Energy Outlook confirms that most of the gas-fired
generating capacity is being built in Europe because of the tightening of C02 regulations.
These same main drivers were identified and listed by McLaughlin and Mehram (1995) for
a similar phenomenon in the US. Furthermore, US experience suggests that European utilities
are reacting to liberalisation by returning to the creation of new "energy firms", vertically
integrated, operating both in the gas and in the electricity sectors and that this behaviour will
still persist.
Since cross-sector merger activity is deeply reshaping the structure of the market, it is crucial
to have a precise understanding of its effects, in order to foresee future measures to overcome
this potential obstacle and to draw a coherent and effective energy and competition policy.
Economic research recommends that control of mergers and acquisitions should be more strict
in the energy sector than in other sectors (Barquin et al, 2006) thus, this growing integration
between the two activities in the same firm presents challenges to competition authorities.
Additionally, given the size and the nature of the energy sector, as well as the number of
consumers potentially affected, it is essential to assess the effect on final consumers.
We have information on all mergers occurred in Europe from 1998 to 2007 in electricity and
gas sectors from Leveque and Monturus (2007) and we may identify some patterns to describe
the evolution in the European energy market. Almost all main European energy companies have
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recently shown an unprecedented activism and the wave of M&As seems far from being over.
The number of mergers in the energy sector increased in the past decade although growth has
not been uniform. Between 1997 and 2007, 247 mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are reported
involving firms with businesses along the electricity and gas value chain in Europe. From those
mergers, 101 are cross-sectoral, therefore 41% of all merger cases in European energy markets
involve a firm with business in the gas sector and a firm with business in the electricity sector.
In table 3.1 we can see the distribution of mergers occurred between (at least) a firm in the
electricity sector and (at least) one in the natural gas sector in the chosen period.
Table 3.1
Cross-sectorial mergers by country and year, 1998 to 2007
1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
51 52 51 52 51 52 51 52 51 52 51 52 51 52 51 52 51 52 51 52 Total
AU 2
BE 2 5
OK 4
FI 6
FR 4
DE 5 3 8 2 2 2 2 26
GR 1
IT 3 5 2 3 3 23
NE 2 2 2 11
PT 4
SP 2 7
SW 2 7
UK 2 2 2 2 2 16
Total 4 2 5 3 10 3 9 0 17 4 11 2 13 2 8 2 8 3 8 2 116
Source: Own calculations from Leveque and Monturus (2007).
Note:To set the dates of the mergers: (1) the end year of the process was considered as the year to infer the
post-merger period; (2) for the case of mergers occurred in the last quarter of the year we consider the effect on
the following year.
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Incumbents in several countries have diversified into other utilities. It was the case of firms
whose activity was in electricity diversifying into gas, through merger processes (Thomas 2003).
The driving forces in this process were a few European companies (E.On, EdF, RWE, Suez,
Vatenfall, Iberdrola, Enel, Endesa).
As it can be concluded the M&A activity was present in all European countries, with special
emphasis to Germany and Italy with more than 20% of all mergers in these sectors in Europe.
The countries where there were less mergers were Greece and Austria, with 1% and 2% of the
total. In what concerns time distribution, we can see the number of mergers spread along the
period with a peak on the first semester of 2002, with 17% of the 116 mergers. In the second
half of 2001 there is no registration of cross-sectorial mergers in any European country. Some of
the mergers occur between firms with different nationality, therefore we consider it as a merger
in both countries. This accountancy method is the reason for the difference of total mergers
and the 116 from the table above: 15 of the mergers are also between-country mergers thus
they are affected to more than one country simultaneously.
Among all the M&As, the already vertically integrated electricity companies'[ have been the
most active. Firms with activity in the electricity sector which acquired gas targets preferred
the downstream segment (distribution and supply), with the aim of seeking for a suitable fuel
supplier and to control the source of fuel. Firms on the gas sector invested in the electricity
industry mainly in the downstream segment as well, in order to secure a stable sale for their
product. Gas companies have mainly been targeted by bidders which already had gas related
businesses (2%). In table 3.2 we present a summary of the cross-sectorial mergers according to
4Firms whose activity is distributed through all the value chain of electricity (from generation to
supply).
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the sector of the firms involved.
Table 3.2
Cross-sectorial mergers according to the parts involved, European countries, 1998
to 2007
(1) acquires (2)
(1) (2)
P+G G 28
P+G P 27
G P+G
P+G P+G 39
P P+G 3
pure mergers 3
Source: Own calculations from Leveque and Monturus (2007).; Note: P - power sector; G - natural gas sector.
We found mergers where a firm in the electricity sector acquires a firm in the natural gas
sector or vice-versa. These are the ones called "pure mergers". However, there are also firms
present already in both sectors acquiring a natural gas/electricity firm or vice-versa. And,
finally firms present already in both sectors acquiring competitors also present in both sectors.
Considering the features presented for the mergers and the aim of this chapter, we will restrict
our analysis to the effects on only some of those mergers.
3.3.1 Mergers selected for our analysis
The selection of mergers to be analysed in this chapter was based on a set of conditions deter-
mined by the aim of our research. The first condition was that the acquisition represents more
than 50% of the acquired firm. None of the mergers involving only a plant as the acquired firm
was considered as a merger to be analysed.
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The second and more important condition was that a merger has to be a cross-sectorial one,
that is to say, between firms in different energy sectors: one in the electricity sector and another
one in the gas industry. We have not considered cases between already vertically integrated
firms in each sector or already cross-sectorial firms wishing to expand the activity to other
sector.
Even recognizing that nowadays electricity and gas industries are already highly integrated
(in each sector), our data contains only mergers where a gas supplier acquires a firm whose
activity on electricity value chain does not include supply. From all mergers in natural gas
and electricity sectors (between 1998 and 2007), we are only interested in those that are inter-
industry mergers and that represent the entrance of a natural gas supplier in the electricity
sector or vice-versa.
From the conditions explained above, we focus on two of the three pure mergers presented in
the previous section: (i) Neste/IVO in Finland; and (ii) EOn/Ruhrgas in Germany. Therefore,
we have decided to exclude also the remaining pure merger between British Electricity and
Swalec in UK, due to the lack of confirmation and information on the description of this merger.
The mergers chosen at the end were controversial and posed some question on the risk of
competitive harm. However, somehow the risk was not large enough to cause the antitrust
agencies to block the transaction or, alternatively, the case was blocked but there were some
other factors that justified allowing the transaction after all. The fact that all cases were allowed
after all by the competition regulator, turns their study more relevant because the idea is to
find if the effects on consumer ,following the decision, were as it was expected.
Next we have a description of each of the chosen mergers. The main purpose is to briefly
describe how every process occurred, which authority played the role of supervision and how,
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which was the result of the process and finally to state similarities and differences in both
processes.
Neste-IVa (FI)
On 14th of April of 1998 the EC received a notification of a proposed concentration between two
stated-owned firms in Finland. The notification was mandatory due to the European dimension
of the merger.
IVO was the largest Finnish company in the energy sector, with activities in generation,
wholesale and distribution of electricity. Neste was active in oil, energy (gas, liquefied petroleum
and heat supply) and chemical business. Neste had no activities in the generation of electricity
prior to the merger and, through its subsidiary Gasum Oy, was the only importer, supplier and
seller of natural gas, which was used as a primary fuel for electricity generation. The role of
only importer was granted by the Finish government to import and distribute natural gas from
the Former Soviet Union to Finland since 1971.
In 1992, Neste was considered by the Finnish Competition Authority as having a dominant
position in the Finnish natural gas market. The main role of Neste was forecasted to increase
over time, given the main position of natural gas on electricity generation and the new national
energy policy implemented.
The firm resulting from the merger is a holding company where the State keeps 100% of the
capital. Following the merger, the proposal was for the Finnish State to sell shares of IVO-
Neste to public and institutional investors, national or foreigner, in a public offering. However,
the State was allowed to retain a majority holding of the shares (more than 50%).
In its assessment the EC stated that the first phase of the operation was considered just as
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an internal reorganisation within the State, whereas the second stage was considered a merger,
according to European merger regulation. In conclusion, this merger was under the scrutiny
powers of the EC, however, only a part of it was eventually assessed.
The integration proposed raised particular concerns from the beginning due to the potential
monopoly position assumed by the new merged firm in the market of natural gas in the future.
Moreover, the EC understood that this merger might lead to effective monopoly, not only on
natural gas market but also on electricity market.
The report from the EC mentions that the merged entity would, as a result of the vertical
links between the sectors and the accumulated position in both markets, be in a position to
successfully adopt market strategies, namely control on prices or quantities in both markets.
Several potential strategies were identified as detrimental. The merged firm could use strategies
of threat to successfully increase electricity prices, because any price increase on natural gas
would have the effect of increasing the costs for competing electricity generators. Another
potential strategy could be to compensate a decrease in the sales of natural gas by increasing
sales of electricity, through vertical integration. Due to these reasons, the new firm's decisions
on pricing natural gas would be essential not only on the market for natural gas, but also on
the market for electricity.
On the basis of this assessment, the EC concluded that the merged entity may enjoy a
superior competitive position in the Finish electricity market that may represent an advantage
compared to other generators. Since these points were all proved, the EC concluded that the
operation, as it was, would threaten to create or strengthen a dominant position on the market
for electricity and therefore raised serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common
market. As determined by principle, the EC decided to block the proposed merger.
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The main aim to avoid competition concern was to ensure that the merged firm would
not have a control position over the market and consequently on prices. Subsequently, the
parties submitted proposals. The main proposals were to resign Neste's control over Gasum (a
subsidiary firm) by the divestiture of 50% of the company's shares. The Finnish Government
made a commitment to ensure that the merged firm would remain a minority shareowner of
Gasum.
The proposals were considered sufficient to solve the competition problems raised on the
assessment and the EC decided not to oppose to the notified operation and to declare it com-
patible with the common market and with the functioning of the European Economic Area
Agreement.
EOn-Ruhrgas (DE)
The regulation on E.On-Ruhrgas merger offers a very particular case for study for several
reasons. The dimension assumed by the merged firm along the years and the fact that the
merger occurred in Germany justify the importance of this case.
A new global player in the power industry was created, comprising vertical integrated ser-
vices from gas imports to supply to the final consumer. Germany is the largest energy market
in Europe and its central location gives the country a strategic importance for any company
wishing to engage in European-wide energy transactions. Furthermore, if the creation of a
national champion worked as an obstacle to slow down the German liberalisation process it sets
an anti-competitive precedent for other European countries.
The firms announced the intention to merge in 2001. Either firms were already very impor-
tant players in German energy markets, prior to the integration. EOn (with RWE) held a joint
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dominant position in the electricity market and Ruhrgas was the dominant gas supplier in the
country. In the gas sector, Ruhrgas controlled almost all gas deliveries to regional and municipal
companies, almost all German gas imports and almost all storage facilities and high-pressure
transmission pipes inside Germany.
In their assessment, the two competition authorities called to intervene identified several
reasons for concern. This proposed merger raised a multitude of competition policy questions,
both in the electricity and the gas sector. The Federal Cartel Office had refused the merger on
competition grounds. The Monopolies Commission gave a negative evaluation on competition
implications from the merger and possible arguments from public interest. Both reports clearly
showed that without appropriate remedies, this vertical merger could pose several constraints
to competition.
The main issues pointed were the major implications due to vertical integration. The Ger-
man competition authorities feared significant market foreclosure effects on gas sales (as much
as 20% of annual amounts). They also feared that the merger might have consolidated the prior
market dominance in both the gas and the electricity sector. Authorities also mentioned that
the new merged firm would have an incentive to discriminate against new competitors in the
electricity generation by setting unfair terms for gas transportation and supply. Moreover, both
firms would no longer compete in the markets in which they were both present. Finally, the syn-
ergies obtained from the merger would place other competitors at a competitive disadvantage,
both in the electricity and in the gas markets.
Concerns were also pointed out about implications of the merger on consumers. A lack of
competition in the German energy sector removes the incentive for the merged firm to pass the
benefits from the vertical integration to consumers.
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According to the identified concerns, both authorities blocked the merger. Then, some
proposals were presented by the parties. However, these remedies were considered very limited
in scope, inappropriate and of little significance to prevent the main problem of strengthening
the dominance in gas and electricity markets.
After this prohibition decision, the merging companies appealled to the German Minister
for Economy and Technology. Although all negative evaluations and warnings, on 5th July
2002, EOn obtained a ministerial permit to purchase the dominant gas company, Ruhrgas, for
10.4 billion euros. This permit was granted under a special procedure in the German anti-trust
laws that allow the government to authorise ostensibly anticompetitive behaviour''. Among
the reasons mentioned by the German Government was the role of the merged firm to ensure
security of supply in the gas market. This is a particularly important motive for Germany,
because the country depends greatly on gas imports from Russia. Therefore, the merger was
cleared politically under the condition that the firms would work toward achieving security of
supply.
Many economists criticised this decision as an anticompetitive result designed to create
national champions and, mainly, as a result that it is opposed to the aims of liberalisation.
Considering that the negative assessment from the competition authorities was based on com-
petition and consumer welfare concerns, the Ministry's decision on allowing the merger did not
consider any of these concerns, namely consumers' interests on their decision.
The EC was also called to give its assessment, but it has repeatedly stated that the merger
fell outside its jurisdiction. This claim was increasingly controversial, because beyond the legal-
5Act against Restraints of competition: "if the restraint of competition is outweighed by advantages
to the economy as a a whole following from the concentration or if the concentration is justified by an
overriding public interest"
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istic question of jurisdiction, this merger had wider implications for the liberalisation process
in Europe, for the reasons mentioned above. Therefore, this merger also puts the scope of EU
jurisdiction in the spotlight making its study even more significant.
3.4 Empirical model, data issues and method
This section describes and explains the econometric model and the data used in our analysis to
reply to the research question: "should European household consumers be concerned with cross-
sectional mergers?". In order to examine this issue we construct a model on determinants of
electricity final prices for households. On a first step, we identify the relevant market, according
to commonly used criteriums and then, we discuss the empirical model, data issues and method
used.
We encounter some data and econometric issues, namely missing data and endogeneity
problems. These issues are also discussed and solutions are proposed and implemented to solve
them. To solve endogeneity, we use instrumental variables estimation and to solve the missing
data problems, we decide for the multiple imputation method.
3.4.1 Relevant market
The identification of the relevant market is a key factor in any study of a merger case and it
may affect the final outcome of any merger assessment. The requirement of defining relevant
markets has been also part of the EU competition assessment and a pre-condition under article
81 and 82 of the EU Treaty. According to the Commission Notice, the definition of the relevant
market for the purpose of competition law is:
"( ...) the area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and demand
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of products or services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and
which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are
appreciably different in those areas".
We may consider the European market as the relevant market for the merger analysis,
though several reasons made us define it according to the traditional approach: the market in
each Member State has still to be considered as a separate market. Several indicators as price
differentials between countries, interconnection capacity and cross-border trade are referred
to as relevant criteria for the definition of the relevant market. Different regulatory regimes,
complex capacity allocation systems and different market design in neighbouring countries may
also explain it.
Even the EC recognises in several reports that the integration of energy markets is still far
from a success and with very few exceptions, electricity in the EU remains national in economic
scope. For merger and acquisition cases, the EC has, so far, nearly always defined the relevant
market as being national, arguing that development leading to wider than national electricity
markets is not fulfilled yet.
It can be confirmed that the price differences between countries in Europe are still significant.
Figure 3.1 illustrates real household prices for the analysed countries for the beginning and the
end of the chosen period (first half of 1997 and first half of 2007). For both periods we can
see that electricity prices for household consumers differ quite considerably between countries,
what may be a sign of insufficient market integration. Similar conclusions can be taken from
the evolution of prices in the remaining periods studied.
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Figure 3.1
Electricity prices (household consumers, Dc6), with taxes 1997 and 2007
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Multiple other factors can explain these differences between prices III each country. The
different costs of generating electricity according to the generation mix of the country, the
different availability of generation capacity, the role played by the level of competition on the
wholesale and retail market and, finally, regulated prices also lead to price differences on the
EU electricity markets.
The coexistence of open markets and regulated electricity prices is still common among EU
countries. Almost half of the countries studied still have regulated prices for electricity" for the
6Real prices, based on Eurostat figures in Euro, with taxes, category De for consumption.
According to Eurostat, there are several categories to distinguish consumers. De is the one where
consumers have an annual consumption of 3,500 kWh that are connected to low-voltage networks.
7Denmark, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece. Germany only abolished regulated electricity prices in
2007.
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period considered and regulation is mainly for prices for household customers. The number of
households covered by regulated prices represent a significant proportion of the population in
some countries, such as in France and Italy.
To define a market wider than national, the price differences should occur only in roughly
10% of the time. In contrast, between European countries it happens in 50% of the time
(Valdezande et al, 2006). Thus the relevant market should not be considered wider than na-
tional.
Another key prerequisite for an effective integrated European electricity market is that
markets should be adequately connected, and that interconnections should be efficiently used.
Interconnection capacity is still scarce across Europe and little progress has been made to
improve it. The available capacity of interconnectors is still limited between many of the
countries studied when compared to installed capacity, as it can be pictured in figure 3.2. This
is the case for Spain, France, Italy or UK.
Trade based on differences in production costs is more efficient and load balancing can be
better achieved if neighbours could exchange electricity more easily. The possibility of trade
may reduce the overall reserve margins needed by diversifying the sources of supply. The
existence of trade increases the important role of transmission grids on sustainability of all the
European system, due to the growing interdependence between European markets.
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Figure 3.2
Electricity Market: Cross border capacity across Europe, 2006
(Interconnection capacity in relation to installed capacity)
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Source: ERGEG, 2007
Therefore, when considering whether the market should be defined more widely than a
national market, data on exchange between countries (imports and exports) may also be in-
formative. Significant imports of electricity may indicate that the market could be considered
wider than national. In contrast, a slow development of cross-border trading may be interpreted
as the presence of isolated markets.
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Although, the trade of electricity between neighbouring countries is common in Europe, for
almost half of the countries, the import of electricity hardly covered 10% of national consump-
tion in most of the period analysed, as it can be verified in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3
Imports as percentage of national consumption (%), 1997-2007
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
AU 19 21 23 27 27 29 35 30 35 37 37
BE 14 11 12 15 20 21 18 18 18 23 19
DE 12 10 15 26 25 27 22 26 39 20 31
FI 12 13 15 16 15 17 15 14 22 16 18
FR 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3
GE 8 8 9 9 9 10 10 9 11 9 9
GR 8 6 4 4 8 10 9 10 11 12 12
IT 16 16 16 16 18 18 18 16 17 15 16
NE 15 13 24 23 22 21 21 20 23 26 21
PT 17 12 10 12 9 13 14 19 21 18 20
SP 3 5 7 7 5 6 4 4 4 4 3
SW 8 5 7 14 8 15 19 12 11 13 12
UK 5 4 4 4 3 3 2 3 3 3 3
Source: Eurostat
In what concerns exports, in all European countries, except France and countries from Nord
Pool, exports are marginal, assuming also less than 10% of national consumption of electricity".
As it can be concluded, cross-border trade is still too limited for the markets to be considered
larger than national markets.
As a result of the national scope nature of the European electricity markets, we assume that
firms have differentiated strategies based on national dimension. Even for the case where a firm
spreads its activities in several countries and assume global strategies (for the merger) it might
8Own calculations with data from Eurostat.
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not be able to exert the same influence outside the country where it started as incumbent.
Therefore, we will study the consequences of a merger on market outcomes only on a single
national market.
In conclusion, the relevant market for the analysis of the effect of the merger on market
outcomes will be the country identified on the merger descriptions and not all the markets
where the participant firms have activities. This is one of the main implications of recognizing
national scope of the market for merger analysis in our research.
3.4.2 Empirical model
Econometrically we are focused on assessing the effect of mergers on final electricity prices for
household consumers. To determine the empirical model for our purpose, we should identify all
relevant variables considered as the main determinants of demand and supply of electricity.
Nevertheless, given that the demand and supply of electricity could be highly intercon-
nected, it may be difficult to identify sufficient exogenous variables. For that reason, instead of
estimating the single structural equations directly, our option was to formulate and estimate a
reduced form model for the determinants of electricity final prices on several European markets.
With our purpose in mind, we set up a standard function where price enters on the left
hand side to be explained and to all other explanatory variables, on the right hand side, we
add a dummy variable representing the existence of a merger. After writing down this reduced
form model, we may then use it to quantify the impact of any variable on prices, namely, for
our aim, the existence of a merger.
The results and conclusions may be very sensitive to the demand specification chosen.
Therefore, we should choose demand specifications carefully. The choice should be based on
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the idea that the demand systems should end on conservative estimation results.
When deciding the functional form, we may conclude that there is very little consensus
about the correct one for electricity prices. Although, most studies use a linear form, a log-
linear or a logit form. The main problem of the log-linear model, also named constant elasticity
form model, is that it omits the influence of a change in market shares. The logit model is
based on a random utility model and yields results that are easily derived and are in the range
of conservative estimates. However, this last demand system is not suitable for the analysis of
electricity, because it finds application more often for differentiated product markets.
In the context of our research, it is sufficient to choose a simple linear demand model.
Firstly, the linear demand function produces a conservative measure of the price change for
homogeneous goods, as is the case of electricity, and reduces the error of false conclusions.
Secondly, although attempts have been made to find a demand model that adequately explains
the demand for electricity (Taylor, 1975) there is no detailed analysis of the European elec-
tricity markets. Therefore, without a more comprehensive analysis of the electricity industry
on European markets it is difficult to firmly decide which of the demand specifications best
represents the actual demand structure in each country. In conclusion, the main motivation for
this choice was the relative ease with which it can be analysed and the conservative conclusions
that allows to take.
Assuming the linear function, as motivated above, the price equation for our research may
be described, in general terms, as follows:
In this equation, Pit stands for final price of electricity for household consumers in country
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i in period t; Uit is a standard stochastic error term that includes other unobserved factors
that are uncorrelated with the existence of a merger. For each country i=1, ... 13 the fixed effect
is given by Vi. The country effects account for all unobservable heterogeneous country level
variables that affect prices but that are time invariant, such as the market structure. Though
it would be expected that with liberalisation the market structure would change over time, it
was not the case for the majority of European countries.
Mit is a dummy variable taking a value of zero for periods before the merger for all countries
and a value of 1 for post-merger observations for countries where a merger, as we define, take
place. For each merger analysed we consider a specific dummy variable (j refers to the particular
merger). Each merger has particular features that should be considered and, therefore, the effect
on final prices may be different.
A linear time trend is also included into the equation. A trend variable is a monotonically
increasing variable. This time trend captures the effect of constant factors that vary uniformly
across countries over time as is the case of environmental regulation, mandatory by the EC and
adopted by all countries, for example, which has changed during the time of our analysis.
X it represents observed control variables that also influence final prices for electricity. To
control for demand and cost determinants, the covariates, we include several relevant variables.
These variables are chosen through a review of the literature in electricity industry, as well as
information on European electricity markets. It should be mentioned that variable selection
was also guided by the likely availability of data.
To generate electricity, there is a choice of a wide-array of generation technologies and fuel
sources. Due to the dominance of fossil fuelled power plants in European electricity generation,
primary energy (as natural gas, coal and fueoil) prices are crucial determinants of the evolution
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of electricity final prices.
However, changes in the price of a fuel should affect only the country where the fuel is
included on the generation mix. Therefore, instead of including just the price of fuel, we
include the weighted average of cost of thermal generation, lagged. Since the decisions to buy
the inputs (fuels) are made before the time of generation we have tried different lags for the
weighted costs and the more significant was one period, i.e., six months. The expected sign
for the estimated coefficient of generation fuel cost, lagged one period, is positive and it means
that higher generation cost on the period before leads to higher final price of electricity.
Besides this determinant, production of inframarginal technologies or non conventional pro-
duction (hydro run-of-river and nuclear power) may also directly influence price formation.
While the relative use of most generation conventional techologies is a choice, the relative use
of hydroelectric resources is largely exogenous, driven instead by the availability of water re-
sources in the country. The expectation is that due to the lower marginal cost of hydro compared
with other technologies, the availability of hydro generation would have a negative impact on
price of electricity. However, in drought years, the marginal cost of hydro generation is not
as low as usual, due to the high value of opportunity costs associated with the use of water,
and may have a positive effect on final prices. Hence, depending on the rain characteristics
of the period, the expected sign of the coefficient of Hydrogeneration (hydrogenerationit) may
change.
Compared with conventional thermal generation, nuclear power is commercially more ex-
posed to risk because it has high fixed costs. This means that it has an economic incentive to
run at maximum load. For existing nuclear power plants, the determinant costs in a competi-
tive market are the marginal costs of operation including applicable repair and refurbishment
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expenses. Typically, nuclear plants have lower marginal costs. However, electricity prices have
to be enough to cover both the marginal costs of operation and the investment costs of nu-
clear power plants. Therefore, it is possible that a higher percentage of nuclear generation
(nuclegenerationit) will drive final prices of electricity up.
The disposable income of each country is also added as a proxy for electricity demand,
mainly for two reasons. One, even if, in the long run, the effect of demand on price may be
neglected, short term variation in demand due to changes in income may affect price. Two,
it may be said that consumers with higher income demand higher levels of electricity. As a
result, we expect that higher disposable income (Incomeit) leads to higher household price for
electricity.
As any good, the final price of electricity may be positively determined by the cost of labour
(LabourCostsit). Due to the low intensity in labour of electricity generation sector, we may
find a non significant coefficient for this variable, though.
The reestructuring of European electricity markets, following the EU Directive in 1996,
forced EU member countries to open their retail markets. Though, European countries opened
their markets at different points in time. Regulatory changes that boost competition in the
electricity industry are expected to have impact on final prices of electricity. Since the third
party access (TPAit) was usually established at the same time as the retail access, we may use
the TPA indicator, as Steiner (2001) defined. The introduction of choice for the consumers
in retail market will boost competition between generators and suppliers. Due to the higher
competition, suppliers are more able to supply industrial consumers than household consumers.
Therefore there is a possibility that industrial prices will decrease and prices for households will
increase with the diminishing cross-subsidiarisation presented in the past on the market. To
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conclude, the introduction of TPA in a market may penalise household consumers through the
increase in final prices.
Finally, a determining factor in electricity prices may be the generation mix of each country.
In the past years, the main change concerning the sources of fuel for electricity generation was
the shift from coal to natural gas inside thermal sources (%natgaSit) for generation. Natural gas
plants are faster to site and build and are less carbon intensive, compared to coal. Therefore,
in most European countries new gas fired power stations were replacing old coal plants and
natural gas is taking market share away from coal due to more competitive electricity costs. A
higher percentage of natural gas in the total thermal sources may have a beneficial impact of
final prices of electricity due to the construction of more efficient plants.
The general specification for the reduced-form equation for electricity final price, including
all variables described and explained above, is as follows:
Pit = Vi
+f31MifE + f32MifI + f33Costsit-l + f34hydrogenerationit + f35nuclegenerationit + f36Incomeit
+f37LabourCostsit + f38Time + f3gTPAij + f310%natgaSit+uit
It is important to notice that there are a number of other variables suggested in various
other studies that may be determinants of electricity prices. These have been omitted due to
the limited number of variables that can be included in a short period dataset, as ours, and
some others were excluded due to lack of data availability.
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3.4.3 Data issues and descriptive statistics
Our research question is answered using panel data covering all the period after the deregulation
and liberalisation of energy markets, from 1997 to 2007, and considering a set of 13 European
countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK).
We have not considered either Luxembourg nor all recent members of the EU. The first
choice is due to the fact that since Luxembourg has got very special conditions for the choice of
groups of consumers and has got different functioning rules for the electricity market it would
be very complex to compare it with the other countries. The second choice is due to the lack of
data available for the entire period. All countries considered embarked upon liberalisation under
the 1996 Directive. This Directive did not immediately apply in the more recent EU Members
and most of them have been undergoing a transformation from socialist to market economies,
often implying additional measures, as for example gradually removing cross-subsidies, and
these changes can have specific effects on market prices, namely on final prices for electricity.
We choose the final prices of electricity and not the wholesale price for our analysis for
several reasons. First, the weakness of the data available from power exchanges. Electricity
is not significantly traded in power exchanges in some of the countries considered and it is
still largely traded bilaterally over-the-counter so it may not be relevant to infer the impact on
wholesale prices. Second, it is proved that the evolution of prices for final consumers is not
similar to the one in the wholesale market and if our final aim is to study the impact on final
consumers analysing the consumer final price it seems to be the best choice.
Since household consumers tend to show lower price elasticity than industrial consumers,
135
it is expected that household consumers will feel less any effect (liberalisation, regulation or as
is our case, change in market structure). Hence, if, for example, household prices would fall
significantly, it can be assumed that other prices will decline at least in the same order.
In conclusion, the dependent variable is the price for household consumers, valid on 1
January and on 1 July of each calendar year, available from EUROSTAT. We are concerned
about the effect on welfare of final consumers. Therefore, we use the definition of price that is
more relevant for household consumers: prices including all taxes". The analysis was limited
to the consumer category Dc. According to Eurostat, there are several categories, namely De
where consumers have an annual consumption of 3,500 kWh that are connected to low-voltage
networks. All end-user prices are based on values in euros and when we had to covert it, we
have used the currency exchange at the period considered. Additionally, each price was deflated
by the Consumer Price Index of the country.
In figure 3.3 it can be seen the evolution of real prices for some countries where the mergers
did not occur (above) and in Germany and Finland (below). In the same figure it is also drawn
the time of each merger analysed in order to distinguish the period before and after the merger.
From the evolution of real prices, it is not completely clear the conclusions about the effect of
mergers on prices, namely if we compare the evolution of prices before and after the merger
for the country where it occurs with prices in other European countries.
9The prices include electricity/gas basic price, transmission, system services, distribution and other
services.
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Figure 3.3
Evolution of real prices for electricity, Household consumers, 1997 to 2007, pre
and post cross-sectorial mergers
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Source: Own construction with Eurostat data.
The remaining data used to estimate our model are obtained from a variety of sources. All
the data used is publicly available (reports from regulators, from firms, statistical institutes
and international organisations) and is half-yearly. All independent variables used are listed
in table 3.4. In order to adjust all monetary values to overall price developments, we use the
Consumer Price Index of each country.
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Table 3.4
Description and sources of (some) Independent Variables (Xit)
Variable Description Source
Expected sign
(coeff)
Hydrogeneration % of hydro generation on generation Eurostat +/-
(%) mix
Nuclegeneration % of nuclear generation on Eurostat +
(%) generation mix
LabourCosts
Average personnel costs on
electricity generation (per Eurostat +
(lOOOeur)
employee)
Income Net national disposable income OECD
(B6NS1)
+
(millions eur)
weighted average of thermal fuel
Costs costs used on generation; weight: % OECD +
(eur/Kwh) of each fuel on country total
generation mix
% natgasTh
% of natural gasgeneration on total
(%)
thermal generation Eurostat
Definition by Steiner (2001)
TPA Dummy variable takes value 1 if
OECD +
(0/1) there is negotiated or regulated TPA
and zero otherwise
The generation costs used as independent variable is the weighted cost of generating elec-
tricity. The fuels considered for the weighted average were the fossil fuel sources for generation:
heavy fuel oil for electricity generation, natural gas for electricity generation and steam coal
for electricity generation. When the price of some fuel for generation was not available for any
period studied we have used the industrial price of the same fuel (when available). Otherwise
it is assumed no value for the period. We just use the data available thus, we have several
missings (described in next section) on this variable. To calculate the weighted average, we use
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all the prices available even if for some period we have, for example, only the price of one of
the thermal sources of fuel.
Since we found several data non available for Sweden and Denmark, we assume the price of
generation fuels for all Nord Pool countries. The reason for this assumption is that, differently
from the remaining European countries, these countries are part of a recognised integrated
market.
Table 3.5 lists the summary statistics for the dataset, which shows the between and within
standard deviation for each variable. The table shows that some variables have relatively little
within country variation as compared to between country variation, as it is usual in micropanel
databases.
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Table 3.5
Descriptive statistics of the Variables
Variable variation type Mean Std. Dev
P_H overall .146 .044
between .044
within .014
Mde overall .033 .179
between .119
within .138
Mfi overall .055 .228
between .198
within .126
Costs_lLag overall .0043 .0033
between .0023
within .0009
Hydrogeneration overall .179 .1831
between .1839
within .0469
Nuclegeneration overall .246 .258
between .267
within .020
labourCosts overall 51.42 13.14
between 12.53
within 4.78
Income overall 9638958 3.23e+07
between 3.34e+07
within 3059201
%natgas overall .405 .181
between .164
within .089
TPA overall .846 .361
between .138
within .336
Auth1 overall -.617 .793
between .623
within .519
Auth2 overall -.271 .919
between .721
within .604
Auth3 overall .308 .462
between .263
within .387
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Missing values and the solutions
As it was stated before, we have data in 13 European countries for several determinants of final
electricity prices. Our database is an unbalanced panel, due to some missing values in several
variables. The advantage of having a panel is that it often contains far more information than
cross-section data. Thus it allows for an increased precision in estimated results. However, it
is worth underlining the relatively small dimension of our sample due to the characteristics of
the market and to the aim of our research.
Most of the research databases are plagued by the problem of missing values. While this
may not be a significant problem in univariate analyses, the concerns increase in multivariate
analyses, as it is our case, making it difficult to analyse the data.
When we want to estimate an econometric model with missing values, we have two options.
On the one hand, we can use appropriate estimation methods (Baltagi, 1985), which are in
general quite complex or, on the other hand, the alternative option is to use appropriate methods
to deal with missing data. We use the second approach on this research.
Much has been written regarding missing values in statistical literature. Three types of
consequences are usually associated with this problem: loss of information, efficiency or power
due to loss of data and complications in handling and analysing the data due to irregularities
in the data pattern and non-applicability of standard software.
Two important factors should be considered when selecting a technique for analysing missing
data. First, the amount of data missing, and second, the specific type (or mechanism) of
missingness. The greater the percentage of missing data, the more important missing data
approaches are for minimising bias. As the portion of data missing reaches 20% or more, the
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choice of a missing estimation technique can have substantial implications for the parameter
estimates. Table 3.6 presents the percentage of missing data for each of the variables included
in the analysis.
Table 3.6
Missing data in the dataset
Variable Nr. Missing Missing/Total
Costs_lLag 23 0.08
%gas *pri ce of gas 112 0.41
%coal*price of coal 67 0.25
%oi I*price of oi I 122 0.45
Nucleageneration 1 0.004
LabourCosts 30 0.11
Note: Only contains variables with missing values.
We can see a very different pattern in the missing data, from around 1% for nuclear gen-
eration to above 20% on weighted generation costs. Some variables seem to be especially
problematic, namely the ones in the price of fuels, as we can see in additional information in
each component of weighted average cost and labour costs. Most of the data were missing by
design: IAEE reports are based on surveys fulfilled by each country and some countries do not
report data for all years to IAEE.
Data is complete for several variables: Hydrogeneration, Disposable Income, the existence
of the merger, TPA and %natgas and all the instruments. The variable Nuclear is almost
complete. Most countries with missing data have only one or two missing variables and few
have three missing values. From the 273 observations around 80% are complete.
Little and Rubin (1987) report a well known classification on the mechanism of missingness.
If all individuals in the population have an equal probability of being missing, then we have
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Missing Completely at Random (MCAR). When the probability of missing is variable but
the difference in probability depend solely on data that is not missing, the data is said to be
Missing at Random (MAR). When the probability of missingness is variable but, this variability
depends upon factors other than covariates or observed values of the response variable, then the
missingness mechanism is described as informative or non-ignorable. Our data is assumed to
be MAR, according to the definitions above. As it was stressed before, from this classification
it also depends the choice of the best method to solve the missingness problem.
A number of different methods to deal with missings have been reported in the literature.
These methods can be divided into two main categories: traditional approaches and missing
data imputation. The first solution is more frequently used in the literature. However, even if
it has some intuitive logic, it lacks a proper formal basis and can be quite misleading. These
approaches include listwise deletion, pairwise deletion, mean substitution and inclusion of an
indicator variable.
The default method in all statistical software is simply deleting cases with any missing data
on the variables of interest (listwise deletion or complete case analysis). A large part of the
empirical literature takes the option of using listwise deletion and eliminates entire observations.
Though, in multivariate problems, case deletion often results in a large portion of the data being
deleted and an unacceptable loss of power. In our case, the use of listwise deletion will represent
losing around one-fourth of our data. The first estimation results presented in section 3.5 are
based on this solution. However, our database is already relatively small and so, the listwise
approach does not seem to be the most suitable.
All shortcomings of deletion strategies have been well documented (Little & Rubin, 1987).
If the deleted cases form a relatively small portion of the entire dataset, then this method may
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indeed be a reasonable approach. Nevertheless, the consequence is a loss of valuable information
at best and a severe selection bias at worst. Inferences from analysis using listwise deletion are
relatively inefficient, no matter which assumption characterises the missingness.
When there is a relatively large amount of data missing, imputation is pointed out as an
assumed popular method to handle incomplete data problems. This popularity is due mainly
to the fact that once the missing values are filled in, it is possible to apply standard complete
data methods to produce the desirable results.
To be effective the imputation method should fulfill two requirements: (i) it must reasonably
capture the actual distributional relationship between unobserved and the observed; (ii) the
analysis must take into account the uncertainty in the imputed values, because no matter how
much effort one makes, the imputed values are simply not the real ones.
Multiple imputation methods-" have been around for about three decades and are now a
choice to avoid the problems of traditional practices presented (Rubin, 1977). The difference
between the latter and the standard single imputation is that the last approach underestimates
the true variability in the data as it does not account for the fact that the imputed values are
not in fact the true, observed data. Multiple imputation addresses this problem by generating
multiple imputations for each missing value.
Among some alternatives we have used Rubin's multiple imputation (Rubin, 1987; Schaffer,
1997). This is a three-step method to meet the two requirements referred to above. The first
step is to build a sensible imputation model and then to impute the unobserved values for m
independent draws from the model. As the second step we simply construct a complete data
laThe textbooks by Little and Rubin (2002), Schafer (1997) provide a comprehensive overview of
methods in this setting, focused on multiple imputation.
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analysis using each of the imputed data sets in the same way as we would use a real complete
data. Finally, as the third step we combine these multiple results to obtain the so-called repeated
imputation inference.
Even if the available literature does not identify clearly the best method to solve missingness
for all data, according to all the reasons stated above, multiple imputation is identified as one
good alternative with very good statistical properties when compared to the other approaches.
3.4.4 Econometric method
If we could assume stability on price function and the presence of no contemporaneous shocks
on price over the period, it would be simple to identify the effects of mergers by just comparing
the post-merger and pre-merger price for the affected country. However, prices of electricity
have changed over time and there were several factors that caused those variations.
The parameter of interest when estimating the effect a merger between a natural gas supplier
and electricity generator has on electricity final prices for the market where it occurred is
(31and (32' the coefficients of the merger dummy variables. Therefore, the estimation of (31 and
(32 is the main issue of this chapter. A value of the coefficients that is statistically different
from zero would indicate that the merger has a significant effect on final prices. The sign of the
coefficients show whether this effect is positive or negative: a positive coefficient means that
the existence of a merger increases final prices for consumers and a negative coefficient allows
to conclude that the merger decreases final prices.
A potential problem with the overall regression model is the endogeneity of the vertical
cross-sectorial merger. The central question is, then, whether market structure can be treated
as exogenous, as in some previous research (Owen, 1970; Landon, 1973). However, the creation
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of a vertically integrated firm is not randomly determined across countries, but rather is the
result of a strategic choice. In fact, mergers do not arise by chance. Factors that trigger mergers
are likely to also concomitantly affect market outcomes, such as final prices. Whether firms in
a country respond by vertically integrating depends, in part, on unobservable factors and these
unobserved characteristics are probably correlated with electricity final price.
One solution to solve the endogeneity of explanatory variables is to implement Instrumental
Variable (IV) estimators. Adding to the economic arguments above, we use the Durbin- Wu-
Hausman test for endogeneity of Mj. The null hypothesis (Ho) is that OL8 and IV are both
consistent but OL8 is efficient. If we reject Ho then the endogenous regressors' effect on the
estimators is meaningful and OL8 is not the appropriate technique due to biased and inconsis-
tent estimators. In all estimated models endogeneity tests confirm the economic reasoning that
justify the endogeneity of Mj.
The instrument variable should identify the exogenous variation in final price of electricity
attributable to a merger, recognising that the participation (having a merger or not) is not
random. There are two requirements that need to be fulfilled, in this case, for an instrument
to be valid. First, the existence of a merger should be highly correlated with the instruments
and second, the instrumental variable should not be correlated with the final price, other than
through the merger variable. The first condition can be tested through the correlation between
the instruments and the endogenous variables (or the coefficient in the instrument on the first
stage of a two stage least squares regression). The exogeneity condition, on the other hand,
cannot generally be directly tested, and an intuitive argument may be made.
Therefore, the reasoning is to find an instrument correlated with the existence of mergers
of this type, but not correlated with prices. The instruments chosen are relative measures of
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strenght./toughness of competition regulation. The existence or not of a merger is likely to
depend on the effectiveness of competition policy. Effectiveness of competition policy is likely
to depend on the toughness of the regulator. Neoclassical explanations of merger waves argue
that these events depend on an industry's economic and regulatory environment. We use three
variables in order to measure the relative effectiveness/ toughness of competition authorities in
each country.
The set of instruments is based on the fact that the effectiveness of competition regulation
may be related with the average quality of a country's regulators. The general quality of
regulators in a country creates an environment that affects the effectiveness of all public policies.
In a context where all regulators, in average, are effective and efficient, the authority that
presides over the enforcement of competition law also tends to be effective and efficient. The
idea behind the instruments is that comparing the quality of electricity sectorial regulator
with the average quality of regulators in a country may be a good indicator of quality of the
competition authority. On the one hand, there will be less attempts from the parts involved in
mergers because they know that, by reputation, the authorities will be very rigorous. On the
other hand, the rigorous scanning from a tough/effective authority will increase the probability
of a merger to be blocked. In any of these cases, a competition authority with higher quality
(more tough/ more effective) is related with a lower probability for the existence of mergers.
To determine our relative measure, we use an index based on a set of regulatory reforms
indicators (REGREF), an OECD regulatory database which collects some indicators of pri-
vatisation, desintegration and liberalisation of several services of general interest across some
OECD countries. These indicators have been used extensively in various empirical studies
linking regulation to economic performance and to measure the strength of policies aimed at
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preserving and promoting market competition.
We use the relative features of electricity regulators (compared to the average of the country)
as a proxy for the same feature on competition authority according to the explanation above
and recognising that the sector regulator has also some intervention on merger cases assessment
in its sector. The description of each instrument is presented in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7
Definition of instruments for IV
Instruments description
Authl the distance of the electricity sectorial regulator index to the average of
the country
benchmark: average of the indicator for all sectorial regulatorfor each
country
Auth2 the distance of the electricity sectorial regulator index to the average of
the country
benchmark: aggregate indicator of regulatory reforms indicator IREGREF)
of each country
Auth3 compare with the indicator for electricity regulator and assumes 0 if it is
less or equal to the anual average amd lotherwise
benchmark: average of the indicator for all sectorial regulator for each
year for all countries
The choice of the set of instruments above was based on economic reasoning and also based
on verifying the conditions for a good instrument, using appropriate statistics. The results and
conclusions are shown in section 3.5.
3.5 Empirical results and discussion
In order to answer our research question on the impact of vertical integration between natural
gas suppliers and electricity generators on household consumers, we will be concerned about
the coefficients of the dummy variables defined for each of the chosen merger. A fixed effects
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approach (within group estimation) is used to control for the unobserved country specific effects
that cannot be captured by the explained control variables through all the results on this section.
The aim of applying fixed effects estimators is to look at the effect on price within each country
and removing the pernicious effect of omitted variable bias.
As most of empirical papers in economics, we start from using listwise deletion to solve the
data missingness problem, by deleting any observation having at least one missing value. In
table 3.8 we present the estimation results for the linear specification of the reduced form of
final price for household consumers using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). In our case, if we
restrict ourselves to observations where data is available for all regressors, we lose around one
- fourth (20%) of our data.
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Table 3.8
Estimation results (OLS estimation): listwise deletion
IDependent variable: P H
listwlse deletion
MOE .019***
(.005)
MFI -.0001 **
(.005)
Costsl_Ll 2.5***
(.399)
Hydrogeneration .031 **
(.013)
Nucleageneration .194**
(.034)
LabourCosts .0005***
(.0002)
Income 1.30e-09***
(2.18e-10)
Time .00005
(.0002)
%natgas -.066***
(.0114)
TPA -.004
(.003)
constant .075***
(.014)
Nr.obser 222
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq( 2) = 19.878
test (0.000)
Notes:The dependent variable is the real prices for household consumers, DC;Standard errors in parenthesis;
***, ** and * denote significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
The coefficients of most of the independent variables are statistically significant. The ex-
ception are TPA and also the Time, which are not statistically significant. The majority of
explanatory variables show the expected sign.
Concerning the merger coefficients, the values are also statistically significant and therefore
150
it allows us to conclude that there are effects of the mergers on the final price for household
consumers. This effect is different according to the merger: from the German vertical integration
we obtain as a result a detrimental effect and from the Finish merger the impact is positive,
even if it is very small. This means that the merger between Ruhrgas and EOn seems to have
increased household prices and the merger between IVO and Neste seems to have reduced prices
for household consumers, if we compare pre-merger with post-merger prices for Germany and
Finland, ceteris paribus, respectively.
We check for multicollinearity between explanatory variables, using a correlation table and
the tolerance and variance inflation factors (VIF). Cumulatively, the highest correlation was
less than 0.60 and the VIF are not greater than 10 while the tolerance values are not lower
than 0.1. Therefore, multicollinearity between the explanatory variables is not an issue to be
addressed.
Further econometric tests seemed essential in this panel data context. These are tests of
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data
assumes the value F(1, 12) = 42.506 what means that fails to reject HO: no serial correlation.
Concerning heteroskedasticity, the null hypothesis is rejected according to the modified Wald
test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in FE regression model [chi2 (13) = 830.70j.
In order to ensure valid statistical inference in the presence of heteroskedasticity, serial
correlation and cross-sectional dependence we use Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (Driscoll and
Krayy, 1998). After assessing the violation of the remaining assumptions we have decided
to assume also cross-sectional dependence between disturbances in the panel. Several studies
show that microeconomic panels, such as ours, are likely to exhibit mutual dependence between
cross-sectional units. In table 3.9 are displayed the estimation results for the FE model with
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Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
Table 3.9
Estimation results (OLS estimation): listwise deletion
IDependent variable: P H
listwise deletion
MOE .019***
(.004)
MFI -.0001
(.003)
Costsl_Ll 2.5***
(.508)
Hydrogeneration .031 **
(.013)
Nucleageneration .194***
(.035)
LabourCosts .0005
(.0003)
Income 1.30e-09***
(1.78e-lO)
TIme .00005
(.0002)
%natgas -.066***
(.015)
TPA -.004***
(.004)
constant .075***
(.011)
Notes:The dependent variable is the real prices for household consumers, DC; Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in
parenthesis; ***, ** and * denote significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
However, these results still reflect the data issues mentioned before. Namely, the endogeneity
of the existence of the mergers is not solved. In fact, one may imagine that a merger is more
likely on markets where prices are high. If this interaction between the existence of a merger
and final price is not considered in the econometric analysis, it must be expected that the
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effect of the merger on final price will be at least partly offset by the effect of the price on
the existence of a merger. Therefore, the true impact may be underestimated. This economic
argument may be confirmed by econometric tests such as the Durbin- Wu-Hausman test (DWH)
for endogeneity. This test compares the parameters estimated by OL8 with the parameters
estimated by Instrumental Variables (IV) method. If there is no significant difference in the
parameters, then the null hypothesis of exogeneity can be accepted and OL8 can be used for
estimation.
As it can be concluded from table 3.8, the null hypothesis of exogeneity was strongly rejected.
Thus, consistent with the arguments previously explained, there is evidence that the endogeneity
significantly affects estimates of the relationship analysed. Therefore, the coefficients on this
estimation are biased and we should apply IV estimators to solve endogeneity and multiple
imputation to solve the existence of missingness on data.
3.5.1 Results 1: Solving endogeneity
In this section the aim is (on a first stage) to solve one of the problems presented in the
estimation results above. Given the endogeneity of two explanatory variables, MDE and MF1,
the dummy variables for the existence of mergers, the solution is to use Instrumental Variable
methods for the estimation. The instruments chosen are the three measures of toughness and
effectiveness of competition authorities, as defined in section 3.4.4. We are still using the listwise
deletion as the solution for the missingness of data, thus we lose 20% of our database.
We assume homoskedasticity, no serial correlation and independence across cross-sectional
units in this section and in the next one. We need to mention that we acknowledge the lim-
itations of these assumptions, but the main aim was to solve, at this stage, the endogeneity
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problem, in this section, and cumulatively, the missingness problem in the next section.
In order to infer the quality of the chosen instruments it is displayed in Appendix C the first
stage regressions (FE estimation) and the summary of some statistical tests for robustness of
instruments. The first stage estimations, displayed in table Cl depict the significant relationship
between the endogenous variables (MDE and MFI) and the three chosen instruments (Auth1,
Auth2, Auth3). Each of the three measures of toughness of competition authorities used as
instruments in our IV estimation appear as statistically significant in the first stage regressions.
Recalling the two conditions for a valid instrument we know that for an instrumental variable
to be valid it must satisfy two conditions: i) instrument relevance and (ii) instrument exogeneity.
Some tests have been proposed to detect the relevance of the instruments. The usual test,
when we have one endogenous variable, is the F-test in the first stage. Staiger and Stock (1997)
proposed a "rule of thumb" in these cases: if the F-statistic is greater than ten, the instruments
are strong; otherwise, they are weak. However, when we have more than one endogenous
variable on the right-hand side, as is our case, the F test and the "rule of thumb" are not good
tests of relevance. An alternative test to be applied is the Anderson canonical correlations test.
It was developed based on the idea that the relevance of the instruments and identification of
the model are closely related. In our case, according to this test, we reject the Ho and therefore,
the instruments are relevant and are not considered weak.
The second condition (exogeneity of the instruments) for good instruments says that these
variables must not be correlated with the error term in the main equation, or in other words,
they have been correctly excluded from the main equation. If they have any effect on the
endogenous variables on the left-hand side, that effect should occur through the effect on the
endogenous variables on the right-hand side. The Sargan statistic is used to test this condition:
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if instruments are correlated or not with the error term. The null hypothesis is that instruments
are exogenous. The results of the Sargan test (displayed in table Cl) allows to conclude that
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity in our model. Therefore, the instruments are
exogenous.
To conclude, we can reasonably verify that the variables assumed as instruments are con-
sistent in producing robust instruments for the endogenous variables. Table 3.10 presents the
fixed effect estimation of the impact of each vertical merger on final prices.
Table 3.10
Estimation results (IV estimation)
IDependent variable: P H
Listwise deletion
.036*
(.0192)
.072***
Hydrogeneration
(.019)
2.62***
(.398)
.035***
(.013)
.229***
(.036)
.0004
(.0003)
1.56e-09***
(2.25e-10)
-.0007*
(.0004)
-.048***
(.012)
.0016
(.003)
.054***
(.019)
Costsl_Ll
Nucleageneration
LabourCosts
Income
Time
%natgas
TPA
constant
Nr.obser 222
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Notes:The dependent variable is the real prices for household consumers, DC; Corrected standard errors in
parenthesis; ***, ** and * denote significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. First stage and
second stage estimations include country dummies.
The parameter estimates with respect to the explanatory variables are consistent with the
economic intuition described before. The majority of the coefficients are statistically signifi-
cant, except the cost of labour and the existence of TPA. Both variables are not significant in
explaining the final price of electricity for household consumers. The low labour intensity of
this industry may be an explanation for the first conclusion. As it was pointed out before, the
relation of the existence of TPA with the household price is related with the decreasing on the
cross-subsidiarisation presented in European electricity markets: price of industrial consumers
were higher in order to have lower prices for household consumers, before liberalisation. The
introduction of competition may lead to a decrease on prices for industrial consumers and thus
to an increase in the price for household consumers. Even if it is not significant, the coefficient
assumes the expected positive sign.
The positive and significant value of the coefficient of lagged weighted generation costs
confirm the expectation: an increase on thermal cost of generation is split into two parts but
both have a positive impact on price. The share of hydrogeneration and of nuclear generation
have a significant positive coefficient. The increase in the share of hydrogeneration in drought
years (as in the period studied) may increase household prices. The same seems to happen with
increases in nuclear generation share in total generation of the country.
Time has a very small negative impact on final prices, ceteris paribus, which means a
decreasing time trend for household prices. This conclusion seems appropriate to support the
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positive effects in the last years after liberalisation in Europe for consumers, even if the decrease
in prices, ceteris paribus, is not very large (it amounts to less that 1cent€).
With respect to the effect of the existence of a merger between a natural gas supplier
and an electricity generator, the main aim of our research, the estimated coefficients (of MDE
and MFI), seem to show that these events increase the final price for household consumers.
The coefficients suggest that the final price of electricity for households in Germany after the
merger is nearly 4cent€ higher than the price before the merger, holding the other independent
variables constant. In what concerns Finland, the results seem to allow to conclude that the
vertical integration increased the household prices around 8cent€. Therefore, the existence of
the cross-sectorial integration, as defined for our study, has a detrimental effect on household
consumers, ceteris paribus. So far, consumers should be concerned if the wave of mergers of this
type are not reduced by competition authorities.
For the estimated results above we still apply listwise deletion to solve the data missingness.
The significant lost of data may result in ignoring useful information from nonmissing regressors
and may produce biased inferences. The estimators obtained with such a method have been
proved to be biased if the data remaining after deletion is not a random sample of the overall
database and may lead to serious biases in variances and covariances and therefore to biased
conclusions.
3.5.2 Results 2: Solving endogeneity and existence of data missingness
In order to avoid the above mentioned consequences it is essential, at this point to solve the
problem with a more efficient solution. Consequently, we implement a two-step multiple impu-
tation algorithm developed by Rubin (1987) and Schafer (1997). Multiple imputation has been
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shown to reduce bias and increase efficiency compared to listwise deletion.
The choice of number of imputations is the first important choice in this method, and we
have used several alternative number of imputations (m). The results allowed to conclude that
the appropriate number of imputations (m) for our database is 5. In the first stage of this
method, multiple imputation for each missing value is created, resulting in multiple data sets,
each with 273 observations and different imputations for the missing data. Then the 5 imputed
datasets are integrated into a final result using Rubin's rule.
Amelia II (Honaker et al, 2011) was used on R to perform the multiple imputations and
draw imputations of the missing values using a novel bootstrapping approach, the Expectation-
maximisation with bootstrapping algorithm. The EM algorithm (Dempster, Laird, and Rubin
1977) is a simple computational approach to find the mode of the posterior. This method
combines the classic EM algorithm with a bootstrap approach to take draws from this posterior,
which gives fundamental uncertainty too. The algorithm draws imputed values from each set
of boostrapped parameters, replacing the missing values with these draws.
After having the five imputed datasets, we use IV estimation method m order to solve
also the endogeneity problem found. The first stage results of IV in appendix C, on table
C2, support the relevance of our instruments. The coefficient of the three instruments are
statistically significant in almost all estimated equations in the first stage. This allows to
generalise the conclusion on the relevance of the instruments. The results seem to show the
significant relationship between the endogenous variables and the three chosen instruments.
In order to evaluate the quality of the instruments, we search for two answers. First, can
we be reasonably satisfied that the instruments have adequately identified the reduced form
equation? Both Anderson and Cragg-Donald Wald statistics suggest that we can comfortably
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reject the null hypothesis of underindentification of the model. The reduced form price equation
is identified in that the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors.
Under the null hypothesis, the instrument is valid, thus uncorrelated with the error term. Since
the Sargan statistics amount to more than 1 for all imputed datasets with higher p-values, the
null hypothesis that the instruments are valid is not rejected.
The second question to be answered is if we can reject the null hypothesis of weak instru-
ments. Once again, since we have more than one endogenous variable, the F-statistic of the
first stage for both variables do not verify the "rule of thumb". Using the alternative, the
Anderson canonical correlations test, we may conclude that we reject the Ho and therefore, the
instruments are relevant. Therefore, after conducting all these tests we are confident to apply
IV setting to our specification of price equation and conclude from the estimation results.
Table 3.11 reports the fixed effect estimated coefficients for the reduced form of the final
price equation for household consumers. The results presented consider the endogeneity of the
merger dummy variables and after using multiple imputation to solve the missingness of data
problem.
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Table 3.11
Estimation results (IV estimation)
IDependent variable: P_H
Multiple Imputation
MGE .072**
(.025)
MFI .050*
(.020)
Costsl_Ll .872*
(.400)
Hydrogeneration .052***
(.0147)
Nucleageneration .177**
(.055)
LabourCosts .001 ***
(.0003)
Income 1.5e-09***
(2.6e-1O)
TIme -.001 *
(.0004)
%natgas -.077***
(.012)
TPA .0087*
(.004)
constant .036
(.020)
Nr.obser 273
Notes:The dependent variable is the real prices for household consumers, DC;Corrected standard errors in
parenthesis; ***, ** and * denote significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
All explanatory variables are statistically significant and confirm the economic reasoning.
The values presented are similar to the estimation of the section before. The main difference of
solving the missingness of data are the dimension of the coefficients as they keep the same signal
as before with listwise deletion. The coefficients that were before negative are still negative in
the new estimation and the ones that were positive are still positive. In conclusion, the direction
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of the effect of those explanatory variables on final prices did not change with this estimation
refinement, thus, the explanation of the effect of each variable on final prices for household is
similar to the one exposed in the section before.
In what concerns to the main objective of our research, to answer the question whether
European households should be concerned, our focus goes, once more to the coefficients of the
merger dummies. The evidence suggests that both mergers have a positive and statistically
significant effect on final price for households consumers in each country, meaning that the
vertical integration seem to cause an increase in final prices and represent, ceteris paribus, a
detrimental event for German and Finish household consumers. The coefficients suggest that
the final price of electricity in Germany is 1.8% higher than the price that would be if there
were no cross-sectorial merger, and in Finland the price seems to be around 2% higher due to
the merger. These values are evaluated at the mean price.
In conclusion, the approval of these events, even if some of them were controversial (namely
the Eon-Ruhrgas merger), seem to be non beneficial for household consumers, due to an increase
of prices. In fact, it seems that it would be better for them if the events had been blocked by
the competition authorities.
3.6 Conclusions
The path of the EU towards a single, competitive European Energy market is being followed
closely by a wave of mergers in electricity and gas sectors. The ones involving either firms in
the electricity and gas sectors had particular (mediatic) attention and regulation concerns.
This chapter contributes to the existing empirical literature on the effects of vertical integra-
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tion on economic outcomes, by providing evidence on how some behaviour of firms may affect
final consumers, namely on energy sectors. The main objective of this chapter is to assess the
effect of vertical integration between electricity generators and natural gas suppliers on final
prices of electricity for household consumer. To study this issue, we formulate and estimate a
reduced model of the determinants of final price of electricity in several European countries.
This question was answered based on panel data from 13 European countries for 21 semesters,
from the beginning of the liberalisation process between 1997 and 2007.
We encounter two main issues to be addressed: data missing and endogeneity of our ex-
planatory variables of interest. An additional aim of this chapter was to apply solutions for
these problems that are proposed in other empirical research. Due to the sparse data and
missing observations that do not match up across our various variables, we have used multiple
imputation techniques developed by Rubin (1987) and Schafer (1997) to estimate the effects
of the cross-sectorial mergers on household consumers through the impact on final prices of
electricity.
From the results and conclusions of this chapter we can summarise three main findings.
First, we found that the existence of a vertical merger between an electricity generator and a
natural gas supplier seems to increase in average the final price of electricity on markets where
it occurs. The comparison of prices before and after the merger for each country where it occurs
allows to conclude for the negative impact of these events on market outcome. Second, we found
evidence that any household consumer in Germany pays a price for their electricity 1.8% higher
because there was the merger between EOn and Ruhrgas. It is worth mentioning that German
competition regulators found, during their assessment, reasons to block this merger. However, it
was authorised by the Government based on the interest to create a national champion. Third,
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even in Finland, where the merger was not controversial, because it involved public firms, the
effect on prices was equally detrimental to consumers. Household prices after the merger are
around 2% higher than they would be without the merger between IVO and NESTE.
The values found are very similar, even if we recognise the fact that the impact of vertical
integration may differ across countries due to the features of the country and the features
of the merger itself. It may be true that these values are not very high, but it may be a
reason of concern for European household consumers or association of consumers and to call
the attention of competition authorities to this type of vertical integration and their effects
on consumer welfare. The idea that the approval of a merger of this type, by a national or
European regulator, may affect negatively their prices may be a warning for consumers to be
more aware of these events in the future. The main concern of competition authorities should
be consumers welfare and, in energy sectors, it should be a priority to act in favour of achieving
all benefits from liberalisation and integration of European markets. This is a working process
and all the actions should be made to improve it.
The research does, however, have a number of limitations which we acknowledge. To begin
with, the small size of our sample may have been determinant on some of the results. The energy
data available for all European countries is still very scarce. In the future, perhaps it will be
possible to infer more clearly these effects and others, due to more availability of comparable
data. Nevertheless, our results and conclusions could be valid to help the awareness on this
subject.
Some of the assumptions made may be relaxed on future research, as for example how the
results would change if we assume that the impact of vertical integration on market outcomes
may have different effects depending on time from the event. We do not consider also in
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our analysis the long-run perspective, leaving out of the research some efficiency effects on the
operation of the merged firms that may represent benefits for consumers that are not considered
in our conclusions.
Our research and its results lead also to other questions that would be interesting to analyse.
Among possible directions for further research is the assessment of the features of cross-sectorial
mergers that increase the probability of detrimental impact on market prices. The research
may also be extended to the approach to other aspects of electricity markets such as, available
quantities or prices for other customer groups which may also be affected by the change in
market structure. From these answers it could be easier to assess merger events in energy
markets based on known features more prone to create negative effects, not only for consumers,
but also for all market participants.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions
The aim of the thesis was to assess the effects of some identified obstacles concerning the
reestructuring (liberalisation and integration) of the EU electricity market.
First, we present and analyse the progress on the liberalisation and integration of electricity
markets in the EU with an overview of the assessement made by the the economic literature in
the achievements (effects) and obstacles of the process.
We use this perspective to identify some important obstacles and concerns on European
electricity markets, namely the exercise of market power and concentration, vertical integration
and unbundling and finally, the lack of interconnection capacity and congestions. All the
obstacles mentioned in the first chapter are connected. The common factor to all of them is the
impact on the exercise of market power. The consequence of not overcoming these obstacles is
to increase, or at least not decrease the exercise of market power.
The solutions presented are mainly proposals for improvement of the European market de-
sign in order to find the best framework that guarantees competition, efficiency and integration
in electricity markets. The example of the Nordic integrated market should be used as a guide
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for European choice due to the success achieved with the restructuring process.
Despite all the solutions proposed by economic experts and implemented, we can conclude,
from our review, that liberalisation and integration of European markets are still far from the
end. The several obstacles are not only impeding the creation of an efficient, competitive and
transparent Single market for electricity, but also and mostly, are impeding that market players
may take all benefits from the introduction of competition and integration.
In the last two chapters the focal point was to assess empirically the effect of two identified
obstacles on market players. The first was the exercise of market power and to verify if the
integration may change this main feature of electricity markets or it is not enough to prevail
over it. The last chapter was about a recent barrier that is a result of the evolution of energy
markets: the cross-sectorial mergers. These events may delay free competition in electricity
and natural gas markets and impede that benefits of reestructuring may be passed on to final
consumers. A merger between a natural gas supplier and a generator of electricity can also be
seen as an attempt to exercise market power or to improve this capacity.
In what concerns the presence of market power, from all the results, it seems that it decreases
after the integration. We found evidence from the simulation of one of the European regional
markets, the MIBEL. Nevertheless, the existence of market power would keep being a feature
of the market after the integration. Consequently, the benefits from market integration would
not be fully achieved due to this obstacle.
The assessment on MIBEL follows the growing importance of these sub-markets on the
regional approach to the achievement of the SEM, implemented by the EC. On the assessment
of who benefits and who does not with the integration the conclusions are as expected. Both
countries benefit from it, but Portugal is the country that would take more advantages, both
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by their consumers if the effect on wholesale prices will be passed on to final prices, and by the
main incumbent generator. These results are partially in line with previous findings where the
.country whose prices are higher before the integration sees the prices decrease and will have
more benefits with full integration. The conclusions on the increase of market share from the
Portuguese incumbent are, however, more unexpected, since marginal cost of generation are,
in reality, higher in Portugal. This evidence is due to the assumption of zero marginal cost for
hydro resources taken in our model.
A cross-sectorial merger, when not associated with cross border acquisition, may be under-
stood as an obstacle for the achievement of the full benefits of liberalisation and integration if
it has a detrimental impact on prices. Our results support this argument by showing evidence
that household consumers in countries where these mergers occur pay a higher price than they
would otherwise. This was the case for Germany with the merger between EOn and Ruhrgas
and for Finland, as a consequence of the merger between Neste and IVO.
The choice of this particular type of merger (cross-sectional) is justified by the importance
of the effects of these events in both energy sectors. A vertical integration between a natural
gas supplier and an electricity generator may expand the exercise of market power to both
markets. The interventions of competition authorities (national or European) in these cases
have been deeply criticized and our results may reinforce this criticism and call the attention
for the essential investigation of merger events on energy markets and their effects.
The main conclusion from all chapters of this thesis is the support of the existence of several
obstacles delaying the attainment of all benefits from liberalisation and integration in Europe,
namely the persistence of the exercise of market power and the reality of some strategies from
market players to increase it as the cross-sectorial mergers.
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The exercise of market power in the European electricity markets has been a major concern
since 1996 and mentioned in all EC reports. In all subsequent legislation on electricity markets
there are several attempts to find new policies to overcome this problem. The main idea is
not to have a European market without market power, because this is common to many other
markets, it is just to decrease this power.
The expansion of interconnection capacities between European countries or regions is always
the best policy suggestion to limit market power in a larger market as the EU. The increase in
the degree of integration between neighbouring markets will enhance competition. However, in
the EU, the expansion of interconnection capacity is slow, due to the wrong incentives for the
investments.
A set of new European directives with common rules about expansion of interconnections
and with effective implementation is the right way. Only with the increase of these capacities
the !EM can be achieved and with it the EU may solve all the problems related with market
power: lower competition, risk of market abuse and collusion.
The main drawback on our research was the availability of data. Our choice for the ap-
plication on the Iberian market was motivated for the inexistence of research on this topic.
However, the effective creation of the MIBEL was in 1997 and this caused some problems to
collect the data. We found similar problems for the study of the cross-sectorial mergers, due
to our aim of studying the effect on final consumers, The consequence in both cases was to
have small databases. However, the main contribution of our research is not the quantitative
results found but the qualitative suggestions on the effects of some obstacles on final consumers
in the European integrated market. In both cases it was possible to find ways of ovecoming
these difficulties, but the results and conclusions would be better, as happens with all empirical
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applications, if there was more data available.
For further research it can be mentioned an extension of the model applied to the MIBEL,
considering dynamic elements as the possibility of entry and exit of firms after integration,
the changes on demand specification after integration and the change on production capacity
through time. Moreover, the importance of cross-ownership between firms calls also for an
extension of our model, considering interdependence between firms.
With respect to the impact of mergers on market outcomes, our future research should
include assessing the effects on other consumers (for example industrial consumers) or the
effects on electricity available in the market. The second extension would be to relax the
assumption of isolated effects of the mergers on the country where the firm is incumbent. The
increasing integration of the European market calls for the relaxation of this assumption in
order to find more realistic conclusions.
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Appendix A
Data sources
The model was estimated using real demand and cost data and it was based on historical data
on plant costs, capacities and technological characteristics of generating units.
Generation Firms Data
Plant status and capacities by source were obtained in firms reports and cross checked with
Reports from national electricity regulators (ERSE and CNE). For the Portuguese generators
we use data supplied by EDP and in Spain the data was collected from the Boletin estadistico
released by REE.
Available capacities were derived using the total outage rate (planned and forced) assigned
to each source of electricity generation for the two chosen months (June and December). We
have used the outage rate of 2005 because it was the only one available. In case of unavailable
data we consider the average outage rate for each type of source. The capacity of each source
was re-rated using an availability factor that accounts for forced outages of power plants as
follows:
Plant availability factor = l-forced outage rate
Plant's available capacity = installed capacity * available factor
Cost of thermal generation sources were derived using data on theoretical full capacity heat
rate and fuel cost projections. Heat rate of a power plant is its design parameter and should
not change significantly within a short period of time.
The data on fuels cost are collected from the annual reports of the electricity regulator
and from the generation firm's reports. To these fuel costs we added variable operating and
maintenance costs taken from Annual Reports released by the generators.
We will use the data released by the Foro de la Industria Nuclear Espanola. We use an
estimation released by the Foro Nuclear for marginal cost for nuclear power plants. The data
that was available is for the year 2003. What we did was to update these costs with the annual
growth rate from 1999 to 2003. The method used by the Foro Nuclear to determine the marginal
cost for nuclear is the same described above for the thermal generators plants.
Special generators are considered as base load due to the existence of law enforcement that
obliges buying all the production from this kind of generators.
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Demand Data
Monthly loads and load shapes were provided by EDP (for Portugal) and by OMEL (for Spain).
For Spain we have access to all the data related with the wholesale market (spot and intra-daily
market): prices and quantities bid for each firm, marginal price and total quantity traded in
the market. For Portugal we have data on hourly demand and for the price we use average
price of acquisition of energy through the energy acquisition contracts (EAC).
While there is a continuum of demand states that arise over time, the analysis is simplified
by considering only 2004 demand figures for four periods, corresponding to different hydro
conditions.Aall days chosen are Wednesday, a typical day to be studied due to the behaviour of
load diagrams. In this study we use two hour time blocks for each typical day: peak, off peak
1. The time blocks were chosen according to the Spanish definition.
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Appendix B
Marginal Cost Curves
Figure Bl
Marginal Costs of fringe firms in Portugal, Spain and MIBEL, December 2004
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Figure B2
Marginal Cost Curves for Pl in Portugal, December 2004
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Figure B3
Marginal Cost Curves of Cournot generators (SI, S2, S3, S4) in Spain, December
2004
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Appendix C
First stage estimation results and
robustness tests
This appendix reports the first stage regressions and the statistical tests for robustness of
instruments for all models used.
193
Table Cl
First stage estimation
IV estimator, listwise deletion (within estimator) and robustness tests for IV
loependentvariable: MFII loependentvariable: MDE I
FE FE
Costsl_lLag -2.931 Costsl_lLag -6.03
-5.820 (6.59)
Hydrogeneration -.015 Hydrogeneration .014
(.177) (.201)
Nucleageneration -.399 Nucleageneration -1.03*
(.491) (.555)
LabourCosts .002 LabourCosts -.009***
(.003) (.004)
Income -2.65e-09 Income -4.80e-09
(3.1ge-09) (3.61e-09)
Authl .007 Authl .273***
(.075) (.085)
AuthZ .024 AuthZ -.212**
(.074) (.083)
Auth3 -.104*** Auth3 -.022
(.027) (.031)
Time .004 Time .01351***
(.004) (.004)
%natgas -1.62 %natgas .0119719'
(.175) (.199)
TPA -.056 TPA -1.02'
(.049) (.055)
constant .221 constant .887***
(.197) (.223)
F 2.83 F 4.78
prob (.002) prob (.OOO)
~ Anderson canon. carr. N'CCEV LM Chi-sq (2) =8.80~..... statistic
III p-value= .0123III
QJ
c.....
Chi-sq(1) = 0.909III
:J
.Q Sargan test
0ee p-va Iue = .3405
Notes:Standard errors in parenthesis; ***, ** and * denote significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively. Include country dummies.
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Table C2
First stage estimation for the five imputed datasets
IV estimator, multiple imputation (within estimator)
IDependent variable: MDE FE
m=l m=2 m=3 m=4. m=5
Costsl_lLag -3.295 -2.67 -2.527 -2.519 -1.86
(4.799) (4.702) (4.74) (4.59) (4.572)
Hydrogene ration .022 .059 .029 .031 .036
(.175) (.175) (.175) (.175) (.175)
Nucleageneration -.796* -.480 -.622 -.930* -.804*
(A64) (A04) (.433) (A85) (A70)
LabourCosts -.008*** -.007*** -.007*** -.006** -.007***
(.003) (.0026) (.003) (.002) (.003)
Income -3.61e-09 -3.94e-09 -3.90e-09 -3.46e-09 -3.25e-09
(3.01e-09) (3.01e-09) (3.01e-09) (3.02e-09) (3.02e-09 )
Authl .244 *** .234*** .23*** .246*** .236**
.072 (.072) (.072) (.072) (.072)
Auth2 -.206*** -.195*** -.193*** -.210*** -.202***
.069 (.069) (.069) (.069) (.07)
Auth3 -.022 -.023 -.0242 -.023 -.022***
.026 (.026) (.026) (.026) (.026)
Time .01 *** .010*** .010*** .009*** .009***
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.026) (.003)
%natgas .0616 .08 .039 .044 .032
(.147) (.148) (.147) (.147) (.147)
TPA -.096** -.098 ** -.096** -.089** -.094**
(.044) (.044) (.044) (.003) (.044)
constant .708*** .589 *** .640*** .677*** .678***
(.177) (.160) (.169) (.175) .176
F 4.76 4.52 4.59 4.63 4.64
prob .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Notes:Standard errors in parenthesis; ***, ** and * denote significance at the levels of 1%,5% and 10%,
respectively.; Include country dummies on estimation.
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IDependent variable: MFI FE
m=l i m=2 m=3 m=4 m=5
Costsl_lLag -1.35 -1.27 -1.27 -.629 -1.51
(4.43) (4.322) (4.372) (4.222) (4.211)
Hydrogeneration -.029 -.025 -.026 -.028 -.030
(.161) (.161) (.161) (.161) (.161)
Nucleageneration -.248 -.172 -.226 -.249 -.253
(.429) (.371) (.399) (.447) (.433)
LabourCosts -.0005 -.001 .0004 -.001 -.0006
(.0024) (.002) (.002) .0023 .0025)
Income -3.26e-09 -3.32e-09 -3.36e-09 -3.18e-09 -3.24e-09
(2.78e-09) (2.77e-09) (2.77e-09) (2.78e-09) (2.78e-09)
Authl -.OlD -.012 -.011 -.011 -.0114
(.066) (.066) (.066) (.067) (.067)
Auth2 .049 .053 .048 .05 .050
(.064) (.063) (.064) (.064) (.064)
Auth3 -.106*** -.106*** -.105*** -.106*** -.106***
(.024) (.024) (.024) (.024) (.024)
Time .007** .007** .006** .007** .007**
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
%natgas -.15 -.145 -.151 -.148 -.153
(.136) (.137) (.136) (.135) (.136)
TPA -.047 -.048 -.048 -.046 -.047
(.041) (.041) (.041) (.041) (.041)
constant .249 .25* .204 .28 .26
(.163) (.148) (.156) (.161) (.162)
F 4.14 4.15 4.13 4.16 4.15
prob .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Notes:Standard errors in parenthesis; ***, ** and * denote significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively. Includes country dummies.
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Table C3
Summary of statistical tests for robustness of instruments
(IV estimators and multiple imputation)
m=l j m=2 m=3 m=4 m=S
Statistics
Test of excluded instruments
MDE
F(3,249) 4.18 .. 3.88 3.79 4.22 3.91
Partial R- Squared: .048 .045 .044 .048 .045
MFI
F(3,249) 6.73 6.77 6.55 6.79 6.75
Partial R- Squared: .075 .08 .073 .076 .075
Underidentification Test:
Anderson Chi-sq. (2) 9.86 9.4 9.2 9.69 9.61
p-value .007 .009 .01 .008 .008
Cragg-Donald W chi-sq (3) 10.25 9.75 9.54 10.06 9.98
p-value .006 .008 .009 .007 .007
Weak Identification Test:
Cragg-Donald Wald test
F-stat 3.27 3.11 3.05 3.21 3.19
Weak-instr-robust inference
Anderson-Rubin Wald test
Chi-sq(3) 23.46 25.68 24.53 23.03 24.34
p-value .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Overidentification test
Sargan Statistic Chi-sq (2) 1.692 2.483 1.685 1.652 1.321
p-value .193 .115 .194 .199 .251
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